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Abstract
In this thesis, we propose an econometric estimator for a repeat-spell 
duration model involving fixed effects. Using data on nationally negotiated pay 
settlements in Britain between 1950 to 73, this estimator is applied to a model 
that simultaneously determines the timing as well as the magnitude o f wage 
changes in a continuously varying economic environment. Our model is very 
robust in terms o f the distributional assumptions and is particularly useful in 
analysing the effect on the exit rate of events occurring after the 
commencement o f a spell, such as incomes policies. Consequently, this approach 
makes it possible to distinguish between two separate effects o f such policies 
on the wage changes: delay and moderation.
We further analyse the impact o f these policies by introducing a self 
contained policy sub-model in the system of renegotiation probability and 
realized wage change nexus, in order to find out the existence o f consistent 
effect exerted by different degrees o f allowance and enforcement.
We find a significant impact o f incomes policy, enforced and non-enforced, 
on the size as well as the timing o f negotiations, which is also confirmed by 
the results o f dynamic simulation.
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Chapter 1: The hazard
1.1 Introduction
In many occasions, we are interested in the spell o f time, the duration o f 
occupying a certain state under uncertainty. A state may represent a condition 
o f the subject concerned, or it  may simply be used to distinguish the time 
before and after the decision making. A termination o f a spell is called failure 
and the spell is called the failure time. Provided that the timing o f a failure 
occurs randomly, our objective is to study the underlying distribution o f such 
failure times and investigate the effect o f explanatory variables on such 
distribution and their behaviour overtime.
Some doctors may be interested in the time to death or recuperation o f the 
several groups o f patients who are treated with different drugs. A factory may 
wish to conduct a life  testing o f their products under different stress levels 
before putting them onto a market. Sociologist may wish to investigate peoples 
decision o f when to get married or to have babies. Economists would like to know 
factors that influence a spell o f unemployment, workers decision to retire, a 
length o f strike or intervals o f successive bargaining, i f  the termination o f 
these spells are not predetermined but decided randomly by the factors under 
study.
These phenomena are all comprised o f a sequence o f choices that determine 
whether to continue or to exit the current state. Hence at any point in time 
during the spell, there exists a probability o f making a transition into the 
other state. For example, the process o f time to death o f a patient is modeled 
as a sequence o f probabilities, o f death versus continue living, im plic itly 
calculated at every moment up to his death. Time to re-employment is determined 
by a sequence o f choice o f whether to take an offer or continue searching over 
time. The length o f a spell is then determined by repeating such choice problem 
sequentially. Hence, by investigating the effect o f potentially interesting 
factors on the choice probability, we can study their influence on the length o f 
time spent in a certain state, on a failure time.
Before embarking on the analysis, it is important to clarify 3 issues in 
defining the failure time properly: a definition o f time origin, time scale, and 
a failure. First, it  is essential that the starting point o f the failure time be 
made explicit. It is usually the time when a subject enters the state concerned, 
although due to the nature o f data sampling, the time origin may be set some 
point after the commencement o f the spell. In either case, it is assumed that
16
entrance into such a state is exogenous, so that the commencement o f duration 
under study is non-stochastic. Our analysis is conditioned on the information 
that the subject has entered such a state, therefore, the failure time is always 
non-negative and the failure happens at most once for each duration. Secondly, 
in most cases, the clock time is used (e.g., hours, days weeks or months) for 
the measurement scale o f time. In other cases, such as the experiment o f stress 
level, some measure o f cumulative fatigue may be used. As long as the non­
negative units are assigned, the important thing is to have consistency in the 
scale measuring the passage o f time throughout the analysis. Once such unit is 
decided, next step is to determine whether the failure time is better considered 
to be measured in discrete or in continuous time. This should depend on the 
nature o f the failure time—the intervals o f decision making sequences. In 
practice, it  can be every day or month, but when the decision frequency is 
sufficiently short, the process is often thought o f as in a continuous time. 
Finally, the definition o f failure needs to be made explicitly. I t  is sometimes 
as clear as "death", although i f  the failure is the "recovery" from a disease, 
it  is essential to make a precise definition o f the term, "recover".
In this chapter, a basic concept o f duration analysis is discussed while 
introducing the recent literature in the field. We confine our interest to the 
economic application o f such analysis which have mostly been done in the field 
o f labour economics.
First, a basic concept o f the hazard function, in particular, its relation 
with the underlying duration distribution is discussed. A  basic form o f the 
proportionate hazard model and some useful distributions frequently used for the 
survival data analysis are introduced. Then, estimation methodology is 
discussed. Second section extends the basic model to incorporate some 
complications such as random heterogeneity terms, time varying explanatory 
variables, and multiple state/spells. Third section introduces actual economic 
applications o f the duration technique. In particular, we w ill focus our 
interest on the past study o f unemployment spells and strike durations. Fourth 
section introduces somewhat different approaches to the modeling o f survival 
data, namely, non-parametric and Brownian motion approach.
1.2 The hazard
Let us denote 5 to be a non negative random variable representing the length 
o f a failure time, and t to be a time since the start o f a spell. Since the
17
entrance to the state concerned (i.e., the start o f a failure time) is 
exogenous, a ll distributions we deal with are conditioned on these events. This 
is appropriate since the same conditioning often applies to the nature o f 
sampling in practice. For example, a sample is extracted from the pool o f 
unemployed when studying the duration o f unemployment. Hence, the sampling is 
conditional on the event that those workers are already unemployed. Their spell 
is terminated by becoming employed or leaving the labour force altogether. From 
these practical point o f view, working with a distribution which is conditioned 
on the in itia l state has its advantages.
1.2.1 The hazard
( i)  Continuous time
Assume that the duration 8 has a cumulative distribution function, F, and a 
density function, f, so that:
Pr( 5= t ) = f( s|x;e )
Pr( <5<A ) = F( A|x;e )
where x is a vector o f explanatory variables and e represents a vector of 
parameters. The survivor function is defined as:
S( A,x ) = 1 - F( A,x )
and it gives the probability o f a spell lasting for at least as long as A. 
Hence, S(0) = 1. Now, given the knowledge of the distribution function of 
durations, it is possible to derive a hazard function, which is a probability o f 
exiting the current state at t provided the spell has lasted at least for t.
P r( U S ^t+ d t | US )
h(x,t) = lim  Pr(5€(t,t+dt) 15 t^) = l im -------------------------------
dt->0 dt->0 dt
=  lim  F <t + d t) - p ( t )  1
dt_>0 dt 1 - F ( t)
f ( t | x )
(1-1-1)
1 - F ( t|x )
It is sometimes called the local exit rate, or the escape rate. In practice, the
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analysis is usually carried out by specifying the hazard function, from which 
the underlying conditional probability distribution, f(t|x ) or F (t|x), are 
derived and they are then inserted to the likelihood function for estimation. A 
reason why the analysis tends to start with the specification of the hazard is 
because the hazard is more intuitive in terms of economic theory compared to the 
distribution function itself. Using the relation (1-1-1), it is possible to 
deduce the distribution functions in terms of h(.).
First, differentiate the log of survivor function with respect to t:
d log S (t|x ) =  d log ( l-F ( t lx ) )
d t d t
- f ( t | x )
= 1 - F (t|x )  = '  h(t,x)
Integrate both sides over the range, A, say, gives:
log (1 - F(A | x)) = - P  h(t,x) dt
J0
Given that F(0|x)=0, by definition, it follows that the cumulative distribution 
function o f a duration is expressed in terms of h(.) as follows:
Fs (A|x) =  1 - exp J~h(t|x) dt j
and also:
f5 (t|x) =  h(t,x) (exp  [ - r  h(u,x) du j j
= h(t,x) [  1 - F (t|x) J 
rt
Denoting integrated hazard, h(u,x) du as A(t,x), the survivor function can be
Jo
written as:
S(t | x) =  exp ( -A(t,x) )
Non defectiveness is required for the duration to have a proper distribution so 
that the density integrates to 1. This is satisfied when S(«>)=0, in other words:
19
lim  h(u,x) du =  oo 
t-»oo •'o
This is called the admissibility condition. In practice, there are some cases 
when this condition are not necessarily met. Some people may stay being 
unemployed forever. In such cases, defective duration distribution arises since 
F(co)< 1.
( i i )  D iscrete tim e
So far, 5 had continuous distributions. However, there are cases where 5 is 
better considered to be a discrete random variable, taking values Ti < T2 < ••• F °r 
example, a strike duration maybe recorded in the units o f days i f  unions’ 
decision is made daily whether to strike one more day. Then the underlying 
density function o f duration is:
P r(5= x) =  f  
j  j
And its survivor function is:
The hazard at x. is the probability o f exit at t= x . given that the spell has not
Pr(s <  x.) =  S(x.) = x| T f(x)
ended for the last x periods, and is written as:
h. =  Pr(5=x. | S^x)
j  j ' j
f j for j  =  1,2
And the underlying distributions in terms o f the hazard is:
( 1- 1-2)
j - i
and f. =  h ^  (1-h.)
j j i j
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1.2.2 Forms o f the Hazard
How the hazard is affected by the length o f elapsed spell is called a 
duration dependence. When dh(t)/dt=0, the hazard is constant for any elapsed 
spell, t. This is the case o f no duration dependence, and its underlying 
duration process is called stationary. The Markovian property is satisfied i f  
the hazard is independent o f its past history given the entrance to the current 
state, departure from which is under study. Out o f which a stationary Markovian 
process is represented by the exponential duration distribution where its 
density function is f(t)=/iexp(-/it). The corresponding hazard rate is h (t)= /i for 
a ll t. In this case, a probability to exit at any point in time during the spell 
does not change no matter how long the spell has been going on: the memory-less 
property. On the other hand, i f  the length o f current duration affect the 
probability o f exiting such state, the process is called semi-Markovian in a 
sense that the duration distribution is independent o f the past durations spent 
in the other states but depends on the current elapsed duration. In this case, 
i f  dh(t)/d t>0, it  is said to have a positive duration dependence and i f  
dh(t)/d t<0, negative duration dependence. The existence as well as the form o f 
such dependence often becomes a central issue in the duration problems in 
economics. For example, in the study o f unemployment spell, the positive 
duration dependence w ill be observed i f  the longer the workers are unemployed, 
the lower the level o f their reservation wage (i.e., the minimum level o f wage 
they are w illing to take on a job) Although i f  it is also assumed that the job 
offer rate decreases with a length o f unemployment, this w ill have a counter 
effect on the hazard, consequently making the direction o f duration dependence 
ambiguous. Note that in this particular problem, the elapsed duration affected 
the hazard through their impact on the reservation wages and job offer rate. The 
duration dependence can be generated from t directly, and also through the time 
path o f explanatory variables, x(t), during the spell, when x are time varying. 
This creates some identification complications as we shall discuss later, and 
for the moment, we continue to assume that x is constant throughout the spell.
The most frequently used simplest formulation o f the hazard is the 
proportionate form:
h(x,t;e)=hi(x;/3) hQ(t;a)
hx(x;/3) depends only on the explanatory variables and not on time, while hQ(t;a)
depends on time and is known as the baseline hazard. This is the value o f the 
hazard corresponding to hi (x) =  l.  (£,a) constitute unknown parameter, e. In this
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formulation, the duration dependence is determined entirely by hQ(t), hence the
explanatory variables can influence the scale o f the hazard but not the form o f 
its dependence on time. Therefore it is easy to discriminate the effects o f time 
and other explanatory variables on the hazard. A form that h^x) usually takes
is exp(/3’x), although linear polynomials or logistics can also be used. 
Exponential form is flexible and it naturally satisfies the basic requirement 
that the term h^x), entering multiplicatively in this probability, is always
non-negative. Hence:
h(t,x;e) =  expO’x) hQ(t)
Below, we list the examples o f duration distributions often used in practice 
which underlies hQ(t). They vary mainly in the forms o f duration dependence they
can accommodate. They also differ in the degree o f simplicity o f distributional 
forms.
(i) Exponential distribution
f(t) =  aexp(-at) 
h(t) =  a
When the underlying distribution o f duration takes the exponential form, the 
transition probability is governed by the Poisson arrivals with rate a. This is 
to say, the probability o f a transition from the current state within a small
interval between t and t-t-dt is adt+o(dt), where J h y  ° ^ [ ^ = 0 indicates that a
probability o f making more than one transition is negligible. Hence, the 
probability o f having n transitions (i.e., arrivals) in t periods is a fam iliar 
Poisson probability:
exp(-at)
And obviously, a is the hazard rate which is constant throughout the spell 
reflecting the memory less property.
(ii)W eibull distribution
f(t) =  xata ^exp(-xta)
22
h(t) = xata ^
The Weibull distribution can be considered as an exponential distribution on a 
rescaled time axis, ta, with parameter x, where x may depend on the explanatory 
variables, x. This distribution can bear either a negative or positive duration 
dependence according to the value o f a. I f  a is smaller than 1, hazard is a 
monotonically increasing function o f t. When a = l, this distribution reduces to 
the exponential case with no duration dependence. Admissibility condition is 
satisfied as long as a> 0 .
(iii)Gamma distribution
k-1f(t) =  « (« t) exp(-at) k > 0  
r (k)
When k=2 , this implies a distribution o f time taken for the alternative Poisson 
arrival with rate a. It includes, as special cases, the exponential (k = l)  and 
the log-normal (a lim iting case as k-*»), and hence, it incorporates a variety o f 
shapes. Gamma distribution is a representative distribution for any positive 
continuous variates, although a computation o f the survivor function is 
d ifficu lt since it involves the incomplete gamma integral.
(iv)Gompertz-Makeham distribution
S(t) =  exp [-y0 5 +  £ [  ey> - 1 ] ] 
h(t) =  r 0 +  ^ e x p ^ t)
When yQ=0, it is called the Gompertz distribution. The hazard is an exponential
function o f the failure time, hence, changes more rapidly than, say, the W eibull 
distribution hazard. Positive duration dependence is seen for r2> 0  and ^ > 0  or
?2<  0 and ^ < 0 ,  and negative otherwise.
(v) Pareto distribution
This distribution can be interpreted as a distribution o f exponential 
survival time whose rate o f arrival differs between the individuals. Its density 
conditional on the arrival rate, y, is:
23
f ( t | r  ) =  7f exp(-r t)
Unconditional density o f t is then:
00
f(t) =  f rexp(-rt) f  (u) du 
o 7
Convenient distribution for f  (.) is the Gamma with mean a and index k .r v 7
/  / w  / \ K K K ~1  - K U / a
y u) =  (*/<*) (*u/°0 e  K >0
In such a case, unconditional density o f duration becomes Pareto distribution 
with a density o f a following form.
fw  =  K <K/* > \ +1
( t  +  k /a )
Hence, the corresponding hazard function is: 
h(t) =  ( t  + "* /« )
This distribution tends to the exponential as k-*», and has a very long tail for 
a small value o f »c. It possesses a negative duration dependence.
(vi)Log-normal distribution
When log o f duration is normally distributed with mean -logn and variance 
tr2, duration, s has a density:
r,» - — i -  «p f - ]
y^ Zrrcrt ' ■ 2  <r '
and the survivor function is: S(t) =  l-$((logtji)/<r), where $(w) is the incomplete 
normal integral, over -» to w. The hazard is f(t)/S (t), and it  takes value 0 at 
t= 0 , and increases with t in itia lly but becomes non-monotonic and tend to tail 
o ff to zero as t becomes large. The thickness o f the tail and whether the
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maximum occurs depends on the value o f o\ Application is d ifficu lt i f  censored 
observation are involved in the data. Also, this distribution is very sensitive 
to the small failure times.
(vii)Log logistic distribution
When w has a logistic distribution, so that:
e w
f(w) =  ^“2
(1 +  e )
the density function of 5, where logs = p+crw, is:
f  (t) = Ay < m ) 7 - 2 
5 [ i+ ( M ) r ] 2
where X=e”*A and r= l/o \ This distribution provides a good approximation to the 
log-normal distribution, and the form of the hazard can be written more 
explicitly:
r  t r " Vh(t> =  r t  A
1 +  (U )
For r > l ,  the hazard has a single maximum, and for r <  1, it  has a negative 
duration dependence.
1.2.3 Parametric E stim ation
(i)M axim um  Like lihood
Suppose that the underlying distribution o f duration is known up to a vector 
o f parameter, e. Then the estimation o f the unknown parameters are usually done 
by the maximum likelihood. We continue assuming that the entry to the current 
state is non-stochastic.
Depending on the nature o f sampling, data may contain completed spells in 
addition to uncompleted observations. Uncompleted spells recorded may have 
ambiguous starting point (i.e., left censored) or ambiguous ending (i.e ., right 
censored). Left censored observations have unknown starting points. This occurs 
for the spells that have already started at the time o f sampling, hence, how 
long the spell had been going on prior to the sampling date is not known. This
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is common in a survey data where the information is based on several interviews
conducted at arbitrary intervals. On the other hand, the right censored
observations lack information on the termination points. We know as much as how 
long the spell has at least lasted, but the exact duration is again unknown. In 
a survey data, the right censoring occurs for those whose spell did not 
terminate at a time of the last interview.
In general, the likelihood function to be maximized is:
f s(5 k+s ) 1-F (s +s )
L =  it fs(s )n D [ l - f . (s )] n , c k , A  n —  p L  ! ( l-2 - l)i€A 5 V i'jeB  L Sv j /J k€C 1 -  F s ( 5  )  1€D 1 -  F J  8 )  V '
o k o 1
Set A and B contain observations whose likelihood is the unconditional 
probabilities of 5. Set A contains observations on completed durations. Set B 
contains observations that are truncated from above, so that the only 
information available on such observation is that its spell has lasted at least
as long as Sj. Hence, the probability o f observing such event is:
Pr(5 > 5j) = 1 - F(s.)
Set C and D both contain observations which are truncated from below, hence,
they are the conditioned observations. Consider the interview survey which was 
conducted at 2 different times. The spell is known to have started 5 (or 5 ink 1
set D) prior to the time the first survey took place. Hence, this particular 
observation could never take a value less than 5 . Hence, the likelihood fork
these observations have to be conditioned on the event, t> 5 k, which occurs with
probability, 1-F(5k). Set C contains the observations on failure time which are
truncated from below but whose complete length of spell is known. This is the 
case i f  the termination of event took place prior to the second survey. I f  the 
spell has lasted for sfc since the first survey, its failure time in total is
sk+sk. Nonetheless, the probability of observing such event is conditional on 
Pr(t> <5k) therefore, f5(5k+sk)/(l-F 6(5k)). Set D, on the other hand, contains
observations which are truncated from below as well as from above. Conditioned 
on the event, t > 5 ,  all we know is that the spell has lasted at least for
another sj periods. In total, it has lasted at least as long as s + s .  This is
the case i f  the spell has not ended at a time of the second interview. The
likelihood of observing such observation is, (1-F5(sj+5 i))/(1-F5(5i)).
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Difficulties arise when there are observations on spells whose starting 
points are totally unknown. Flinn and Heckman (1982) have proposed a technique 
of deriving a likelihood contribution of the observed part o f duration when the 
starting point is unknown. Suppose the observed part of a failure time is d. We 
consider, for such partly observed samples, the probability o f observing 5 (5^d) 
as an actual duration. A probability of sampling a duration, 5, for an 
individual with x is f(5|x;e) at every point in time. Since this individual is 
in this state for a period 5, the total probability o f sampling an individual 
with duration 5 is sf(5|x;e). In order to make this into a proper density so 
that it integrates to 1, we have to divide it by E(5|x;e), hence it becomes: 
<5f(s | x;e)/E(51 x;e). On the other hand, given that the true duration is 5, the 
probability o f observing d is uniform and its simply, 1/5. From these two 
probabilities, form the joint density between 6 and d, and integrate 5 out over 
the range (d,co) to yield a marginal probability for the observed d . This w ill be 
the contribution of the partially observed duration, d , in the likelihood 
function. As can be seen, it involves an integration of the distribution 
function, f(5|x;e), hence, a numerical complication is unavoidable even for the 
distribution with a simple closed form.
In the straightforward case when all the observation are uncensored or right 
censored, fu ll likelihood can be simply written in terms o f the hazard as:
where A(t) is the integrated hazard over [0,t] interval, U is the set o f 
uncensored observations and A is the set o f whole observations. The likelihood 
function is then maximized with respect to the unknown parameters which appear 
in the function in various ways according to the assumed functional form o f the 
hazard.
Under the regularity conditions for f, e is consistent and ^N(e-e) is 
asymptotically normally distributed with mean zero and variance:
log L  = iiu  In h(t) - , |A  A(t.)
A A
1 a log L 
n aeae ’
which can be consistently estimated by:
n aeae ’ J
1 a2log L  I ' 1
«  3QOQ » I
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When the expression for the derivatives are not in closed form, numerical 
maximization should be adopted to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. When 
the log likelihood is concave, the Newton’s method works well. Cares must be 
taken to ensure that the global maximum is to be attained.
The maximum likelihood estimation can accommodate censored or truncated data 
as well as the time varying explanatory variables. But the entire functional 
form o f the hazard, in particular, that o f the baseline hazard is essential in 
constructing a likelihood function to be estimated parametrically. Moreover, 
when a random heterogeneity term is introduced, the density function for such 
term has to be also assumed so that the corresponding marginal density can be 
calculated. A possibility o f correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the heterogeneity term cannot be easily handled. Problem often arises since the 
economic theory rarely provides any information on the form o f such density 
function, and yet, such assumption is crucial to the estimation. The parameter 
estimates become inconsistent i f  they are wrong.
On the other hand, the semi-parametric estimation technique avoids such 
risks. One can build a likelihood function and derive consistent estimates 
without making assumptions over the parametric forms o f the heterogeneity term 
or the baseline hazard. There, the baseline hazard and/or the heterogeneity 
distributions are treated as discrete functions over the elapsed spell, whose 
discrete mass points are estimated together with the parameters o f explanatory 
variables. When the number o f distinct duration spells is large, a number o f 
parameters to be estimated should increase accordingly to avoid inconsistency, 
although this reduces efficiency. In practice, there are a few problems in 
obtaining a global maximum for such a semi-parametric likelihood. Another semi- 
parametric method is called a partial likelihood where the analysis is 
conditioned on the unknown form o f the baseline hazard, hence, avoids making 
assumption over hQ. These methodologies are discussed in detail in the next
section.
( i i )  P a rtia l L ike lihood
Under this proportionate hazard formulation, it is possible to draw an 
inference about a without the knowledge o f a functional form o f the baseline 
hazard, h0. Ranks rather than values o f the observed failure times carry 
information which is enough to construct the likelihood. Hence, the parametric 
form o f the baseline hazard doesn’t have to be assumed.
Order the observed failure times as t1< t2< t3< ... tn. I f  the j-th  spell is o f
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length ti? it  implies that the j-th  spell lasted for tj, which is the i-th
shortest amongst all the observations, j-th  observation faces explanatory
variables Xj, so at the end o f j-th  spell, Xj(tj). Then the conditional
probability that the j-th  spell is o f length tj given the entire history is:
hft.XjOi)) /  £  h ft.x^ tj) (1-2-2)
ksR,
where Rj represents the risk set just prior to ti. This set includes
observations on durations which are longer than or equal to tj and not yet 
terminated at spell duration t j .  (1-2-2) is a probability that the j-th  spell 
ends at tj given that one o f the spells in the risk set R* does end at t.. In a
sense, this probability is conditional on the entire history o f a ll the failures
and censoring before tj and the values o f all the explanatory variables up to
and including time tj, but without the knowledge that the j-th  observation fails
at tj. The baseline hazard h0(t) cancels out because o f the multiplicative form
assumed by the proportionate hazard specification. Hence, a contribution to the
likelihood o f j-th  duration observation which is the i-th shortest, is,
hj(X:)/£ hj(xk). Then the jo in t distribution o f the observed set o f failure 
keRi
times, t ,t ,...t , can be obtained using the chain rules. The log o f partial
1 2  n
likelihood to be maximized is:
log L  =  £ [ in  hi(Xj(t[)) - In £ h,(xk(tj)) 1
i = l  L k€ R . Ji
Censored observation can easily be incorporated in the partial likelihood 
framework. I f  an observation is censored between duration t. and t. . itsi i+1
contribution to the likelihood is only towards the risk set, the denominator o f
individual’s conditional probability for t >...t . Ties (when there exists
more than one duration observations with the same spell length) w ill reduce 
efficiency o f the estimator, but can still be dealt with in a similar manner.
Likelihood contributions o f the tie observations w ill have the common 
denominators with the different numerators associated with each observations, 
possibly, with a different set o f explanatory variables. A multiplicative random 
heterogeneity term can also be incorporated, although it w ill involve multiple 
integrations o f order Ri, a dimension o f the risk set, and such computation w ill 
be tremendously messy. A non-stationary duration distribution, which depends on
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a calendar time, is also easily accommodated. Denoting t as the calendar time
at which the j-th  spell has started, x.(t) should be re-written as x.(t+x.).
Obviously, this estimation method is not useful i f  one is interested in the
direction o f duration dependence.
Rank information only is enough to make an inference about /3 can be seen by 
considering any one to one strictly increasing transformation. Under such a 
transformation, hQ(t) w ill not be identified but the rank information on the
observation on durations is not altered, which identifies the value o f £. In
this sense, the parameters o f explanatory variables w ill not be identified i f
they are closely correlated with the elapsed duration. This method is sometimes
called the "marginal likelihood" although it only means "marginal" with respect 
to the distribution function when the explanatory variables are not time 
varying.
( i i i )  Regression method
Under the proportionate hazard formulation, a log-linear regression model o f 
the observed duration can usually be constructed because o f the multiplicative 
explanatory factors in the hazard. Given the hazard function, the underlying 
density o f duration is:
fs(t|x ) =  h(t,x) exp(-A)
where A denotes the integrated hazard, which is J,Qh(u,x)du. Transformation o f 
variable from 5 to A w ill give the density o f A as:
fA(i | x) =  exp(-A)
since the Jacobian o f transformation is | S5/dA| =h(t,x). This is an unit
exponential distribution. Moreover, transforming A to e=-logA would give:
fe(e/x) =  e"Gexp(-e’ G) =  exp(-e-e’ G)
This e is the log o f exponentially distributed random variable, and it  follows a
type I  extreme value distribution. For the proportionate hazard form:
h(t,x;e) =  exp(e’x) hQ(t)
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integrate this hazard over the range (0,5) and take a logarithm to derive c:
c =  -logA  =  £ ’x  +  lo g  hQ(t)dt 
D e n o tin g  th e  la st term  as In Aq(5 ) , th is can b e  rew ritten  as:
-InA ( 5 )  =  p ’x  +  c
ov V i i
for the i-th observation. This can be regarded as a regression equation with the 
error term c. which follows an extreme value distribution. This term has a fixedi
distribution and does not depend on £, although in practice, there is an 
additional regression residual from the least square estimation, that involves 
an error component because o f the assumption we made over the form o f the 
hazard. Variance o f such least square residuals can be compared with the 
predicted value to test the existence o f omitted regressors, for example. I t  is 
o f an interest to draw inferences o f parameters conditioned on this ancillary1
statistics, but such attempt have not been made so far.
In th e  c a se  o f  the con stan t hazard w h ere  h ( t ,x ) = h e  , lnAo( s . ) = ln h + ln S . ,  
h en ce:
logs =  g -|3’x -loghi i i
Ot™ 1 R ^ yUnder the Weibull distribution, where h(t,x)=xat ~ ep , 
logs. =  art +  a.’x +  g .
°  1 0 1 i i
w h e r e  aQ= - lo g T /a  and a ^ - j S /a  and aga in , c. fo llo w s  ex trem e v a lu e  d istr ib u tion .
The advantage o f this least square method is that it  is simple and is 
distribution free, in a sense that no assumption is required for the
distribution o f the error term. And the correlation between the error term and
the explanatory variables are easily incorporated. In addition to the examples 
above, log normal or log logistic distribution for the baseline hazard with time 
invariant explanatory variables can also be estimated by the simple regression 
o f log o f duration. When the explanatory variables include time-% varying 
series, dependent variable becomes more complex than merely the log o f duration. 
S till, the regression model for the log o f duration serves as a specification 
test as a preliminary analysis. I f  the model is correctly specified, the error
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term should possess the moments predicted by the theory. Drawbacks are that 
there is no simple way o f handling severely censored or truncated data. Tobit 
type method can be applied based on the extreme value distribution o f e, though 
resulting non-linear computation w ill no longer be simple. Also, because o f the 
explosive nature o f logarithm near 0, it is not suitable for the data that 
contains observations on short durations which are contaminated with measurement 
errors, or i f  the study is aimed particularly at short term durations. Also, as 
can be seen from the example o f Weibull distribution, it  is not possible to 
identify £ and a. Hence, i f  one assumes a certain distributional form for the 
baseline hazard, interesting parameters representing such distribution, 
particularly the duration dependence may not be estimated separately in this 
regression method. Cox and Oaks (1984) states that this ordinary least square 
regression’s asymptotic efficiency relative to the maximum likelihood estimation 
depends on the mean values o f ancillary statistic (i.e ., standardized residuals, 
e).
1.3 Generalization o f a model
1.3.1 Random Heterogeneity
Consider a possibility that there are additional variations across 
individuals apart from those explained by the observable explanatory variables, 
or suppose that we have omitted some factors which influence the hazard. Up to 
now, we have been excluding these possibilities which is much too restrictive in 
practice. In general, unless we know a priori that individuals are homogeneous, 
it  is necessary to take into account o f the population variation apart from the 
variation caused by the observables. We denote an unobservable term representing 
a random heterogeneity as v. Its distribution function fy is called a mixing
distribution, and is defined over a range, Ry . The hazard and underlying
duration distribution are then all conditioned on v so that they are now written 
as, h (t|x,v;e) and f5(t|x ,v ), respectively. In order to obtain the unconditional
distribution o f duration, we need to integrate out for v over the range, Ry :
F ( S |x )  =  F ( S |x ,v )  f  (v )  d v  
JR
The unconditional hazard is derived as before:
h/t K 1 _  f ( t | x )  
h (t ,x )  "  1 -  F ( t [ x )
In practice, a convenient pair o f distributions are selected for the mixing 
distribution and the underlying duration distribution conditional on v, so as to 
come up with a simple closed form for the corresponding unconditional duration 
distribution. This is often called a reduced form method. Lancaster (1979) 
utilized Weibull for the conditional duration distribution and Gamma for v. 
Kennan (1985) used Logit for the hazard and Beta for v. In his study, given the 
assumed Logit distribution for the hazard, Beta specification for the mixing 
distribution was convenient for the following reasons: (l)its  range lies in the 
unit interval, (2)its likelihood had a closed form, (3)it has only two 
parameters, and (4)the shape and location o f the hazard could vary flexibly with 
the explanatory variables (can be uni-modal, U-shape, J-shape or uniform). The 
other commonly used combination o f distributions for v and t are beta-logistic 
used by Heckman and W ills (1977).
What happens i f  we ignore such a heterogeneous term altogether? Lancaster 
(1979) found out that the spurious declining hazard is observed as a result o f 
the omitted variables. I f  the individual characteristics are not wholly taken 
into account, this can falsely exacerbate the shortness or the lengthiness o f a 
spell. An individual with a short spell w ill contribute to raise the hazard 
above its true value, and those with long spells w ill lower the hazard below its 
true level, both leading to an apparent negative duration dependence. Consider, 
for example, a study o f a strike duration. Suppose vn measures a degree o f 
militancy o f the n-th union. Then, it is natural to assume that the higher vn, 
the longer the strike is likely to last (i.e., lower the hazard). I f  we fa il to 
take into account o f vn, the estimated hazard w ill be higher than the true value 
for short strikes due to the groups with low level o f v , and w ill be lower than
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the true value o f the hazard for longer strikes due to high proportion o f 
remained groups with high level o f vn. On the whole, the effect o f omitting vn 
alone would make it look as i f  the hazard declines with the length o f strike.
In practice, it is often possible to deduce a form o f the hazard from the 
economic theory while that o f the mixing distribution is not. And yet, the 
estimates o f the structural parameters are very sensitive to the specification
o f the hazard and/or the mixing distribution. Heckman and Singer (1984) has 
demonstrated that different directions o f duration dependence was inferred from 
the different assumptions o f underlying mixing distributions, and the parameter 
estimates were also found sensitive to the specifications o f duration 
distributions. Although it does not necessarily lead to the inconsistency o f the 
reduced form parameters (Lancaster (1985)), neglected multiplicative 
heterogeneity in the hazard gives inconsistent maximum likelihood estimates for 
the structural parameters. Also, these parameter estimates are sensitive to the 
specifications assumed for the distributions o f the hazard and v . Hence the
misspecification o f the functional forms can lead to several errors, yet, there 
are rarely any theory which gives guidance to their functional forms. Is the 
making o f such an ad hoc functional forms really necessary for the 
identification?
In general, introduction o f the heterogeneity term raises an identification 
problem. Given only the data on durations, there exists more than one pair o f 
specifications o f f5(t|x ,v ) and fv(v) for which the same unconditional duration
distribution, Fg(t| x), applies. This is why these methods outlined above have 
specified the functional forms o f both fg(t| x,v) and fv(v) in controlling the 
random heterogeneity. However, there is no need to specify the functional form 
o f fv(v) in identifying both h (t|x,v) and fv(v) as long as f^ (t| x,v) is known
and some conditions are satisfied. Given the functional form for fg(t|x ,v ), it
is possible to uniquely solve for fy(v), hence, a standard practice o f assuming
the functional forms for both f5(t|x ,v ) and i jy )  over-parameterizes the
duration model and may produce inaccurate estimates o f the structural 
parameters. Specifically, in the proportional hazard models with a 
multiplicative random heterogeneity term:
h (t|x ,v) =  hj(x;0) hQ(t) v 
Ao® =  K  ho(u) du
the conditional hazards and the mixing distributions are identified (i.e ., a ll 
h , Aq and f  Jy) are identified) i f  there exists at least one exogenous
variable2 taking values along the real line and E(v)<w  (Elbers and Ridder 
(1982)). Identification condition given by Heckman and Singer (1984) allows
E(v)=oo, which permits wider range o f distributions to be a candidate fo r fv(v),
but has heavier restriction on the form o f the baseline hazard. I t  requires
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existence o f a known constant, c, where AQ(t’)= c  for a certain t ’ fo r all 
admissible aq. For most widely used parametric hazard models (a class o f Box-Cox 
hazard or a non-monotonic log logistic models), identification can be achieved 
without any regressors by specifying a functional form o f the hazard up to a 
fin ite number o f parameters and placing some restrictions on the moments o f 
admissible mixing distribution. In other words, provided that there is a 
parameterization for h(t|x,v), the non-parametric identification o f f^(v) is
achieved without any regressors. This directs us to consider the semi-parametric 
maximum likelihood estimation where consistent estimates o f the structural 
parameters can be derived from parameterized fg(t|x ,v ) and non-parametric fy(v) 
(see section 1.5.2 (ii)).
1.3.2 Tim e varying explanatory variables
Observable explanatory variables may themselves vary overtime during the 
course o f a spell. For example, amount o f unemployment benefit depends on how 
long one has already been unemployed at the time o f a claim. The hazard is then 
written as h(t,x(t)|v). The duration distribution now depends not on the value 
o f x at certain point in time but on the entire form o f the time path x(t). Now, 
there is a possibility that the value o f x(t) after the start o f a spell can 
influence the hazard. Hence, continuous observations o f x are required in the 
estimation. When observations are only available at finite discrete points, 
which is usually the case, or i f  one assumes that x is a discretely changing 
variable, an arbitrary time path for x has to be considered based on the given 
observation points. Accordingly, the numerical integration has to be done to 
derive the density function.
Another problem with the time varying regressors is best illustrated in the 
proportional hazard formulation, h(t,x(t)|v) =  h0(t)h1(v)h2(x(t)). The function 
h2 (effect o f time varying variables) is only identified from h0 (baseline 
hazard) i f  there is sufficient independent variation in x(t), that is to say, i f  
x(t) varies substantially across observations, so that ln(h0) and ln ^ J  are 
linearly independent, or otherwise, multicollinearity arises. Also, a time path 
o f x must be independent o f the parameters o f interest. Consider the comparison 
o f the effect on survival o f two alternative treatment, for instance. The blood 
pressure measured during the spell may exert a strong impact on the probability 
o f failure. But the level o f blood pressure may be endogenous to the treatment 
provided.
A method o f estimation frequently used for the proportionate hazard model
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involving the time varying explanatory variables is the partial likelihood. The 
method was described in the estimation section 1.2.3 (ii). When the covariates 
don’t depend on time, the product o f conditional probability was interpreted as 
"marginal" likelihood o f ranks. Now with the continuously varying covariates, 
the likelihood is no longer inferable o f marginal nor conditional probabilities. 
This likelihood corresponds to the fu ll likelihood without the term that 
reflects information on the gaps between successive failure times, and is called 
the partial likelihood. Cox and Oaks (1984) states that the estimator derived 
from this method w ill be consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. 
Consider the information matrix o f the fu ll and partial MLE. They converge to 
var(x(t)) and E(var(x(t)|t)), respectively, for groups defined by the failure 
time, t. Then, the relation:
Var(x(t)) =  E {Var(x(t) 11)} +  Var (E (x(t)|t)}
shows that the asymptotic efficiency o f the partial likelihood relative to the 
fu ll likelihood w ill be high i f  the ratio o f the between-spells component o f 
var(x(t)) (i.e ., var{E(x(t) 11)}) to the within-spells component (i.e ., 
E{var(x(t) 11)}) is small. It depends on how useful the information provided by 
the gaps between successive failures would be in determining the coefficient on 
x. This condition applies unless the coefficient on x is far from 0, censoring 
depends strongly on x(t), or there are strong time trends in x. A loss in 
precision is greater under the partial likelihood for a fin ite sample. 
Conditional probability that the i-th spell terminated at t (j-th shortest o f
a ll observations) is now:
^  h ( W  =  W P  '  k€R  W j »
j
where x (t.) denotes the value o f explanatory variables facing the k-th spell at
K J
duration t.. Here, the random heterogeneity term is not incorporated, although 
i f  multiplicative, it  can be included in the partial likelihood framework. 
S till, it  w ill involve multiple integration over the heterogeneity term o f order 
equivalent to the number in the risk set, R .
1.3.3 Competing risks
When defining the failure time, it  is important to make sure what the 
notation o f the failure means. So far, this failure was defined so that a spell
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is terminated by a single cause. For example, unemployment spell ends when one 
becomes no longer unemployed. Nonetheless, in practice, unemployment spell can 
be terminated not only by a transition to the employment state, but also by a 
withdrawal from the labour force. In this case, the hazard has to take into 
account o f the probabilities o f a spell terminated by two different causes. As 
such, when a spell can end in several different ways, the competing risk 
settings occur.
Consider the case when there are m risks so that m different ways o f 
failures to the current spell. Those risks are independent o f each other. Let 
hi(t,x i;ei) denote the probability o f exit caused by the i-th risk, with unique 
explanatory variables, x., and the corresponding parameter vector, 0j.
Termination o f the current spell w ill be eventually caused by one o f the m 
sources, hence its hazard rate is:
m
h(t,x;e) =  hi(t,xi;ei)
where x = {x ,,x 2,..xm} and e= {e ,,e2,...em}. That is, the hazard corresponding to 
the current spell is the sum of instantaneous exit probability due to each risk. 
In case o f the unemployment spell, the hazard rate o f exiting such state is the 
sum o f two hazard rates, namely, into employment and out o f labor force.
1.3.4 M u ltip le  spell s /m u ltiva ria te  fa ilu re  times
So far, we have been dealing with the failure times o f a single transition 
from one state to another. Under the competing risks framework introduced in the 
previous section, we allowed a spell to be terminated by several causes. That is 
to say, an individual, having exited from the current state, have a possibility 
o f entering several different states. Nonetheless, all it  mattered was the exit 
from the current state, and it was not relevant into which state the process 
continued onto. In this sense, there were only two possible states concerned: 
currently occupied state (entrance to which is exogenous) and all the other 
states. Here, we extend this two states with exogenous in itia l state setting to 
the one which can deal with the data that contain several spells over several 
states for each individual over time.
There are people who become unemployed, finds a job and go back to 
unemployment again sometime later in their life . Data that records employment 
history o f each individuals may contain length o f each unemployment spells they
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have experienced. Consider a study o f open ended contract spells. Since they 
negotiate for the open ended contracts, there is a positive probability o f re- 
contracting at anytime once the contract starts. Hence, there is no unique t 
where the contract ends with probability one. Data w ill contain a sequence o f 
length between consecutive bargains for each group over time. And there probably 
are more than single duration data recorded for each group (i.e ., multiple 
spells). In such cases, it  is best to set the starting point o f the "duration" 
as the actual start o f each spell, so that there is no le ft censored 
observation. Note that the exogeneity o f the entrance to each state concerned is 
still valid for every duration in the sample. In fact, i f  the sample period is 
long enough to allow for every individual to record at least one complete spell, 
there w ill not be a problem of right censoring since the sampling period can be 
adjusted accordingly for each individual. These are the case o f multiple spells 
where the data contain several spells for each individual overtime.
In these cases, the vector o f explanatory variables may include any function 
o f past history or future variables o f the individual. I f  the hazard o f a 
certain individual depends not only on the current durations but also on its own 
history o f durations, then the process is said to possess a lagged duration 
dependence. Then, even the semi-Markovian property fails to hold on the duration 
distribution because the hazard given only the current duration and the hazard 
conditional on the lagged duration are no longer equivalent. This is applicable, 
for example, to the case o f unemployment history i f  we assume that people with a 
history o f unemployment spell is more likely to become unemployed again. Or in 
the case o f contract length, it may be that a group who had long contracts in 
the past tend to have longer contracts in the future. However, in both cases, it 
may be the underlying character (the fixed effect) o f each individual (or group) 
that gives rise to what seems to be the lagged duration dependence. This 
d ifficu lty in distinguishing the effect o f individual or group heterogeneity 
from that o f the lagged duration dependence makes it  all the more important to 
control for all the idiosyncrasies o f the individuals concerned. The lagged 
duration dependence is incorporated in the jo in t density by writing it  as a 
product o f individual densities each conditioned on its relevant history with 
the last term being the unconditional density for the in itia l condition. In 
order to test for the lagged duration dependence, at least one observation is 
required for each individual in a sample.
I f  the number o f previous occurrence o f event influence the hazard rate out 
o f the current spell, then it is said to have an occurrence dependence. For 
example, a number o f times one has become unemployed in the past may influence
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his chance o f becoming unemployed in the future. In this case, the hazard should 
be allowed to vary as a number o f past occurrence varies (c.f. Flinn and Heckman 
(1982), Heckman and Boijas (1980)).
On the other hand, the multiple state settings occur when there are more 
than one state to transfer at a time o f exit from the current state. For 
example, at anytime, an individual can be in 3 different states, namely, 
employment, unemployment and withdrawal from the labour force. An exit from any 
one o f these state involves a choice o f 2 possible states to go into. I f  there 
are records o f individuals who had experienced these transitions more than twice 
during the sample period, then this w ill be the case o f multiple state as well 
as multiple spell (i.e., multivariate) duration data.
Consider a multiple state setting in which there are s possible states. From 
any particular state, there are potentially (s-1) different states to move into, 
and those (s-1) states act as competing risks to terminate the current spell. 
The distinct hazard needs to be specified according to a pair o f states involved 
in the transition. That is to say, altogether, s(s-l) hazards have to be 
specified, possibly with parameters and explanatory variables unique to each 
transition. The hazard rate o f transition from state i  to j  can be written as, 
hij(t,x ij;e ij) for all i,j =  l,2 ,...s  such that i* j. The form o f possible
dependence across the spells o f each individual should be carefully studied in 
this setting.
1.3.5 Marked Fa ilu re
Apart from the data on the failure time, when there exists an additional 
measurement that is observed as a "result" o f a failure, this further 
measurement is called a mark, and the failure time in conjunction with a mark is 
said to be o f the marked failure type. In general, the mark is assumed to be a 
random variable, and is associated with the failure time, as well as a calendar 
time. W ith this kind o f failure type, it is important to investigate the 
relation between the failure time and the mark, at the same time, study the time 
series structure o f a mark.
In a study o f contract length, there is a concomitant wage change whenever 
the contract ends, and in this sense, the new wage rate achieved is a "mark" to 
the contract duration process. It w ill be o f interest, then, to investigate the 
relation between the agreed wage change and the length o f the contract just 
terminated, as well as the time path o f outside factors during the contract.
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1.4 Economic application o f duration analysis
Economic applications o f duration analysis have mostly been confined to the 
field o f labour economics. The transition between discrete labour market states, 
for example, from the state o f unemployment to that o f employment are analyzed 
by the duration model techniques while the choice o f covariates or the 
specification o f distribution were made according to the underlying economic 
theory. Here, we consider a study o f job search, and briefly introduce how to 
model a sequence o f employment choices by using the hazard/duration technique. 
We consider the discrete time as well as the continuous time setting. We also 
extend the case to time inhomogeneous environment. Followed by the example o f 
job search model, we introduce some of the recent literature o f unemployment 
spell and strike duration.
Assume that a person who is unemployed can exit its state only through 
obtaining an employment. And the process o f finding a job consist o f 2 steps. 
First o f all, one has to receive a job offer. Given a certain job offer, a 
worker w ill accept it  only i f  their offering wage is at least as high as their 
reservation wage (i.e., the minimum level o f wage at which the worker is w illing 
to work). Suppose that this worker has been unemployed for a period x, and at 
that period, a job offer for such person arises at rate A(x). Let distribution
o f a wage offer be F(w) and a reservation wage w to be a function o f ones
current unemployment spell, x. w maybe derived as a solution to the optimization 
problem o f expected present value o f future income stream. Then the probability 
o f getting a job is a product o f probabilities that an offer arises and the
offered wage being larger than the reservation wage, w(x), that is:
Pr(accepting a job after x periods o f unemployment spell)
=  Pr(offered wage >  w(x)) A(x)
=  (1 - Fw(w(t)) A(t) (1-4-1)
This probability is conditioned on the fact that this worker has been unemployed 
at least for x periods. This is the probability o f getting out o f unemployment 
after x periods o f unemployment spell given that he has been unemployed at least 
for period x. Hence, it clearly is analogous to the hazard rate.
Consider this setting under the discrete time context, so that 5 is a 
discrete random variable taking values x <  x < ... with the associated hazard h1 2 j
at the j-th  shortest observation on duration, which is x.. The analysis based on
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such a discrete setting is appropriate i f  the data contains only the discrete 
failure times, for example, in days. In addition, it  is plausible to assume the 
decision intervals to be defined according to such units, or that the data comes 
from the grouping o f continuous data due to imprecise measurement (Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice (1973)). Consider the time homogeneous environment so that A nor
the reservation wage, w, depends on the current duration. A  probability o f 
receiving i  offers in x periods is a probability in Bernoulli tria l, and that 
is:
Pr(receive i  offers in x periods) =  x \ l - x ) T i
A probability o f staying unemployed at least for period x is the sum over x 
periods (i= 0  to x) o f probabilities that there are i  offers and none o f them are 
accepted. Hence:
X
P r(5  >  x )  =  . QP r(rece iv e  i o ffers)
x Pr(do not accept offers | receive i  offers)
=  l o
=  (^ 1 - A(l-Fw(w))j
This is analogous to the survival function in discrete time. The corresponding 
density function is derived as a difference between consecutive discrete 
distribution function:
P r ( 5 = x )  =  P r ( S > x - l )  -  P r ( S > x )
= (1 - A(l-F(w))T"' (1 - A(1-F M )t
=  X(1 - F(w)) 1^ - A (l-F(w ))j 
=  h (1 - h)T" ‘
since h(x)=h for any x under the time homogeneous setting.
Let us now allow A and/or w to depend on the current duration, that is, the 
time inhomogeneous setting. This allows the rate o f incoming job offer and the 
reservation wages to vary according to how long one has already been unemployed. 
Again, the distribution function o f duration is the product o f conditional 
probability describing his state for each period from t= 0  to t= x . For the first 
(x-1) periods, it  was either that the job offer did not come or the job offer
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did come but their offering wage was lower than his reservation wage at a time. 
Hence, the probability attached to it is, l-h (i) for i= l. . ( x - l) .  Given what had
happened in the first ( t - 1 )  periods, he then accepts an offer at x-th period,
and this occurs with probability h(x), where h(x) now depends on x. Therefore, 
its unconditional probability is:
Pr(S=x) = Y  [1 - h(i)] h(x) (1-4-2)
Unit that measures x can be months, weeks, or days according to the sequence o f 
decision intervals. But it  is not clear i f  there exists any well defined natural 
time intervals according to which people make decisions. So, unless there is a 
clear time units for the their decision sequence, it usually makes more sense i f  
these intervals are made sufficiently small. This leads us to operate the whole 
process under the continuous time setting.
Instead o f considering the arrival o f a job offer as the Bernoulli tria l,
suppose that such event takes place according to the Poisson process. This 
presumption is appropriate since the Poisson process is the continuous Bernoulli
tria l with instantaneous probability o f success being A *= H iji-j^ - (*0), where A
being the probability o f success within an interval, n. To start w ith, consider 
once more a time homogeneous environment where a probability o f receiving one 
offer in one period is A. So, the probability o f receiving one offer in an 
interval (x,x+dx) is Adx+o(dx), where o() denotes the term with order o f 
magnitude. I f  we denote g(k,t) as a discrete density function that there are k 
offers in t period:
g (i,x+ d x )= [P r(l offer in interval (x ,x + d x )|(i-l) offers during last x periods 
+  Pr(no offer in interval (x,x+dx) | i offers in last x periods)
= g(i-l,x)(Adx+o(dx)) +  g(i,x)(l-Adx-o(dx))
d f( i ,T )  =  Hm g(i ,x+ A ) - g ( i ,x )
dx . AA-» 0
=  l i m g (i- l ,T )A A +g(i,x )(l-A A )-g(i,x )
A->0 A
=  l im  |g(i-l,x) - g(i,x)| A 
A->o L J
=  (g(i>T) ‘  g ( i- l,T»
where all the terms with o(A) disappear since l im ^ ^ = 0 .  Solve this differential
A-»0 A
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equation with the condition that f(i,x )= 0  for i< 0 , then:
g ( i,t)  =  exp(-Ax)
=  Prob (i job offers in t periods)
Hence, a probability o f not accepting a job up to period t  is the sum over i= l  
to in fin ity o f a probability that all o f i  offers given in t  periods had offered
wages lower than w (which, at the moment is time invariant). This is equal to 
the probability o f unemployment spell being at least as large as t , which is 
intuitively equivalent to the survivor function.
Pr(s > t) = zv 7 j=0 c*P<-At) F lw /
=  exp (-A x) exp [A xF (w )]
=  e x p  [- ( l-F (w ))A x ]
=  ex p  (-h x )
W h ere  th e  hazard fu n ction  is  th e in stan tan eou s p rob ab ility  to  e x it  a fter  x  
p er io d , and that is:
h =  lim  *A0 -F (w )) +  o(j±  =  A(i_F (w))
A-»o
as before. Hence, the density o f duration is:
P r ( s = x )  =  h e x p (-h x )
In the time non-homogeneous setting, as we have dealt with in the discrete case, 
A may depend on the current duration. In this case, the arrival o f job offer 
comes from the non-homogeneous Poisson process, where the probability o f i  
offers in the interval (x,x+A) is:
P r(l offer in  (x ,x + A ))  =  A(x)A 4- o(A)
f x )Pr(i offers in (x,x+A)) =   J—— *— exp|- j'QA(t)dtJ
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Hence, the corresponding underlying distributions are:
P r(5  >  t ) = exp |  ^  A(t)dtJ (1 - F(w)) j
= exp  ^STQ h(t) dt j 
Pr(6=x) =  h(x) exp^ - h(t)dt j
where the hazard also depends on the current duration, x, hence:
h (x ) =  A (t) ( l-F (w ))
This can also be seen directly from the discrete duration distribution (1-4-2). 
As an interval becomes smaller, each h(i) becomes small. Hence, we can 
approximate exp(-h-)=l-h. so that equation (1-4-2) becomes:
Pr(exit employment after x periods) =  exp^-.SQh(i)jh (x)
In order to transform this into the continuous formulation, replace summation by 
integration, and narrow the unit o f interval, then, the lim it o f summation, x-1, 
becomes close to x, hence:
P r ( 5 = x )  =  h (x ) ex p ^ -J g h (t) dtj
This is the density function o f the duration under continuous time. In practice, 
a problem lies in the specification o f the hazard. Since economic theory does 
not im ply the exact functional form o f these components, they are often left 
unknown. Usually, the best the economic theory can do is to help lis t up a set 
o f potentially influential variables to the process. Nonetheless, since such 
lis t can not be complete, a need for the heterogeneity term arises. This makes a 
matter worse since its functional form is utterly unknown. Most o f the past 
literature have hence chosen to assume the functional form o f the duration model 
rather arbitrarily, and resumed the estimation on the basis o f such assumption. 
The non-robustness o f this reduced form approach is stated in section (1.3.1).
One o f the pioneering application o f the duration analysis is the study o f 
unemployment spells by Lancaster (1979). He assumed the proportionate hazard
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with a multiplicative heterogeneity and the Weibull duration distribution.
h (t ,v )  =  v  e x p (x ’/3)ata '*
where v is a random heterogeneity term and x is a vector o f explanatory 
variables. He also assumed the distribution o f v to follow  the Gamma 
distribution. These assumptions are arbitrary since it  was chosen purely on the 
ground o f their simplicity while allowing for a monotonic duration dependence. 
The relation (1-4-1) suggests to include any variables that may influence (1-4- 
1) into x in the hazard. But the economic theory o f unemployment cannot predict 
whether a negative or positive duration dependence should prevail. I f  we suppose 
that the reservation wage declines as a spell o f unemployment persists, this 
alone w ill increase the hazard overtime. However, the opposite effect on the 
hazard w ill result i f  we assume the rate o f job offer to decline with the 
current unemployment spell.
His particular concern was with the effect o f heterogeneity term on the 
duration dependence when such term is omitted. He used a survey data on once 
unskilled, unemployed workers. Time invariant explanatory variables included age 
at a time o f first interview, individual’s unemployment history, and replacement 
ratio which is the ratio between income during unemployment to that o f the last 
job. He formed a likelihood function and estimated the parameters excluding the 
heterogeneity term. Estimate o f a is 0.77 which indicates a decreasing hazard. 
However, he found that this value increased as he included other explanatory 
variables which proved significant to the model. This is to say that the 
negative duration dependence implied by a=0.77 from the first estimation was 
partly due to the omitted variables rather than the true negative duration 
dependence. This was further confirmed by the value o f a estimates, a =0.9, when 
the heterogeneity term is included. When the heterogeneity was neglected, it 
gave rise to the spurious decline in the hazard over time.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) generalized the conditional hazard specification 
further to include the heterogeneity which is correlated across spells, and in 
addition, allowed for the time varying exogenous variables. Their hazard is 
called the Box-Cox conditional hazard since it  involves Box-Cox transformation:
r t y l - l  t y 2 - l  'I
(t) = exp p - w  + cv„ + • * , + »*,—77- J
for where x(t) is the vector value o f time varying covariates at current
duration, t, and v is the heterogeneous term. The last two terms approach logt
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as sr-^ O or r 2-»0, respectively. This model converges to a W eibull duration 
distribution i f  ^ = 0  and n2= 0, to a Gompertz i f  n2=0 and 3^  =  1, and fina lly, to 
an exponential i f  p =p =0.
Lancaster (1985) tried to determine the jo in t probability distribution 
function o f unemployment durations and reservation wages by paying attention to 
the simultaneous relation between the two. The data he used is based on an 
interview survey conducted in two different years on unemployed people. The 
recorded wages and unemployment duration had multiple contemporaneous nature in 
a sense that they contain, for each individual, the length o f unemployment spell 
they have experienced together with the wages in the following job. Also, at the 
time o f interview, workers were asked what level o f wages they were w illing to 
start working and the elapsed unemployment spell up to the time o f interview. 
Hence, this data contain reservation wage w(t), elapsed unemployment duration at 
each time o f the survey, and the accepted wage. The elapsed spell t is a
stochastic function o f w, in the ex-post sense, since longer the employment
spell, higher the reservation wage he must have been using. On the other hand, w 
is a decreasing function o f the elapsed duration since one would lower his 
reservation wage the longer he is unemployed. Hence, there are 2 causal
relations between w and t. A t the same time, since the accepted wage in a new 
job is an increasing function o f w, there must be a similar causal relation 
between accepted wages and the completed durations. As a result, the estimation 
was done by deducing the jo in t distribution of: ©completed unemployment
durations and accepted wages, and (ii)elapsed unemployment durations and
reported asking wages. The hazard rate took a form o f equation (1-4-1). He
assumed the Pareto or Log normal distribution for (1-F(w)) and posited a
monotonic decreasing function o f t for the reservation wage function. I t  was 
constructed so that it decreases with unemployment spell only until it  reaches a 
certain lower bound and stays flat thereafter. Given this assumption on the 
functional form o f the hazard, he approximated the moment generating function o f 
log(w) and log(t), from which he derived a log linear simultaneous equations to 
be estimated. This formulation was able to accommodate the specification error 
or heterogeneity terms into the structural form error terms as long as the 
errors are uncorrelated with the regressors. He estimated the effects o f factors 
such as age, years o f schooling, marital status, disability and locations on
this simultaneous relation. The results were consistent with the job search 
theory. To ensure identification, at least one explanatory variables which were
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not present in both equations were required. But such variables are hard to come 
by. Also, this regression method can neither cope with censored observations nor 
time dependent explanatory variables.
Other applications include those on strike durations. Kennan (1985), under 
discrete time setting, considered a continuation probability for any individual 
who is on strike. This is a probability o f a strike lasting for one more day 
given it has already lasted for certain days. He introduced a multiplicative 
heterogeneous factor, v, into the individual continuation probability:
P r(r|x ,v ) =  v p ,(t |x)
Its survival function is the probability o f a strike lasting at least for t 
days:
Pi (t | x,v) =  vT+1no pt(t| x)
The heterogeneity term was assumed to follow Beta distribution which was then 
integrated out to give the "aggregate” survival probability:
Q (t|x ) =  f  vT+1n0 P j(t|x ) dFv(v |x)
R v
He found that the strike tend to resolve after 3 months. From the empirical 
hazard which is based only on the data on duration (see section 1.5.2 (i)), he 
found that the hazard has a U shape with respect to the strike duration. Hence, 
he adopt a logit distribution, that can accommodate U-shape, for P ^tl x). His
main objective was to find out the impact o f business cycle on the strike 
activities where the former was proxied by the level o f industrial production. 
By adopting this duration technique, he was able to distinguish the effect o f 
business cycle on the duration o f strikes, which he found counter cyclical, and 
on the frequency o f strikes, which was found pro-cyclical. The Beta-logit 
specification was convenient since its likelihood has a closed form and, in 
addition, the shape and location o f the corresponding hazard specification is 
flexible enough to vary with the explanatory variables. It was not possible, 
however, to detect the precise effect o f the unobserved heterogeneity on the 
aggregate hazard since the heterogeneity was not identified from the duration 
dependence.
Harrison and Stewart (1987) also analysed the strike activities using the 
duration technique. They adopted the discrete proportional hazards model with a
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multiplicative heterogeneity term. Their assumed conditional survivor function 
takes a form:
A(T,x|v)=no(l-xtr (*,f3+v>
where is a discrete time analogue o f the baseline hazard at current duration 
t, and v is the heterogeneity term. The hazard in a discrete setting is:
Hence their hazard is:
h(t,X,V) =  1 - (l-At)eXp(xP+v)
They assumed the entire process to be in discrete time since a strike decision,
naturally, is taken on the day to day basis. They assumed exp(v) to follow  Gamma 
distribution and the function o f the baseline hazard, lo g (-lo g (l-\)), to be 
represented by a third order polynomial in t to allow for flex ib ility  in the 
form o f duration dependence. They found the strike duration to be counter­
cyclical.
Given the proportionate hazard specification with a constant hazard, Stephen 
Jones (1988) has derived the log-linear relation between the expected value o f 
the elapsed duration and the explanatory variables in his study o f unemployment 
spells. He assumed an offer probability to follow the Pareto distribution, from 
which, he derived the expected value o f elapsed unemployment spell to be log 
linear in reservation wage and random error term. His data consisted mainly o f 
the censored unemployment spells. Nonetheless, the reservation wage measures 
were available at the time o f each censoring (i.e., at a time o f interviewing),
which enabled him to study the relation between the elapsed unemployment spell
and the reservation wages. A possibility o f endogeneity o f the reservation wage, 
in his simple linear regression model, was easily dealt with by instrumenting. 
The instruments were chosen so that they affect the reservation wage but not the
exit rate (i.e ., search cost) such as the level o f benefits. They found that the
results from this IV  estimation were more significant and also economically 
sensible than the simple OLS estimates.
A problem inherent in the empirical application o f duration analysis is how
to specify the functional form o f the hazard and their dependence on the
observed and unobserved variables in accordance with the economic theory. It  has
48
been shown in section 1.3.1 that the results o f estimation are very sensitive to 
the functional form assumed for the hazard as well as the mixing distribution. 
The identification problems are much easier to deal with i f  we have better 
knowledge about the functional form o f the economic parameters. Despite this, it 
is generally d ifficu lt to deduce the functional form from the economic theory. 
As a result, most o f the empirical studies have estimated the reduced form model 
whose underlying distributions o f the duration as well as the random 
heterogeneity is assumed to follow some arbitrary distributions without the 
justification o f the theory.
In order to simplify this inference problem, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) 
resorted to the design o f data. They argued that as long as there exist a survey 
data that reports the elapsed duration and a mark at such duration, as well as 
the completed length and a mark at the termination o f a spell, we can deduce the 
interesting parameters without arbitrary assumptions about their parametric 
forms. Their paper, based on search theory, succeeded in deducing rather than 
inducing (or estimating) the parameter values (mainly elasticities) from two 
surveys o f unemployed people.
The analysis o f job search involves a distribution o f offer wage as well as 
that o f arrival rate (see equation (1-4-1)). They used data that contained 
answers to two survey questions: the reservation wage and the expected wage 
conditioned on accepting a job. Under the stationary environment with a constant 
unemployment benefit, a random offering wage, and a random rate o f incoming job 
offer, they maximized the expected present value o f future income stream over an 
infin ite horizon to yield the reservation wage equation in terms o f a job offer 
distribution. In addition, there are data on conditional expected wage which is 
mathematically a function o f the job offer distribution. Thus, a function o f the 
unknown offer distribution can be substituted into the reservation wage equation 
to yield the relation between: (i)reservation wage and benefit level, and 
(ii)reservation wage and offer probability, without making any assumptions over 
the underlying distributions. These elasticities were calculated at their mean 
values, therefore should be robust against measurement errors. They have also 
deduced the elasticities between: (i)re-employment probability and benefit 
level, and (ii)re-employment probability and offer probability. For the 
computation o f the latter elasticity, however, it was necessary to assume the 
form o f offer wage distribution above the benefit level. They considered this to 
follow  a member o f the Pareto family. In the case o f marked failure, one way to 
resolve the problem with the ad hoc reduced form method is to exploit the 
available data which are potentially informative about the transition process,
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in particular, the interrelation between the elapsed duration and the marks, as 
much as possible so as to infer the underlying parameter values from the 
statistical relations derived from the economic theory.
1.5. Brownian m otion and Non-parametric method
1.5.1 Brownian M otion
An alternative approach to the inference problem may be to consider the 
determination o f duration spells to follow some stochastic Markovian process. 
Then, a task is to derive a first passage time to the absorbing barrier o f such 
process. I f  a transition o f state is regarded as a continuous probabilistic 
process, a duration o f occupying a certain state is a continuous random 
variable. We can consider this transition probability to be determined by the 
accumulation o f a pressure measure, where a transition takes place when it
reaches a certain threshold (i.e., the absorbing barrier) for the first time. 
This duration since the start o f a spell until the transition is called the 
firs t passage time.
Lancaster (1972), in his study o f strike duration, postulated x(t) to be a 
barrier representing the difference between wages demanded by the workers and 
that offered by the management, where t is the elapsed duration o f the current 
strike. Strike duration is determined by bargaining and concessions such that it 
is terminated whenever the magnitude o f x(t) becomes large enough to reach a 
certain threshold. Beyond the threshold, both sides w ill compromise to reach an
agreement. He assumed this barrier process, {x (t);t>  0}, to follow  a simple
Brownian motion with drift. This assumption implies that the process, {x (t);t> 0 } 
satisfies the following properties o f stationarity and independent increments: 
( l) fo r any interval ( t ^ ) ,  E(x(t2)-x(t1))= (i(t2-tJ), (2)[x(t1)-x(t0)], [x(t2)-
x(t ) ],... o f non-overlapping intervals for any tQ< t} < t2< ... are independent o f 
each other. Hence, the movement in x(t) occurred on one day is independent o f its 
movement occurred in any o f the previous days. The former is the stationarity 
property which implies that the average level o f how close the parties are 
towards settling a strike (i.e., x (t)-x (t))  in any interval is independent o f
either ^  or t2, or their corresponding calendar time, but is proportionate to
the length o f interval, t - t . And this factor o f proportionality, n, is a
"d rift" indicating the mean proportionate rate per day o f a d rift towards the end 
o f a strike, where t is the elapsed duration o f the current strike. When these 
two assumptions are satisfied, the process {x (t);t> 0 } is called a Markov process.
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In addition, for any interval (t ,t ), i f  [x(t ) -x (t)] is distributed normally
with variance ‘A tj- t,)  and E(x(t))=0 for all t bigger than 0, then {x (t);t> 0 }
follows a Weiner process (Brownian motion). The process can be rescaled and the 
origin shifted so that at a start o f a strike, x(0)=0. And the strike terminates 
when the absorbing barrier is reached, that is, when x(t) =  l  for the first time. 
Given that the process {x (t);t>  0} follows a Brownian motion with d rift, the first 
passage time o f x(t) to the absorbing barrier, x(t) =  l ,  is shown to follow  Inverse 
Gaussian distribution. He estimated the influence o f explanatory variables over 
the pressure measure, x(t), by using the maximum likelihood and found the fit  o f 
such distribution to be very good, although a large number o f short strikes 
observed in the data failed to be explained. It is likely that these short
strikes occurred as predetermined rituals by the union to exert threat, and thus, 
their spells were determined in a way entirely different from that embodied in 
the pressure factors, x(t). Jovanovic (1979) used a similar technique in his
study o f job search.
Consider formulating the labour contract durations in this way. Here, the 
the length o f open-ended contracts are the spell duration to be studied, which 
is a random variable with a probability distribution characterized by the 
several economic variables that affect the occurrence o f a wage negotiation. We 
consider a stochastic process o f a certain pressure measure in continuous time 
and space, and a time to negotiation is determined whenever this process reaches 
a threshold point for the first time since the last negotiation. In other words, 
whenever the pressure builds up high enough so that the gain from re-negotiation 
is higher than the cost o f doing so. Then, as long as we can consider such 
pressure factor to follow a Markovian process, it is possible to model the 
duration between consecutive wage changes as a first passage time o f a 
stochastic process to an absorbing barrier. Specifically, this pressure measure 
represents a difference between a post tax real wage plus transaction cost, and 
a target wage, where the latter is derived as an optimal solution to the 
bargaining problem given the economic environment at a time. Let us write the 
pressure factor as follows:
n o  -  - - m  +  4 0
where W (t) : current nominal wage 
R(t) : retention ratio 
TT(t) : rate o f inflation 
c(t) : transaction cost
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x(t) : target wage
Note that W (t) w ill take a form o f step function over time with a discrete jump 
at every negotiation. Given this formulation for the barrier, the hazard rate 
can be derived by specifying the stochastic process which governs {p (t);t> 0 }. 
The hazard, in this case, is the probability o f p(t) crossing a barrier in an 
interval (t,t+ d t) provided that there is no previous crossing for the last t 
periods. Since R(t), n(t) and c(t) are exogenous and W (t) being a predetermined 
variable, they evolve independently o f the actions o f agents. As a final step, 
we need to derive a density function o f the first passage time and build a 
likelihood function to estimate the interesting parameters.
Specifically, we assume the pressure variable, {p (t);t >  0}, to follow  a 
simple Brownian motion with drift. Let such d rift parameter be p. One can 
rescale and shift the origin so as to make p(t) to be 0 when a spell starts and 
end when the barrier is reached from below to p(t) =  l  for the first time. For a 
stochastic process {p (t);t> 0 } to be a Brownian motion, it has to comply with the 
stationarity, independent increment and normality assumption. This means, 
for any interval ( t ^ ) ,  p(t2)-p(tl) is normally distributed with mean K t2‘ tj)
and variance ^ O ^ ) -  We also assume p >  0 so that the average target wage
increases proportionately with the length o f the successive negotiations. In 
other words, p is the mean proportionate rate o f drift. The normality assumption 
implies a symmetry about the mean, pC^-tj), so that there is as much
possibility for p(t )-p (t) to be negative as it is to be positive. Also, for
any interval ( t ^ )  and (t3,t2), p(t3)-p(t() = [p(t3)-p(t2)]-[p (t2)-p(t1) ] , hence
the le ft hand side, which is a sum o f two independent normal variates, also
fo l lo w s  a n orm al d istribution  w ith  m ean p (t - t )  and v a r ia n ce  (t -t  V 2.
3 1 3 v
Finally, a jo in t density function o f x(tQ),...x (tn) can be written as a product 
o f conditional densities with an in itia l condition that is:
f (x0,V .xn) =  Pr(p(tn)= x J p (tDi)= x i i i )....
 Pr(p(t2)= x 2|p(t0)= x 0)Pr(p(t0)= x 0)
=  ft -t < V XJ  ft -t ( V xo>- ft <xo>
n n-1 1 0  0
since P r(p (t)= x  |p(t ,)= x  ,)=P r(p(t )-p(t ,)= x -x  ,) due to the stationary
n n n-1 n-1 n n-1 n n-1
increment property. The estimates o f p and cr2 can be computed by the maximum
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likelihood.
A problem with this method essentially is its in flexib ility  and its strict
distributional assumptions. The density for the first passage time is only
explicitly known for a very simple form o f barrier, such as a constant or a 
linear function o f time. Moreover, as we have seen in the case o f contract 
length, the assumptions o f independent and stationary increments are too strong 
in practice.
1.5.2 Non-parametric and semi-parametric approach
Another solution in avoiding the inference problem is to embark on a non- 
parametric or a semi-parametric method. Misspecifications o f distributional 
forms not only lead to inefficiency but also to inconsistency o f the estimators. 
By adopting a non-parametric estimator at least in some components o f the 
hazard, we can be less dependent on the correctness o f underlying distributional 
assumptions that are too often arbitrary.
(i) Empirical hazard
The actuarial approach, which is to construct the empirical hazard rate or
the empirical survivor function from the data on duration alone, is useful in
conjunction with the plotted graphs o f survivor function or hazard to assess the 
goodness o f fit, or as a preliminary step to surmise the potential functional 
forms before embarking on to the parametric method. An example o f this is the 
work o f Kennan (1985), in which his decision to use the log it duration 
distribution was based on the finding that the shape o f his empirical hazard is 
a U-shaped function o f the elapsed duration.
Sample survivor function, S(t) is the probability o f a spell lasting at 
least as long as t. This can be estimated by a share o f sample points exceeding 
t out o f total number o f observations. Suppose that we have a set o f n 
observations in duration among which k (=m) observations are the completed 
durations. We can order observations on distinct completed durations so that 
T i< T 2<T3< ...T k. Then the number o f spells neither completed nor censored before 
xj is:
k
ni = i5j (mi +  &)
where, n^ : number o f observation censored between Tj and xi+1.
gi : number o f spells completed at duration xj
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In other words, rij is the number o f observations in the risk set at t - whose 
duration has lasted at least as long as t -. The corresponding hazard rate at t - 
is a probability o f completing a spell at Tj conditioned on the event that a 
spell is at least as long as T j. In this case, there are nj observations in a 
set which satisfies this condition. Therefore, the hazard rate can be estimated
A
as: h(Tj)=gj/nj. This is a maximum likelihood estimator o f hj where the log 
likelihood o f this discrete duration observation is:
log L  =  Z [gj loglSCtjl-SCtj+O)) +  nij logS(Tj+0)]
since a probability o f failure at tj is S(Tj)-S(Tj+0) where S (x j+0 )=dlh ji 
S(xj+dt). Recalling the relation between the hazard and the survivor function 
under the discrete setting:
S(tj) ^ ( l- M x i) ) ,  S(xj+ 0) =.ni(l-h(xi))
After substitution, the likelihood to be maximized becomes:
log L  = {  gj [loghj +  ^  log(l-h;)] +  (nj-gj) log(l-h;) }
k
“  j? i fej lo§hj +  (nj'g j) log(l-hj)]
A
which yields h(xj) =  gj/nj, and the corresponding estimated survivor function is 
a step function:
*  j _1 (n ; - g j)S(T.) = n ^ ^
v y  i = i  n j
This is called the Kaplan-Meier or product lim it estimator. The corresponding 
integrated hazard is:
A(^j) =.=. ^(^i)
I f  the number o f distinct failure times x i,x2,... xk are fixed and the number o f 
failure at each x j (j =  l..k ) increases as total sample size increases, then the 
standard asymptotic theory o f inference on the maximum likelihood estimator
A
applies. An asymptotic variance estimator o f log(S(x)) is:
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Var(logS(T» = s (1-hj)'2 Var(l-hi)
j | T j < T
Inductively3, therefore:
Var(S(T» = S2(x) I   ^ (1-5-1)
T j  < T  n j V n j  ©j /
which is known as the Greenwood’s formula.
A  plot o f the estimated integrated hazard or the survivor function against 
the elapsed duration helps determine the parametric form o f the hazard. For 
example, exponential duration distribution should observe a constant hazard and 
a linear in duration integrated hazard. From a practical point o f view, the 
plots o f integrated hazard are usually smoother, hence, easier to interpret. The 
estimator is more accurate for the shorter durations where the number o f 
observation in the risk set is high.
Another method o f deriving the estimates o f empirical hazard/survivor
function is the use o f a life  table. Consider again the ordered observations on
completed spells. Divide [xi,xk] into some intervals (not necessarily equal). 
Then build a life  table where the number o f censored and completed observations 
are listed for each interval. Let those intervals be I i , l2,...Ik. As before, let 
nij be a number o f censored data within the interval Ij, and gj be a number o f 
completed duration in the interval Ij. A number o f observation in the risk set 
at t  is ni= z (g 1+m 1). Then the life  table estimator o f the hazard, h-, gives
J J 1—j  J
conditional probability of a failure during the j-th interval, Iji 
£ -  8 j
A
fo r all nj except for nj=0, in which case, hj =  l.  nij in the denominator is 
divided by 2 by assuming that not all but about half o f the ^  observations are 
at risk throughout the interval, Ij. The corresponding life  table estimator o f
the survivor function at the end o f the interval Ij is:
S(Ij) =  ^ (1 -1 0
Variances for this estimator is given by replacing ^  by nj-mj/2 in the
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Greenwood’s formula, (1-5-1).
This life  table method is often used when the actual censoring times are 
unavailable but gj’s and m ’^s are still known for each j-th  interval.
(ii) Semi-parametric maximum likelihood
A problem o f identifying the conditional duration distribution, f5(t|v ,x ),
and the mixing distribution, fv(v), out o f the observed data, fg(t| x), led the
conventional study to specify the parametric distributions o f both f(t|v ,x ) and 
fv(v) even though their specification, particularly o f fv(v), was rarely 
justified by the theory. Yet, different functional forms led to very different 
estimates, casting importance on the correctness o f the parametric 
specifications to be adopted.
Semi-parametric method came up with a solution to combat these problems. 
They assume the parametric form o f either fv or f(t|v ,x ) and use the non- 
parametric method to infer the nature o f the other distribution which is le ft 
unknown4.
The conditions discussed in section 1.3.1 under which h (t|x ,v) and fv(v) are 
identified secured the identification o f fv(v) non-parametrically. Heckman and 
Singer (1984) have proved that it  is possible to use the observed duration data 
to consistently estimate both fv(v) and the structural parameters o f the 
conditional duration distribution, provided that we know the specification o f 
f(t|v ,x ). Specifically, for the proportionate hazard model in the presence o f 
censoring and time-varying covariates, the non-parametric maximum likelihood 
estimation (NPMLE) yields consistent estimates when hj(x) and h0(t) were 
specified up to a finite number o f parameters and fv(v) to have a certain 
behaviour in its tail distribution. They verified the conditions stated by 
Kiefer and W olfowitz (1956) that ensure the existence o f a consistent estimator 
o f the mixing distribution and the structural parameters. I f  so, it is possible 
to derive the estimates o f interesting structural parameters by imposing fewer 
arbitrary a priori identifying assumptions. Then, the conventional model which 
specifies both the form o f f(t|v ,x ) and fv(v) is over-parameterized and bears 
unnecessary risk o f making inaccurate estimates.
The maximum likelihood estimator for the structural parameter, e, and the 
mixing distribution fv(v) are derived by solving a problem:
sup S In ( S f5(ti|x ,v)d fv(v) )
fv€ V , 0 € 0  Ry
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where 0 is the parameter space for e, and V = { fv:fv(v)^0 is non decreasing, right 
continuous and J1 dfv(v) =  l} .  And N is the total number o f observations. For a
fixed 0, non-parametric MLE o f fv(v) in an identified model is a fin ite mixture 
with at most N * points o f increase, where N * is the number o f distinct values o f 
(ti,Xi). Hence, the problem reduces to:
0)Pf-P,
N *
subject to.Zj Pj =  l  and pj^ O for all j.  In a case o f general proportionate hazard 
model with a multiplicative heterogeneity, h (t|x ,v )= h 1(x)hQ(t)v, transforming a 
variable from t to t*, say, where t*=J 'h1(x)h0(u)du simplifies the likelihood. 
The density function o f t* conditional on v is exponential, hence, f( t* |v ) =
ve" v. Optimization problem is now:
„ p . . p SUv . . v *  | , to [ j S . v J ^ T V j J P j ]
M ,  1 N , N —N L J  J
N 5
where d = l for the uncensored observation, and subject to £ ^  =  1 and pj^O for 
all j .  Asymptotic standard error cannot be computed from the Hessian o f the 
likelihood since a dimension o f the parameter space varies with N. They 
suggested the use o f EM algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977)) to achieve 
the convergence to a stationary point. For a fixed 0 that determines h}(x) and 
h0(t), estimate fv(v) using above NPMLE. Then, for each estimate o f fv(v), 
estimates o f 0 is derived by the parametric maximum likelihood, which w ill then 
yield new values o f t*. Given the new values o f t* , new estimates o f w ill be 
derived fy(v). In this way, the process is iterated until the convergence is
achieved. There usually are multiple local maxima, hence, the estimation 
inevitably becomes sensitive to the starting point. Only the global maximum 
ensures consistency o f the estimator. Results o f the Monte Carlo experiments 
suggest that the NPMLE succeeded in estimating the parameters o f structural 
model (i.e ., 0) well despite the unreliable estimates for the mixing
distribution. The NPMLE could not estimate more than four points o f increase for 
fv(v), and they were poorly estimated. This suggests a possibility that as long 
as the mixing distribution is allowed to have a very flexible parametric form 
(with more than 2 parameters), corresponding MLE estimates o f the structural 
parameters w ill not be heavily biased. They suggested the use o f NPMLE as a test
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in determining a plausibility o f the parametric MLE, although there is no formal 
test statistics to conclude its plausibility.
In their paper, Heckman and Singer (1984) estimated only the random 
heterogeneity term non-parametrically while the baseline hazard remained heavily 
parameterized. In a view that the parametric form o f the baseline hazard is 
often d ifficu lt to determine except for their overall shape, it  would be 
convenient i f  we could also estimate it  non-parametrically. The baseline hazard 
can be considered as a discrete step function. Ideally, a separate parameter 
should be assigned for every distinct duration observation in a sample. But in 
practice, a number o f steps have to be consulted for the sake o f efficiency. 
Meyer (1986) discusses efficiency comparisons between the semi-parametric hazard 
and the parametric maximum likelihood estimates. He states that in a situation 
when the explanatory variables differ more across observations than over time, 
or when the explanatory variables include a time trend, the semi-parametric 
method loses little  efficiency but insures consistency. The results, he states, 
are very similar to using the Cox’s partial likelihood.
Having seen that those two components o f the hazard are possibly estimated 
non-parametrically, Han and Hausman (1986) estimated both he baseline hazard and 
the heterogeneity term non-parametrically. They provided the asymptotic 
normality property o f such semi-parametric maximum likelihood by requiring at 
least one pre-determined variables to be partly continuous so that the model is 
identified. Nonetheless, in practice, the estimation involving a discrete 
distribution with many points are difficu lt, particularly with respect to the 
mixing distribution estimates, as Meyer (1990) found in his recent paper on 
unemployment spells.
Meyer (1990) has investigated the effects o f the level and the length o f 
unemployment benefits on unemployment durations. The data contained both 
completed and right censored observations. Since they are all recorded in term 
o f weeks, observations could be regarded as sampled out o f discrete time 
duration distribution. But instead, he regarded them as incomplete observations 
in continuous time, hence, a contribution o f a spell reported to have lasted for 
t weeks, say, in the likelihood is, P r(tespell< t+1), which is:
{1-Pr( spell ^ tH-11 spell ^ t )} Pr( spell t) (1-5-2)
where the latter probability can be written as a product o f another conditional 
distribution:
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t -1
yj Pr (spell ^ k+1 | spell ^ k )
k=0
(1-5-3)
Also, a contribution o f the censored duration in the likelihood is merely 
Pr (spells t). Hence, the entire likelihood can be written in terms o f the 
conditional probability o f the form such as (1-5-3). This can be written in 
terms o f the hazard as:
exp( - J^ +1 x;(u) du ) (1-5-4)
He posited a proportionate hazard form and included the time varying explanatory 
variables (namely, length until benefits lapse), which, he plausibly assumed to 
be constant between any unit interval, t and t+ 1  (i.e., week). The weekly 
observations on those variables are required for each i from the start t ill the 
end o f the spell. But by taking the conditional probability form (1-5-3), he 
managed to avoid the numerical integration o f those time varying explanatory 
variables altogether.
He then assigned different parameter values to every distinct value o f 
duration observation in a sample and estimated together with the parameters o f 
the explanatory variables. This way, the baseline hazard is estimated non- 
parametrically. Heterogeneity term could be estimated non-parametrically, 
although in practice, Meyer found it very d ifficu lt, hence, resorted to 
estimating with a gamma heterogeneity. Non parametric estimation o f the baseline 
hazard may sacrifice efficiency, but insures consistency. He found that his 
estimates are more plausible than that o f the totally parametric studies. Note, 
however, that he was able to allow as many parameters as there are distinct 
duration observations since the number o f such observations was not too large. 
The effect o f ignoring the heterogeneity or imposing a certain distribution 
function for such term is not known. As Meyer states, estimating the baseline 
hazard non-parametrically may make the existence o f heterogeneity term 
unimportant. Even though they are theoretically identified, computationally, it  
seems much too d ifficu lt to estimate the heterogeneity as well as the baseline 
hazard non-parametrically. Another interesting finding is that the peaks found 
in the empirical hazard were also found in the non-parametrically estimated 
baseline hazard. These peaks, however, disappeared once he introduced a new 
explanatory variable that indicates the expected time until the benefits lapse. 
In this way, the non-parametrically estimated baseline hazard can also serve as 
a useful diagnostic device.
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Footnotes to ’chapter 1
1. Ancillary means that this is a stochastic process that is exogenous to the
individual under study and its marginal probability distribution is 
independent o f the parameters o f the hazard (Kalbfleish and Prentice. 
Chapter 5, 3.1). Nonetheless, the ancillarity here has been obtained from a 
relationship between the hazard and the duration’s density, which presumes 
the validity o f the hazard specification. In this sense, this transformed 
variable is an ancillary statistics whose distribution depend on the 
correctness o f the parametric form assumed for the hazard.
2. This condition requires the existence o f a mean for the mixing distribution.
3. For Vn (0-0)4n (O,ct2), and Vrn(g(0)-g(0))4N(O,(5g/se)2 1 Acr2), in this case,
0=9
^  A a a A 2 A
g(s)=logs , hence, var(log(s))=var(s), and (dglde) = ( l/s ) var(s)
4. This is not proved theoretically, but it is possible to specify conditions
under which h(t|v) is estimable non-parametrically once fv(v) is 
parameterized (Heckman and Singer (1984)).
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Chapter 2: The microeconomic theory o f bargaining
2.1 Introduction
There exists a vast literature that deals with the microeconomic theory o f 
the labour market. Collective bargaining or some quasi collective bargaining 
such as wages council was the primary mode at least in Britain (80% in manual 
sector according to New Earning Survey 1978) during the period o f our interest, 
between 1950-75. This enables us to work in the context o f the union-firm 
bargaining when modeling the wage determination process. Note that for their 
wage determination process to be considered in the context o f the firm-union 
bargaining, it  is not necessary for the firms to be completely unionized. This 
setting is also valid i f  there exist a competitive sector with an infin itely 
elastic supply o f labour in addition to the unionized sector w ithin the firm . In 
those cases, size o f the union sector becomes relevant in the determination o f 
employment and wages.
First o f all, we need to formulate the behaviour o f the parties involved in 
the bargaining. Consider the utility function o f a trade union and maximizing 
function o f a firm . Then consider the constraint confronted by each party. 
Generally, the employees aim for higher pay as well as more jobs while the firm  
seeks for higher profit which is also a function o f the level o f employment and 
pay. Finally, the objective functions o f both parties are together or separately 
maximized with respect to their choice variables subject to their constraints to 
derive an optimal solution to this bargaining problem.
There exist several competing models for this process, and these can roughly 
be categorized into four groups: the union monopoly model, the efficient bargain 
model, the right to manage model and the seniority model. They mainly d iffer in 
their assumption as to what constraints the union faces.
2.2 Microeconomic theory o f bargaining
Before embarking on the detailed description o f these models, let us assume 
for a moment the following. First, each individual has a decreasing marginal 
u tility  o f income. Second, we principally consider each firm  as a price-taker in 
its product market, although we also briefly go through the case o f monopolistic 
competition. Under perfect competition, real revenue function is R =pf(n)/c, 
where c is a level o f price index and p is a product price, both being given 
constants. While under monopolistic competition, the firm  faces a downward 
sloping demand curve for its product that is decreasing in competitors (i.e.,
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substitute’s) price (s), and increasing in real demand shock (e). Retail price 
index has a role o f deflating the product price towards consumers, but its 
effect on demand is likely to be ambiguous since c include prices o f substitutes 
as well as complements. Hence, the product demand is a function o f p/c, c, s and 
e. A t equilibrium, supply (f(n)) equals demand, and the induced price equation
where n is number o f workers. The revenue function is also a function o f the 
same arguments, thus w ill affect the bargaining outcome. As we shall see later, 
the price taking firm  makes a decision based on the product wage while the 
monopolistic firm  bases their decision on the consumption wage. In practice, it 
may be too restrictive to assume perfect competition which predicts the level o f 
negotiated pay and employment that is independent o f the external influences on 
the product market.
As far as the specification o f the u tility  function o f the union is
concerned, majority o f studies have utilized either the general quasi-concave
utility  function or the expected utility, utilitarian preference approach. The
example to the first type o f u tility function is the Stone-Geary function which 
represents a specific form o f quasi-concave u tility  o f union in terms o f the 
wages and employment over and above their standard levels, with a weight
attached reflecting the relative importance o f two objectives. The function is 
represented as:
where w denotes wage rate, n denotes employment level, and w and h denote
minimum levels o f wage rate and employment, respectively, e is a weight
reflecting the relative importance o f wage and employment to the union, hence,
O^e^l. The minimum level o f wage, w, usually reflects the level o f outside
wages; thus this formulation is able to capture the relative wage effect on the
union preferences.
The latter formulation uses the theory o f representative individuals where 
the u tility  o f union members as a whole is the sum o f individual utilities, each 
o f which is identical. Moreover, layoffs take place randomly. I f  we denote a
number o f union members as m, actual employment as n, and w to be the wage in 
alternative employment, then the union’s u tility  function is written as:
is:
p =  p(n,s,c,e) (2-2- 1)
(2-2-2)
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U =  n u (-^-) +  (m-n)u(-^~)
C C
(2-2-3)
This is called the utilitarian utility function. The expected u tility  approach, 
on the other hand, assumes the union to be concerned with expected u tility  o f 
its members rather than its sum, hence:
UU =  [n/m]u(— ) +  [(m-n)/m]u(— ) (2-2-4)
C C
U =U U  when the membership is fixed. This specification o f the u tility  function, 
unlike the Stone-Geary, explicitly states individual worker’s preferences and it 
also incorporates the membership consideration into the u tility  function. These 
specifications, however, become invalid as soon as the number o f employment 
exceeds the membership, that is often the case. We can rewrite (2-2-3) and (2-2- 
4) so that:
U =  m u(-£-) +  (u(-SL) - « (-£ -)) * max( 0,(m-n) ) (2-2-3)’
UU =  u ( - f- )  +  ( u ( ^ )  - „(-£ -)) * max( 0 , 2 ^  ) (2-2-4)’
For the moment, we assume that the membership is exogenously determined unless 
otherwise stated. In special cases, these utilities reduce to maximizing the 
wage b ill or the rent:
u  =  n -3 L  and U =  n ( w ~ W )
c c
Workers represented by these u tility  functions are risk neutral since U =  0.
2.2.1 Monopoly Union Model
The simplest o f all the models is the monopoly union model where an u tility  
maximizing union, constrained by the labour demand curve, sets wages 
unilaterally. This is followed by a firm  choosing the level o f employment 
accordingly. Hence, the equilibrium outcome lies on the labour demand curve.
Let R(n) be revenue function o f the firm  where labour and capital are the 
only input o f this production function. Isoprofit curve is concave. The firm ’s 
objective is to maximize its real profit with respect to the level o f 
employment, that is:
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=  R(n) - wn - k
n C (2-2-5)
where p is product price, k is fixed capital cost, and c is consumption price 
index. A t the optimum, the firm  chooses n so as to make the value o f marginal 
product o f labour equal to the real wage: R =w . In other words, at the profitn
maximizing point, they choose a level o f employment corresponding to the given 
wage level on the labour demand curve (figure 2.1, Ld). The union has a concave 
utilitarian u tility  function (note for a fixed membership, the utilitarian and 
the expected u tility  approaches yield the same results), hence indifference 
curve o f the union takes the usual convex shape exhibiting the tradeoffs between 
the level o f wages and employment. Its u tility  is increasing in both w and n.
This indifference curve approaches to w =w  asymptotically from above as n goes to 
in fin ity , since workers are indifferent between working and not working at such 
wage level. The union maximizes its u tility  with respect to wage level while 
taking into account o f the labour demand curve. For a standard concave u tility  
function, u(.), the problem facing the union is:
m ^x U =  n u (-^ -) +  (m-n) u (-^ -) (2-2-6)
subject to p f =w , where f  denotes a derivative o f f  with respect to then n
argument in the subscript. This is equivalent to writing:
m $x U =  n * (-^ -) u ( ^ )  +  [m -n *(-^-)] u ( ^ )  (2-2-7)
where n * (-^ -).. (2-2-8) is labour demand function. This is the level o f
employment that the firm  would choose given the real product wage, On the
other hand, under monopolistic product market, maximization o f the utilitarian 
u tility  is subject to the labour demand function:
n* =  n*(-£-,s,c,e) (2-2-9)
It depends on the real consumer wage and other factors affecting the product 
demand and not on the product price alone as in the perfect competitive case. In 
both cases, the first order condition which is set to zero at the maximum
yields:
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/ 'W
(Figure 2.1) Monopoly union
U W =  "w  W -T -) -  U< 4 -»  +  nU w
This implies that the solution is at a point o f tangency between the union’s 
indifference curve and the firm ’s demand curve, such as point A in figure 2.1. 
A t this point,
-R /[n R J  =  uw w / W - 2 - H ( J L ) ]  (2-2-10)
Marginal cost in terms o f reduced labour demand due to the wage rise (i.e ., 
negative o f wage elasticity o f demand for labour) equals the union’s marginal 
benefit from raising wages (i.e ., elasticity o f benefit from employment with 
respect to wages). In the long-run competitive equilibrium, where there is no
union and w is the wage attainable elsewhere in the economy, the marginal
product o f labour equals the alternative wage, w. In the current context,
however, (2-2-10) implies u(w /c)<u(w /c), thus the marginal product o f labour
exceeds the alternative wage w, indicating a job rationing (n < h ) created by the 
existence o f the union which sets wages unilaterally.
Any exogenous shift in the union’s u tility  that leads to a wage rise 
consequently reduces employment as the equilibrium moves up along the labour
demand curve. For example, a rise in unemployment benefit (i.e ., rise in w) 
raises wages chosen by the union since U =(-n *u ^  is larger than 0. The 
corresponding changes in the employment is determined by the firm  according to 
the labour demand curve. In this way, changes in the variables that influence
union’s bargaining power or preferences, such as w, affect the level o f 
employment only in as much as they affect wages. As can be seen from the reduced 
form labour demand equation, (2-2-8) or (2-2-9), they should not be affected by
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variables such as w once they are controlled for wages. In other words, n* is
affected by w only through the changes in w. Improvement o f the product market 
can be captured by product price under perfect competitive framework, and level 
o f GNP or competitor’s price under monopolistic framework. I f  they have impact 
on the alternative wages through their effect on job opportunities, the movement
o f w w ill be pro-cyclical and so w ill the agreed wage. A rise in price o f 
output, on the other hand, w ill have no effect on wages i f  the elasticity o f 
labour demand is constant. This can be seen from the FOC:
u^w / (u(w/c)-u(w/c)) =  -w * n jn
where the right hand side is the elasticity o f demand for labour. As long as the 
right hand side stays constant, the left hand side expression becomes also 
fixed, so does the wage level. In this case, the wage rate chosen by the union 
remains the same while the equilibrium employment may increase due to a shift in 
demand curve, creating the "wage stickiness". Moreover, U =0, so thatwm
membership does not affect the union’s desired wage in this model. Effect o f 
changes in CPI has an ambiguous effect on the union’s wages since the sign o f 
the following expression is indeterminate:
U =  n’u’/pc2 (w-w) - nwu” /c3 -nu’/c2wc
Here, for the purpose o f clarity, u^ denotes the partial derivative with respect 
to w, while u’ denotes its derivative with respect to its single argument, in 
this case, w/c.
W ith respect to the employment level, p f =w  under perfect competition,n
hence, n* is independent o f c. However, under monopolistic market, demand for 
labour (2-2-9) is decreasing in w/c and increasing in s and e but ambiguously 
determined with respect to the movement o f c. This is because CPI includes the 
prices o f substitutes as well as complements to the particular product this firm  
deals with. Nonetheless, i f  the effect o f a fa ll in real income induced by a 
rise in CPI outweighs the substitution effect towards the firm ’s product, then 
the effect o f c would be negative on the number o f employment.
This model is consistent with the empirical finding that the firms usually 
set employment unilaterally. However, in practice, unions do not usually set 
wages without negotiations. What also lacks in the current setting is the 
membership consideration, that m does not affect the negotiated wages (Uwm= 0).
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Later on, we w ill discuss the extension o f this model that maximizes the Nash 
formula; a formula that takes into account o f the membership consideration into 
the notion o f bargaining power. Last point o f this model to be noted is the 
inefficiency o f the equilibrium outcome. As is clear from figure 2.2, there 
exist points above the labour demand curve (shaded area) that are Pareto 
superior to the equilibrium point, A. And there is no reason why either parties 
shouldn’t move to any o f these points where they can both be better off.
2 .2 .2  E ffic ie n t Bargain Model
The efficient bargain model, where the idea was first introduced by Leontief 
(1946), was put forward by McDonald and Solow (1981). They focused on the 
inefficiency o f the monopoly union model, and derived an efficient outcome by 
assuming that the firm  and union bargain over both wages and employment. The 
problem with the monopoly union model is that it leaves a ground for both 
bargaining agents to be better off. I f  the union also has a power to negotiate 
over the level o f employment, they w ill accept lower wages for higher employment 
which w ill then increase the firm ’s profit. Hence, on the whole, the outcome 
w ill be Pareto superior. This model can also explain the phenomena o f over 
manning (value o f marginal product o f labour <w ), wage rig id ity and pro-cyclical 
fluctuations o f employment, all o f which are the features commonly observed in 
the recent labour market.
A firm  maximizes its profit with respect to n and w for a given level o f 
union’s u tility , while the union maximizes its u tility  with respect to n and w 
for a certain level o f profit. This is identical to maximizing the Lagrangean o f 
a form:
L  =  R -cwn - k  +  MS- n u (^L ) - (m -n )u (4 -)] (2-2-11)
with respect to both n and w, for some arbitrary level o f union’s u tility , u. 
The first order condition is:
w-R un   n
n Uw
which, under the utilitarian union, is:
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[R - w]/c =  [« (-£-) - u(-£-)] / u’ (2-2-12)
where u’ denotes the derivative o f u with respect to w/c. In case o f perfect
competition, R = p f and the demand function for labour is:n n
„  = n(^ ,  A ,  i )  (2.2. 13)
where the arguments follow from the specification o f f  . Under monopolistic
n
competition, on the other hand, the first order condition is:
R» =  4  - [u(^ >  - 'u’ (2-2-14)
where R = R(n,s,c,e). The corresponding labour demand function is:
n =  n (-^ -,-^ -,c ,s ,e ) (2-2-15)
In both cases, at the equilibrium, the slope o f isoprofit curve for the firm  is 
equal to that o f indifference curve for the union. Hence, the equilibrium lies 
on the contract curve (a locus o f such points o f tangency) and is Pareto
efficient; it is impossible to make either party better o ff without making the 
other party worse o ff by moving away from those points (point B in figure 2.2).
i
VI
(Figure 2.2) Efficient bargain
Consider a point such as A. This point is on the demand curve, but any point in 
the shaded area is Pareto superior to this. Such superior points w ill continue 
to exist until it reaches point B; a point on the contract curve.
In addition to this revealing characteristic, follow ing points are also
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observed. R „=w  on the labour demand curve, and it intersects w ith the contract
curve when u(w)=u(w) (making RHS o f (2-2-12) equal to 0). Then, the point (w,n)
represents the competitive outcome with no union and the outside u tility , u(w). 
A slope o f the contract curve is positive for the risk averse union, because
dw/dn is positive except at (h,w), where the contract curve is vertical: 
dw/dn =  (RnnU’) / {[w  - RJ u” } (2-2-16)
The contract curve is also vertical for u” =0, that is, when the union is risk 
neutral. In this extreme case, the number o f employment is not affected by the
wages determined but only by the alternative wage, w. For instance, this applies
to the rent maximizing union, u=(w/c-y(w/c))n, where y is a fixed parameter. In 
particular, when r= 0 , it is strongly efficient and is socially Pareto optimal 
since the marginal product o f labour is equal to the alternative wage throughout 
the economy. Bargaining outcome is also efficient for the risk neutral union 
with the expected or utilitarian u tility  function. W ith a risk loving unions, 
the contract curve slopes down, but this is very unlikely. More realistically, 
i f  the union is not interested in the level o f employment (see section 2.2.5), 
the labour demand curve coincides with the contract curve.
For w > w , the first order condition implies wages in excess o f the marginal 
product o f labour along the contract curve, hence the level o f employment is 
higher than that determined solely by the firm . Even stronger result is true 
when we take into account o f the concavity o f u(.). From the first order 
condition:
“ (-F -) '  +  H r  • -£ - ] = u’ I W c R" ] (2-2-1-7)
The left hand side o f this function is positive, so, w/c £ R„. Hence, the value
o f marginal product is lower than the real competitive wage, w/c, implying over
employment under the efficient bargain. Wage rate in excess o f w invites excess 
supply o f work force, thus, it needs some mechanism to ration the level o f 
employment. Moreover, any exogenous shock that has the effect o f raising wages, 
such as a rise in the union power, also has a positive effect on the level o f 
employment. This result is distinctively different from that o f the monopoly 
union model where the tradeoff between wages and employment always exists to the 
extent that the shock makes them move along the labour demand curve. For
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example, a rise in the unemployment benefit (i.e., rise in w to w i in figure 
2.3) shifts the contract curve up to the left making the starting point o f the
curve at (m ,w i). Consequently, higher wage w ill be determined for a given level 
o f employment.
dw/d*  =  u’ ’ (R - w )  >  0n
On the other hand, a rise in output price shifts the labour demand curve hence 
w ill shift the contract curve to the right giving higher employment level at any 
given wage.
hi^ iev- p
(Figure 2.3) Shift in the contract curve
R u ’ c 
dw/dP =  - u; ' (R -w) <  0n
where Rnp= funder perfect competition. The wage stickiness under the efficient
bargain is accentuated when the union seeks for a "fa ir share" deal, so that the 
wage b ill is always a fixed proportion o f the total revenue: wn=kR(n,p)..(2-2- 
18) (McDonald and Solow (1981)). This, together with a contract curve equation 
(2-2-17), yields:
r u - a -R n n dw ' R np(u ’ ) 2 dp =
n w-kR M 4
dn
b Hn * kRb
The numerator o f dw/dp is equal to -w{R (1-nR /R )+nR R /R } whose sign isnp n nn p
indeterminate. Under the fair share rule, the negotiated outcome w ill be at the 
intersection o f the contract curve (eq.2-2-17) and a locus o f the fa ir share 
rule (equity locus, eq. (2-2-18)), which is negatively sloping for the positive
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profit. In a recession, decline in the product demand (i.e ., decline in p) 
shifts the contract curve to the left and the equity locus down to the left. 
Hence, the negotiated level o f employment w ill decrease unambiguously while the 
wage can either go up or down. McDonald and Solow has given two examples where 
the labour demand or the inverse labour demand is not affected by p for a given 
level o f wages or employment. When dw/dp=0, all the burden comes out in the form 
o f reduced employment. In other cases, a sign o f dw/dp becomes the opposite o f 
d/dn(NR /R). This implies that during a recession, i f  the revenue elasticity
n
decreases, due to sales constraint for instance, the negotiated wage rate w ill 
increase.
Obviously, the most appealing aspects o f this model is the Pareto optimality 
o f the equilibrium outcome. According to their setting, however, the union and 
firm  have to negotiate over the level o f employment in the same way as they do 
over pay. The stylized facts suggest that the level o f employment is largely 
adjusted unilaterally by the employers and very rarely do we see a contract 
specifying the level o f employment or even a man-machine ratio. Firms usually 
adjust the size o f their labour force without any negotiation with the workers, 
except when the adjustment involves a large number o f compulsory redundancies. 
This maybe because that the firm  may find it costly to negotiate over employment 
as well as wages. Also, the unions may be more interested in the condition o f 
work rather than the number o f employment. Once the wage is fixed, the firm  
always has an incentive to renege by jumping over to the labour demand curve and 
derives a higher profit while employing fewer number o f workers than it would 
had it kept to the negotiation with the union. In order to prevent such 
asymmetry, the contract has to be complex enough to ensure the union’s 
involvement in the determination o f the employment level.
2.2.3 Formal Bargaining
So far, we have been using the Lagrangean method to solve the bargaining 
problem between two parties. The welfare level o f either party was maximized 
subject to the constraints which usually involved the welfare level o f the other 
party. This method was suitable in identifying the equilibrium level o f wages 
and employment in the case o f the monopoly union model, since the constraints 
and the choice variables each party confronted with enabled us to solve for a 
unique equilibrium point on the labour demand curve. On the other hand, under 
the efficient bargain setting, it was the contract curve equation, a locus o f 
feasible equilibria, that was derived from the first order condition o f the
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Lagrangean optimization problem. Varying the the value o f Lagrangean multiplier 
identified different points on the contract curve. We need additional 
information in order to determine a unique point on the contract curve that is 
to be a solution to this bargaining problem.
Consider, instead, an axiomatic rule that can accommodate several forms o f 
bargaining. This theory operates in the context o f the bargaining set and its 
efficient frontier instead o f the contract curve itself, although the solution 
w ill be on the contract curve. This theory is justified axiomatically as well as 
strategically (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1984)).
First, define a bargaining set as a set o f possible outcomes o f payoffs. 
Given such a set, a formal solution to this bargaining problem is derived by
maximizing the Nash formula, (z -z)(n -n f, subject to the constraint, f(z,rr)=0, 
where z and n are the utilities o f each party. This constraint is the frontier 
o f the efficient payoff possibility curve that is decreasing and concave in 
(z,7r) plane, for the axiomatic bargaining theory requires the bargaining set to 
be convex. The Nash formula is a product o f each party’s gains over and above 
the non-contract (fall-back, status quo) outcomes, z and n. This product form is 
derived from the formal bargaining setup where the sequences o f offers are made 
by each party and the compromise to achieve a settlement is induced by the lower 
welfare level (i.e., fa ll back utility) that has to be tolerated until the 
agreement is reached. To the union, it is the loss o f forgone wages, to the 
firm , it is the loss o f output and profits that prompt them to reach an 
agreement quickly. This assumption, that the bargaining outcome should never 
fa ll below the status quo utilities, is crucial or otherwise the union and firm  
would not bargain at all (strong individual rationality). In fact, this 
assumption is sufficient in ensuring the existence o f a unique Nash outcome 
instead o f assuming the agents’ behaviour to be Pareto Optimal (Svejnar (1986)).
Under this setting, each party’s optimal acceptance level is chosen by 
comparing the present value o f immediately accepting whatever is offered by the 
other party and the present value o f waiting for its desired offer to be 
accepted. In the latter case, one has to bear with the status quo level until 
its desired offer is accepted by the other party. By equating these two present 
values, we can derive the maximum tolerable stoppage time for each party. 
Whichever with the shorter tolerable time w ill have to compromise its offer. 
This comparison o f the maximum stoppage time is equivalent to comparing the 
product o f each party’s welfare over and above their fall-back outcome, that is 
equivalent to maximizing the form o f Nash maximand: (z -z )(n -n f . here is
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interpreted as the bargaining power, which originally stems from the relative 
discount rates o f each party. A party with the higher discount rate is less 
patient or less able to afford the long stoppages, the cost o f disagreement is 
higher for such party, thus, has a lower bargaining power. The fall-back 
outcomes for the two parties are their welfare level during the stoppage. I f  the
fall-back profit for the firm , n, is the level o f fixed cost, -k, then: 
n - n =  [R(n) - wn]/c 
The union is assumed to maximize its utilitarian utility, hence:
z =  n[u(-“ ) - u ( ^ ) ]  +  m u(-y-)
where m is number o f members. Their fall-back welfare level is z=m u(w), as long 
as the workers can derive outside income, w, even during the strike.
z - z =  n ( u ( - f )  - u (-y -))
Therefore the Nash formula to be maximized is:
[ n (u(-£-) - u (4 -)) ][ -^ _ w n _  f
subject to the constraint, f(z,7i)= 0. I f  the solution indicates u tility  level 
that is less than their outside option, the outcome o f the agreement w ill not be 
on the frontier, f(z,7r)=0, but at a comer solution.
W ith the additional information regarding the relative bargaining power 
between the two parties, this framework is general enough to embody both the 
monopoly union setting discussed in section 2.2.1, as well as the efficiency 
bargain problem o f section 2.2.2. In particular, it derives a unique solution to 
the efficiency bargain model.
In the monopoly union, the union determines the level o f wages unilaterally 
subject to the labour demand curve. Hence, (3=0 and the problem now reduces to:
max n*(w) (u ( - |- )  - u ( -~ )) 
where n*(w) is the labour demand curve; a solution to the profit maximization o f
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the firm , R =w .n
Under the efficient bargain model, the union and firm  bargain over both w 
and n so that the problem is now:
max n (U (-£ -) - U (-£ -)) ( R ;  wn fn , w L/ C L/
A ratio o f the first order condition to this problem gives the contract curve 
equation (2-2-12). Furthermore, each first order condition gives a relation 
between w, n, /3 and their fall-back welfare levels. Note that these were not 
known under the analysis in the former section. This additional relationship 
identifies the equilibrium wage level, w=w(p,c,w,k,/3). We saw from equation 
(2-2-16) that the risk averseness (u” ) o f the union determined a location 
(slope) o f the contract curve. This time, the bargaining power, 13, determines 
the location o f a solution on the contract curve.
To make this model even more appealing intuitively, Svejnar (1986) has let 
the bargaining power, (3, to depend on the exogenous variables to provide a 
channel through which variables such as union membership or government policies 
have impact on the bargained level o f wages and employment.
2 .2 .4  R ight to Manage Model
The right to manage model as discussed in Nickell and Andrews (1981) and the 
monopoly union model together fa ll into a family o f the labour demand (LD) model 
since its solution lies on the labour demand curve. Indeed, their comparative 
static results are very similar to each other. Yet, the right to manage model 
captures the stylized institutional facts that are not seen in the monopoly 
union model; the firm  and the union bargain over the wage level, while the firm
still holds a right to determine the level o f employment unilaterally. By
letting both parties bargain over wages, bargaining power (i.e ., relative 
bargaining strength) can be incorporated to affect the outcome. This factor is 
ignored in the monopoly union model.
The firm  maximizes its profit with respect to the level o f employment,
therefore:
which gives the labour demand, n*(w), as a solution to the firs t order
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condition. The firm  and union together bargain over w to maximize their u tility , 
7r(w,n*(w)) and U(w,n*(w)), given a certain level o f n and u, with respect to w 
(In the efficient bargaining, it was with respect to both w and n). This is 
equivalent to solving a Nash formula:
_  / / W x , w v R - wn J3max n ( u(— ) - u(— ) )( —  -------)'n , w C C  if
subject to Rn=w . This can also be solved by: 
max n*(.) (u(w) - u(w))(R(n*(.)) - wn*(.))^
where n*(.) is the labour demand function under the appropriate product market 
situation. First order condition is:
- n ^ r  - + u’ / (u (Jr ) - “ ( 4 - ) ) = °
where Rn=w . The comparative static results are the following. Variables that 
increase opportunities for the workers outside the firm  raise the bargaining 
power o f the union, hence, lead to higher wages. I f  the membership or union 
density affect the bargaining power parameter, /3, dw/dm w ill no longer be zero,
as was predicted by the monopoly union model. Similarly, an increase in w raises 
w. On the firm ’s side, higher product price or higher productivity enables the 
firm  to have larger rent to be exploited by the unions. While i f  the firm  adopt 
higher employment, higher wages become more expensive to the firm  at the margin. 
I f  we expect the income effect to dominate, higher product price w ill result in 
higher wages. Higher fall-back profit increases the firm ’s bargaining power, 
hence lowers wages.
The shadow value o f labour does not depend on alternative wage, and this is 
a feature o f the labour demand model that also applies here. This property is 
often used to differentiate the labour demand model from the efficient contract 
model. Nevertheless, even i f  a firm  stays along the labour demand curve, 
introduction o f efficiency wage consideration (e.g., discouragement o f shirking) 
can bring about the relevance o f the outside opportunities in the employment 
equation. Extension o f the LDM  in this way makes a discrimination o f the LD 
model from the EC model very d ifficu lt one to test empirically.
Layard and Nickell (1988) showed that under a general equilibrium framework 
with Cobb-Douglas technology and constant elasticity u tility , the Nash outcome
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yields the same level o f aggregate employment whether unions bargain over 
employment as well as wages or wages only. Moreover, i f  the elasticity o f 
substitution between capital and labour exceeds unity (hence, there is greater 
substitutability between the two), employment level w ill be lower under the 
efficient bargain than under the right to manage model. Also, moving from the 
competitive labour market to the efficient bargaining reduces employment. I f  the 
workers know the relation o f the labour demand curve, highly elastic demand for 
labour makes union more cautious when bargaining only over wages. This result is 
different under the partial equilibrium analysis, which assumes the same 
external opportunities regardless o f the system o f wage determination in each 
representative firm , where the employment is higher under the efficient 
contract. When the union can bargain over n as well as over w, they are given 
more power. It seems counter intuitive to find higher unemployment in the 
equilibrium when the union has more power, although their higher power is used 
principally to raise wages. The gain from higher wages more than compensates the 
loss from lower employment.
Under this right to manage model, the union is aware o f the demand curve o f 
labour, and yet, the union and employers do actually bargain over the wage 
level. This aspect is distinctly different from the monopoly union model. Also, 
they do not bargain over both the level o f wage and employment as they did under 
the efficient bargain model. The outcome, therefore, is not Pareto optimal. 
Nonetheless, as Nickell and Andrews argued, the firm  might find it too costly to 
negotiate over employment. Given such a cost consideration, this theory very 
well explains the stylized fact that employers continuously adjust their level 
o f employment without bargaining with the union. The rationale as to why this 
form o f bargaining takes place, however, is not given in these literature. 
Special case, in fact, is considered in the following section.
2 .2 .5 S en io rity  Model
Here, we introduce a model which is a half-way-house between the efficient 
model and the labour demand model. It gives an efficient outcome (in a sense 
that it  lies on the contract curve), while at the same time, it lies on the 
labour demand curve, hence the value o f marginal product o f labour is equal to 
the wage rate. This can be considered as a special version o f the efficient 
bargain model which complies with the stylized fact that characterizes the right 
to manage model, yet, avoiding the inefficiency underlying the labour demand 
model. It justifies the form of bargaining seen in the right to manage model
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where it is only the wages which is negotiated and specified in the contract 
while the level o f employment is chosen solely by the firm . There are two 
possible rationales which yield such setup for the bargaining and they differ in 
their specifications o f the union’s preference.
The first case assumes the strong discriminating power o f the "insiders" 
(i.e ., members) as opposed to outsiders and that it is only the insiders’ 
preference that matters. Hence, as long as all the members are employed 
(i.e.,n^m ), the union is indifferent to the level o f employment. It is only when 
the risk o f its members becoming unemployed arises that the union starts caring 
about the level o f employment. We assume that all the employees are paid the 
same wages. The utilitarian and expected u tility  function are re-written as:
U =  u(w) -I- (u(w) - u(w))* max [0 , (m-n)/n]
U =  mu(w) -I- [u(w) - u(w)]* max [0 , (m-n)]
In this case, union’s indifference curve becomes horizontal for n^m as in figure 
2.4. For example, in an industry whose employment is expanding, the equilibrium 
occurs at point such as A, which is at tangency between the union’s indifference 
curve and the isoprofit line; the firm ’s profit maximizing point (i.e ., on the 
labour demand curve). When new employees are allowed to become insiders, 
however, the membership increases to m’ and its effect becomes ambiguous. In 
this way, the transition o f equilibria overtime for this model involves a 
complex problem o f endogeneity because the union’s preference may change as 
membership changes. I f  larger membership is considered to expose insiders with 
higher risk o f being laid o ff in a recession, wage demand w ill decline. On the 
other hand, the larger the membership, the larger the marginal u tility  o f pay 
for the union as a whole, inducing a stronger incentive for the union to demand 
for higher wages. This w ill lead to a decline in employment (therefore, fa ll in 
the number o f insiders) when faced with a negative demand shock, since smaller 
number o f insiders w ill try to convert all the rent into higher pay rather than
(Figure 3.4) Flat indifference curve: membership model
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to expand employment for the outsiders. Consequently, unemployment persists 
despite the fluctuations o f the aggregate demand. This is called hysteresis 
(Blanchard and Summers (1987)) and it can explain the persistently high wage 
rises accompanied by equally high level o f unemployment seen in the current U .K. 
The size and speed o f adjustment o f this effect also depends on how the entry 
and exit to the membership is determined.
The second setup produces a horizontal segment in the union indifference 
curve by introducing a certain order to the laying o ff procedure such as, "last 
in first out" principle. Layoffs are not random; it assumes these to be done by 
seniority and the majority voting scheme within the trade union. Then, the 
behaviour o f the union is characterized by the maximization o f the median 
worker’s u tility . So that as long as the median seniority worker is insulated 
from the risk o f being laid off, even though they can bargain over the level o f 
employment, they are happy to leave its decision to the employers and merely 
interested in demanding higher wages. Only when a large number o f members’ jobs 
are threatened, does the union start exercising its power to bargain over the 
level o f employment (concession bargaining). This argument is applicable 
whenever the lay o ff procedure takes place with some known sequence. For 
instance, it  can be the order o f tenure or age.
The equilibrium in this model can be considered as follows. As long as the 
median workers are insulated from the risk o f redundancy, that is, i f  the level 
o f employment, n, exceeds the median worker’s seniority position, ns, the 
union’s indifference curve (represented by the ns-th (median) worker) is
horizontal. It is because for n > n s, the union simply seeks for higher wages 
without caring about its consequence on employment. Outcome is on the isoprofit 
line touching the indifference curve at its peak, (see figure 2.5) where w =R
n
(i.e ., on the labour demand curve). Moreover, at this point, the outcome is 
"efficient" since it lies on the contract curve. Since it is derived by 
maximizing the individual’s (i.e., median worker’s) u tility , it is only Pareto 
efficient in a partial way. On the other hand, when there is a huge decline in 
demand that makes median voter to face a risk o f redundancy, there w ill be a 
comer solution. This is no longer efficient, as depicted in figure 2.6.
Let us consider more formally what happens over the period. As long as the 
demand movement leaves a median seniority worker safely insulated from the risk 
o f redundancy, it is s till rational for the median worker to vote fo r the 
highest wage achievable without caring about the level o f employment. This w ill 
lead to a higher wage with no growth in the level o f employment for a positive
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demand shock. On the other hand, when there is a huge negative demand shock, 
huge enough to make the median worker to face a redundancy risk, there w ill be a 
comer solution as depicted in figure 2.6. There is a "concession bargaining" 
where the union vetoes upon the firm ’s optimal employment choice. A t this point, 
it is neither efficient nor a steady state equilibrium. Next period, the union 
w ill be represented by a new median seniority worker at position ns who w ill 
opt for fewer employment, and a new steady state equilibrium w ill be reached at 
point such as e in figure 2.6, given that the isoprofit line remains unchanged. 
But under this mechanism, even i f  there is no risk o f unemployment over the 
current contract, as long as there is a negative shock, one time a median worker 
w ill never stays as a median worker since the level o f employment falls. There 
w ill be a new median seniority worker representing the union’s u tility  who 
continues to bid the wage up irrespective o f the declined level o f employment. 
In this way, the former median worker w ill be laid o ff eventually, which makes 
his strategy, that continues voting for the maximum possible wages at each 
settlement, irrational.
Layard (1989) argues that under the world o f no demand uncertainty and long 
but fin ite life  with a certain turnover each period, the median voter in the 
seniority model should act to achieve the highest possible wage in each period 
such that it  w ill keep him employed up to his retirement. The only way to make 
sure that he w ill never get laid o ff is to remain being a median voter 
throughout his working life . Under the partial equilibrium framework, he 
analyzes how the convergence towards a steady state level o f employment, n*, is 
reached from below and above its level. When there is a drastic fa ll in demand, 
as long as there are s most senior workers who leave every period, the median 
worker w ill vote for the wage level that reduces employment by s per period 
until the level o f employment reaches a little  more than 2n* but less than 
2n*+s. So that the equilibrium employment level is reached from above without 
the median worker facing a risk o f redundancy. One period later, he w ill vote
e
(Figure 2.5) Flat indifference curve: 
seniority model
(Figure 2.6) Concession bargaining
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for the level o f wages corresponding to n* on the labour demand, so as to 
restore the steady state equilibrium.
Here is a formal model that illustrate both o f the rationales discussed
above:
max u(w/c) such that, R - wn ^ it and n - n8^  0
w , n
where n8=m  for the membership model. For the range n^n8 (or n^m), this reduces 
to maximizing the union utility with respect to wages subject to the labour 
demand curve. I f  we exclude the possibility o f a comer solution at n= n8 (or 
n=m ), this gives a unique solution (w *,n*). Let us solve for the Nash solution 
to this problem in order to reveal a unique solution. The maximand is:
max L  =  [ u(w/c) - u(w/c) ] [  R(n*(.) - wn*(.) - tt ]
where n*(.) is a solution to max (R-wn), n and u(w/c) are the fa ll back u tility  
o f the firm  and the union, respectively. First order condition is:
=  uVc(u-u) - n /[ R(n*)-wn*-7r ] =  0
with second order condition:
C3(u-u) C2(u-u ) 2 (n*-n) (n*-n)2
Comparative static is:
L  - =  - n / (n* - n) 2 < 0
w7T V y
L  =  u’2 / c3 (u-u)2 >  0
ww
Hence a rise in the firm ’s fa ll back profit decreases the negotiated wage while 
a rise in the union’s fa ll back wage increases their bargaining power thus 
raises the negotiated wage.
dw/dp =  . >  0
The denominator is negative from the second order condition, thus, dw/dp is 
positive. However, an extreme wage rigidity can be observed when the production
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function is o f constant elasticity form and n=0. Then the problem reduces to
m ^x (u-u) 7i(n*(.)) 
whose first order condition is:
(u-u)/u’ =  - n/n^
Letting f(n )=na where ae(0,l), the right hand side is equal to:
pf/n - w =  w (l-a )/a
using the profit maximization condition for this particular production function. 
This is independent o f p, hence, the wage is determined independent o f product 
price (Oswald (1987)). This wage rigidity is confined to the case where n>m
(n > n s). For n< m , the union cares about the level o f employment, hence the 
bargaining setup becomes that o f the efficiency bargain under which we also 
observe wage rig id ity (see section 2). It is indeterminate for the case n=m , 
when the equilibrium is reached at the kink o f union indifference curve where 
the contract curve is vertical. This is likely to happen under the membership 
context for the open union where all the employees automatically become members. 
Carruth and Oswald (1986) has simulated a estimates derived for the constant
elasticity u tility  and production function with u=mu(w) and 7t=0. They find a 
strong wage rig id ity associated with an increase in the employment towards the 
number o f membership. Once n reaches m, the employment level stays rig id while 
all the gains are transformed into higher wages. Further increase in the product 
price increases the level o f employment above that o f the membership indicating 
that by this time, it is also o f insiders interest, to let outsiders have the 
job. Such rise in employment increases the firm ’s profit which eventually 
benefits the existing members. This refutes the conventional critique o f this 
model predicting the union that forever claims for higher wages. They also find 
that the lower the risk aversion and production elasticities, the larger the 
price range that keeps employment level rigid at around the level o f membership.
The feature o f "last in first out" o f this model is shown to be consistent 
with the evidence according to Medoff and Abraham (1981). Their paper, based on 
the newly collected US survey data o f non-agricultural non-construction 
companies in the private sector, strongly supports the claims that the senior 
workers enjoy over-payment o f their wages together with greater protection
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against redundancies and the latter point is particularly true amongst the 
unionized employees. Also appealing is the Pareto efficiency o f the outcome 
which lies on the labour demand curve. A t equilibrium, workers are not 
interested in the elasticity o f labour demand except at a time o f sudden sliding 
recession, in such circumstances, the concession bargaining may take place.
2.3 E m pirica l work on the un ion -firm  bargaining theory
Since the introduction o f the union-firm bargaining theory discussed in the 
former section, a vast number o f studies were carried out to test their 
empirical significance. Very few used aggregate time series data where they 
estimated reduced form models o f the wages and employment (Nickell and Andrews 
(1983)). Majority o f them have concentrated on using more disaggregated data. 
Different industries have different characteristics, and face different economic 
climate over time. In particular, with respect to the union-firm relation, 
considerable institutional differences must exists in a way the bargaining takes 
place. In this sense, even the industry based data may not be adequate enough to 
take into account o f such diversity. Hence, it  is sensible for such empirical 
studies o f the bargaining to be based on the data which is as disaggregated as 
possible in order to avoid the aggregation problems. Most o f the empirical 
studies introduced in this section are based on the particular industries where 
their own institutional characteristics, such as their relation to the firms, 
are taken into consideration in forming the structure o f bargaining.
These empirical work all assume that the union and firm  act as though 
maximizing (or minimizing) well defined objective functions. It is generally 
agreed that the firm ’s objective function is something related to the level o f 
p ro fit (although it is questionable particularly under nationalized industries). 
However, when it comes to that o f the union’s, the issue is rather more complex. 
Some o f the studies have focused on the nature o f union’s objective functions 
while the form o f bargaining is assumed a priori as a maintained hypothesis. The 
others test the efficiency o f contracts (that is to say to test the form o f 
bargaining) given certain functional specifications for the objective functions 
o f the parties involved. In particular, some concentrate on testing between the 
two polar models o f employment determination: (l)the labour demand model where 
the union optimizes with respect to the wage while constrained by the labour 
demand curve, (2)the strong efficiency model with a risk neutral union and the 
firm  bargains over both wage and employment. In this case, the problem is the 
choice o f a criteria in discriminating those two polar models without assuming
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too strict the functional forms o f the agents’ objective functions.
However, as we have seen in the former section, there are cases when the 
efficient contract lies on the labour demand curve. Assuming that the members’ 
u tility  is represented by a leader and there is a distinction between selfish 
members (insiders) and non-members (outsiders) or because o f LIFO, it  is 
plausible to expect that the horizontal segment emerges on the union’s 
indifference curve. As long as all the members (or the representative members) 
are employed, union becomes locally indifferent about expanding the level o f 
employment. W ith such an assumption, the simplified model predicts the 
negotiated wage to be a function o f the firm ’s profits and the external 
pressures. Under this assumption, discriminating criteria mostly chosen for 
these studies becomes unidentified. Moreover, the rejection o f either o f these 
polar models, even i f  the union cares about the employment level, does not 
necessarily lead to the acceptance o f the other. In the end, the actual 
bargaining seems best represented as weakly efficient with a good case for the 
efficiency wages consideration.
We start o ff with the first type o f empirical literature which mainly 
concentrate on the test o f the union objective function, followed by which the 
work involving a test o f efficiency o f a contract. And lastly, we review briefly 
those literature based on the model o f insider-outsiders. Their assumed 
structure o f the model, the method o f estimation and their major findings are 
discussed.
2.3.1 U nion’ s objective function
Farber (1978) is the first to carry out an empirical analysis on the union- 
firm  bargaining problem. He formulates the union behaviour o f the United Mine 
Workers (UMW) in the USA such that the union maximizes expected u tility  o f a 
median aged member subject to a labour demand curve. Institutional background o f 
the UMW  provided a suitable background for his formulation o f the monopoly union 
bargaining: the coal industry is labour intensive and UMW  had a dominant force 
in an industry because o f a growing concern over the OPEC o il embargo which made 
the union to be a monopolistic supplier o f labour to this industry. UMW  
negotiated for three types o f compensations, two types o f benefits and a direct 
payment. He assumes all members to be identical in their preferences over the 
total compensations. It is represented by the constant absolute risk aversion 
u tility  function that permits risk neutrality as a special case. Since workers 
vary in their age, he has allowed their preference over the income composition 
to vary. Then, a leader o f the UMW acts as i f  to satisfy the u tility  o f the
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median aged worker so as to minimize his risk o f losing a job. Hence the 
expected u tility  o f the union is represented as:
J i_  u m+ (1 - -£ -) U” (2-3-1)m v m 7 v 7
where Umis the u tility  o f employed members represented by that o f the median
worker (i.e ., leader) and Un is the u tility  o f unemployed members. Farber’s aim 
is to investigate the nature o f the union’s objective, in particular, the 
parameters that reflect risk averseness, relative importance o f direct wage 
payment versus fringe benefits and the rate o f time preference. Using annual 
data from 1947 to 73, the first order condition derived from the u tility  
maximization together with 7 other reduced form equations regarding the labour 
demand and other product market conditions are estimated by F IM L where additive 
error terms are assumed to be multivariate normal. He uses the average hourly 
earnings in durable goods manufacturing sector as a measure o f alternative wage. 
As a result, the union is shown to be highly risk averse (relative risk aversion 
coefficient is larger than 3.0) and the UMW ’s concern over employment is higher 
than that predicted by wage b ill maximization. Also, he finds that the workers 
value a dollar received as the fixed benefits more than they do as the 
discretionary income. Price o f o il is influential over the bargaining outcome, 
but on the whole, the union’s policy is not very responsive to any shift in the 
demand for coal. Also, he argues that the omission o f strike cost might have 
been responsible for the relatively high value o f risk averse parameter, i f  the 
strike activity and the union demand were positively correlated.
Carruth and Oswald (1985) has formulated a union behaviour o f the National 
Union o f Mine Workers (NUM) in Great Britain, under the monopoly union setting. 
The NUM is the single unusually militant trade union in the British coal 
industry which is nationalized. Their study focuses on the objective o f the 
union, in particular, the effect o f the shift in labour demand, alternative wage 
and technological change on wages. They start with the utilitarian u tility  
function where each identical worker is represented by a constant relative risk 
aversion u tility  with an additive "comparative" wage component. The reduced form 
labour demand is formed to include lagged value o f exogenous variables such as 
price o f o il to capture slow inter-fuel substitution. Technological progress is 
also incorporated, which they found best represented by a time trend rather than 
productivity per se. They estimate two models one with the instantaneous and 
another with the slower adjustment process between employment and wages. In the 
latter, the union determines a time path rather than a unique pair o f wages and
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employment by solving an intertemporal optimization problem where the partial
A  A
adjustment equation for the employment is: ANt=A(N-Nt-i), where N is the target 
level o f employment and parameter A reflects the speed o f adjustment.
The first order condition derived by maximizing the appropriate present 
value o f the utilitarian u tility  and the reduced form labour demand functions 
are together estimated by FIM L. Alternative wage measure in their case is the 
average earnings in the manufacturing sector. As a result, they find the partial 
adjustment framework better in explaining the NMW ’s behaviour. Relative risk 
aversion coefficient is very significant at around 0.8 (1.1 under intertemporal 
model). Also, they found the significant employment adjustment parameter, A, 
suggesting that a gap between the target and actual employment level in any one 
year is closed by as much as 50%.
Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) has adopted Stone-Geary u tility  function for 
the International Typographers Union (ITU) under the framework o f the labour 
demand model in the USA. Stone-Geary u tility  has wage b ill or rent maximand as 
its special case and can explicitly measure the relative weight between 
employment and wage in the union utility.
U(w/p,n) =  (w/p-y)e(n-6)10 (2-3-2)
This u tility  specification is also useful in finding out whether the absolute 
real wage, w/p, or the level above some "norm", r ,  matters to the union. For 
instance, i f  y is the lagged real wage, then the growth o f real wage is what 
matters to the union. In this way, Stone-Geary functional form enables us to 
test for interesting structural parameters representing the individual’s 
u tility . Institutional background o f the ITU, the homogeneity o f its members and 
its renowned democracy, justifies this single u tility  function to be the 
representative o f all its members. Also, the consensus is that the union is 
aware o f its industry’s competitiveness, hence, remain cooperative so as not to 
set wages unduly high. This is consistent with the assumption that the union 
chooses the value o f wage subject to the labour demand curve.
The reduced form labour demand function and the wage equation derived from 
the first order condition are together estimated simultaneously by F IM L.
A
Although the variation o f e across different union locals are notable, the wage
A
b ill and the rent maximand are both rejected, e lies somewhere between 0 and 
0.5, implying the union who places relative importance on the level o f
A
employment rather than supernumerary wage, (w/p-y). This y is significantly
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larger than 0, hence that the union makes a decision over wages with reference 
to some "norm” . However, the overall preferences seem to vary substantially 
across the locals. In some cases, the parameter estimates are pretty 
implausible. This may be due to the strictness o f the functional form assumed 
for the u tility  function posited above.
Pencavel (1984) has introduced the union u tility  function that is even more 
flexible than that o f Stone-Geary to investigate the union behaviour still 
constrained by the labour demand curve. He also uses the IT U ’s annual data in 10 
different cities. The addilog function represents the union’s u tility  which can 
accommodate the rent or wage b ill maximand in addition to the constant 
elasticity o f substitution utility. This is expressed as:
U(w/p,n) =  n (W/P 'f ] . ‘ '  1 +  (1-m) 1 0 ^ 1  (2-3-3)
Because o f the complexity o f this u tility  function, instead o f estimating the 
reduced form equation for the real wage, he directly estimates the marginal rate 
o f substitution (MRS) which has a simpler expression. The MRS is then equated to 
the slope o f a particular labour demand function, namely, exp(ax)/r. They are 
estimated jo in tly  by non-linear two stage least squares since the level o f 
employment is treated as endogenous. He finds that the u tility  function is 
generally quasi-concave in w and n. And the elasticity o f substitution between w 
and n is somewhere between 0 and unity, reflecting little  substitutability 
between the two. He has also found significant variations amongst different 
locals. Hence, he repeats the estimation by splitting the sample into large and 
small locals. The rent maximand hypothesis failed to be rejected by the larger 
locals, and in general, they tend to weigh the "supernumerary" wages more 
heavily than the employment (r here is set proportionate to the wage o f retail 
trade workers). This may be due to greater outside employment opportunities in 
bigger cities where the larger locals tend to be located.
On the basis o f assumption that the union and firm  bargain on the labour 
demand curve, what these empirical studies have shown in common are the 
following: the unions are concerned over the impact o f employment on wages more 
than they do under the risk neutrality. Exogenous shocks that affect the product 
demand are shown to have varying degree o f influence over the union. In fact, 
Pencavel, Dertouzos and Pencavel have found substantial variations in the 
union’s objective function in different locations even within a single union 
(ITU). Pencavel (1985), in his survey, has computed the elasticity o f
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substitution between wages and employment for the number o f empirical work, but 
they widely vary between 0.18 to 2.1 and some o f them are estimated imprecisely. 
Altogether, these results accentuate the importance o f the institutional and 
regional factors that are unique to each union and firm  concerned, hence, 
reminds us the necessity o f using the disaggregated data in analysing such 
union-firm bargaining behaviour.
A ll the studies introduced so far focused on the form o f the union’s 
objective functions while the number o f employment was always le ft to a firm  to 
decide unilaterally. Although the main concern was in the union’s objective 
function, it  was still necessary to posit a certain functional form for the 
labour demand function. In this way, these analysis involved a jo in t test o f the 
functional forms o f the union objectives as well as the labour demand function. 
Hence, any results derived hitherto depends on the correctness o f the 
alternative hypothesis, that is, the specification o f the labour demand 
function.
2 .3 .2 Form o f bargaining
In this section, we introduce the studies that test the efficiency o f 
contract while the objective function o f the union as well as that o f the firm  
are specified as the maintained hypothesis. Bear in mind that such tests still
depend crucially on the correctness o f the maintained hypothesis.
Comparison o f the efficiency o f contract is analogous to testing the form o f 
bargaining between two parties. In the labour demand model, the union maximizes 
its u tility  function with respect to wages while they face the trade o ff
relationship between w and n o f the labour demand curve. The result from such
bargaining lies on the labour demand curve where the marginal revenue product o f 
labour is equal to contract wage. However, this is not a Pareto efficient point. 
Both parties can gain by (efficient only in relation to the agents involved) 
moving away from the labour demand curve towards the contract curve. Pareto 
optimality is achieved on the contract curve, that is, when both parties bargain 
over wages and employment. Testing between these models have important policy 
implications, since, for instance, i f  a contract is efficient, the trade o ff
relation between wages and employment would be severed.
Before discussing the studies which test the form o f bargaining, let us 
discuss the work by Svejnar (1986) which tests the degree o f efficiency within 
the paradigm o f union and firm  that bargain over both employment level and wages
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by solving Nash maximization problem. The literature introduced so far may be 
called "institutional literature", in which they contained variables that were 
likely to affect the bargaining power as regressors in the reduced form wage 
equation. However, they do not generate any explicit concept o f the bargaining 
power nor do they incorporate the fear or the cost o f disagreement as 
influential to the wage-employment determination process. On the other hand, the 
literature on axiomatic formal bargaining theory recognize these factors but 
lacks flexib ility  in accommodating other factors that is required for the
empirical purposes. Svejnar has bridged them together and introduced the 
institutional aspect o f the bargaining by allowing such factors to take effect
via the bargaining power. As a result, the bargaining outcome is determined by 
such institutional factors, disagreement u tility  (status quo u tility ) and the 
fear o f disagreement, all within the context o f Nash bargaining. The 
disagreement u tility  reflects a threat point, which is analogous to the 
alternative wage. The fear o f disagreement is a measure o f risk averseness and 
it  determines the location o f the contract curve. Furthermore, additional 
consideration o f the bargaining power determines the location o f a unique
solution on the contract curve. The Nash maximand is:
(U(n,w) - U(w))r (TT(n) - n f *  (2-3-4)
which is to be maximized with respect to w and n. U(n,w) is an expected u tility  
function where the individual worker is represented by a constant risk aversion
function; U (w )=w  Is  (5 < 0  suggests risk averse agent). Under such setting, as 
long as the membership is more than employment, the outcome is efficient fo r any 
values o f risk aversion parameter. The first order condition from the
maximization yields two nonlinear equations for wages and employment which are 
estimated by iterative three stage least squares. Data used contains changes in 
wage levels o f 12 major unionized companies between 1950 and 70. For the wage 
equation, he uses two data that differs in the way wages were recorded. One 
records wage changes at each bargain, while another reported every wage change 
including those brought about by the cost o f living adjustment provisions 
(COLA), thus the latter has inflated sample size. Nonetheless, the results are 
very similar. A test for a strong efficiency hypothesis, where the workers are 
risk neutral, had failed to be rejected for the most companies although y varied 
substantially across firms. In view o f this, he estimates the unrestricted model 
under Cobb-Douglas production technology with the bargaining power y that is
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allowed to vary with exogenous factors. He finds that the union’s bargaining 
power rises with inflation and COLA, while negatively correlated with 
unemployment and wage/price control policies. These results supports the view 
that the exogenous factors influence the outcome above the threat point via 
their effect on the union’s bargaining power. Under the context o f bargaining 
over both w and n, this model did not provide a solution to be on the labour 
demand curve. But this does not mean a rejection o f the labour demand model i f  
it  is supplemented by the additional assumption that the union is indifferent 
over the certain level o f employment.
The following literature test the efficiency o f the contract across 
different forms o f bargaining. Union and firm  may bargain over both employment 
and wages, or may bargain only over wages, in which case the outcome lies on the 
labour demand curve.
Let us consider how we can differentiate the labour demand model (LDM ) from 
the efficient contract model (ECM) when there is no restriction over the form o f 
bargaining. For the union u tility function, u=u(w ,n), which is quasi-concave and 
continuous, and the firm ’s objective function, which is represented as profits, 
?r=R-wn the LDEM predicts that the employment should be set where the value o f 
marginal product o f labour is equal to the contract wage;
R =  w (2-3-5)
n
On the other hand, ECM produces a contract curve equation which is a locus o f 
possible outcome pairs, that is;
R = n ( U / U )  +  w
n n w
=  ( e +  1 ) w (2-3-6)
nw
where enw is the elasticity o f employment with respect to wages. Comparing 
equation (2-3-5) and (2-3-6), it is the marginal rate o f substitution that is 
present under ECM but not under LDEM. This additional term is non-zero only i f  
Un> 0  and Uw>0 . As has been discussed in the former section, when the union is 
indifferent over the level o f employment so that Un=0, efficient contract lies 
on the labour demand curve. In such a case, the LD and EC are 
indistinguishable2. For the moment, exclude such possibilities so that U n> 0  and 
Uw> 0 . Here, we introduce two representative papers that has tried discriminating 
these two models. They both used data o f ITU  in the USA but differs in the
89
choice o f criteria with which to differentiate the two. Brown and Ashenfelter 
(1986) is more restrictive than MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986) in their functional 
form specification, and they meet the conclusion from the opposite extreme forms 
o f bargaining. Later, we represent other work which also tackled this problem.
Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) first o f all, assume the elasticity term enw to
depend on alternative wage, w, which does not appear in the equation (2-3-5), so 
that equation (2-3-5) and (2-3-6) are identified. On the basis o f this
assumption, their test becomes an exclusion test o f w in the employment 
equation. They assume reduced form o f workers’ marginal revenue product to take 
the following form:
In (Rn) =  «0 +  a X - a2ln(n) (2-3-7)
where X is the vector o f exogenous variables. Assume either expected u tility  or 
Stone-Geary u tility  function to derive the marginal rate o f substitution 
equation, which, substituted into (2-3-7) forms an employment equation. Then, 
the ECM and LDEM is differentiated by the existence o f w in the employment 
equation. In particular, they have focused on the strong efficiency, an extreme 
case o f the efficient contract, where a level o f employment is determined only 
by the alternative wage. This holds i f  the workers are risk neutral, that is, i f  
they are characterized as having a rent or some monotonic transformation o f rent 
as the u tility  function. A t this point, it is socially efficient. Even though 
this is very restrictive on the individual u tility , they argue that, 
collectively, there is an incentive to act as i f  they are risk neutral by 
setting up an efficient employment benefit system which completely insures them 
from a risk o f disemployment, even when an individual worker is risk averse. 
Then, under the world o f uncertainty and imperfect information, workers as a 
group tend to act as risk neutral, and consequently makes otherwise weakly 
efficient3 contract strongly efficient. This is so unless there exist some human 
or technical obstacles which hinder such insurance provision to be made. This 
argument makes their focusing on the test o f strong efficiency, as opposed to 
just weak efficiency, somewhat less restrictive, since the individual worker 
does not have to be risk neutral to achieve the strong efficiency as a group. 
Nonetheless, for the efficiency o f a contract to prevail, the weak efficiency 
has to be at least satisfied.
Their estimation reveals that the level o f employment was affected by the
contract wage even after controlling for w, leading to the rejection o f strong 
efficiency. This means the rejection o f the ECM i f  the risk neutrality o f the
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union or the existence o f the complete insurance provision were true. On the 
other hand, i f  there were no such complete insurance provisions, the rejection 
o f efficiency is probably due to the risk neutrality assumption which is too 
restrictive in a real world. Moreover, their entire analysis bases crucially on 
the assumption that the marginal rate o f substitution between labour and wage 
depends on the alternative wage. I f  this is not the case, employment can be
independent o f w even under the efficient contract4. Also, in the course o f 
estimation, they use lagged contract wages as instruments for the current wage. 
This is only valid i f  these instruments do not appear in the union’s objective 
function or i f  there is no lagged partial adjustment mechanism in the formation 
o f union policy.
MaCurdy and Pencavel’s (1986) paper does not test the exclusion o f 
alternative wages in the employment equation since their marginal rate o f
substitution does not necessarily depend on w. Instead, they test the existence 
o f the marginal substitution term itself in the the stochastic marginal value o f 
labour equation. When there are input factors other than labour, at equilibrium, 
the ratio o f marginal products o f the two inputs is equal to the ratio o f their 
prices. And this relation is equivalent under both regimes except fo r the
marginal rate o f substitution term, which is only present under the ECM. This 
term reduces to the elasticity term o f equation (2-3-6) in the single input 
case. They estimate the stochastic marginal value o f labour for a very general 
form o f the marginal rate o f substitution, namely, a non-linear function o f 
employment and a set o f union size and time dummies. They consider the Stone- 
Geary or rent maximizing union u tility  with the Cobb-Douglas or translog 
production function. They derive the marginal product for each input, whose 
which are substituted in the place o f marginal value o f labour in the final 
equation to be estimated. They find this additional term important, which is an 
evidence against the LDEM. However, this does not mean the acceptance o f the 
ECM. For that, they required further assumption over the form o f union maximand.
Oswald and Christofides (1987) has also tested the validity o f the LDEM 
against the ECM in the context o f Canadian private unionized sector in 
manufacturing and trade &  services. Given the utilitarian union u tility , perfect
competitive product market, the reduced form employment is: n=n(w /p,w /c,w /c,p/c) 
under the efficient bargain, where c is consumer price index, and n=n(w /p) under 
the LDEM. This assumption o f the perfect competitive environment in which the 
producer competes is commonly assumed throughout the empirical studies discussed
so far. However, this assumption may be too restrictive, and on this ground,
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they set up the case where the firm  faces the monopolistic product market. 
Corresponding employment function is: n=n(w/c,p,c,z) for the LDEM  and
n=n(w/c,p,c,z,w /c) for the ECM where z denotes a vector o f demand shock. In both
cases, a rejection o f the LDEM follows i f  the alternative wage, w, is found to 
be significant in the employment equation. Under the ECM, employment equation is 
a solution from the Nash optimization problem. Here, the bargaining power is 
assumed to depend on the government wages, incomes policy, negotiating stage o f 
a contract and the outside rate o f unemployment. Their data details in wage 
levels and number o f employees at the time o f each settlement, hence it  is 
possible to measure the real wages at the beginning o f the current contract and 
those at the end o f the previous contract. They introduce a lag structure to the 
static representation o f the employment equation to take into account o f the 
adjustment cost. These lagged variables in the equation are their levels at each 
contract and not their quarterized or annualized averages. As a proxy to the 
alternative wage, they use 3 measures; regional wage rate, regional unemployment 
benefit and regional benefit duration. Consequently, the differenced employment 
equation that eliminates the fixed effect is estimated. They find weakly 
significant negative effect o f the alternative wage variables in either product 
market conditions. Moreover, the strong efficiency fails to be rejected. On the 
other hand, employment equation estimated solely with the lagged product wage 
performs well with highly significant negative effect which is consistent with 
the LDEM. On the whole, these results failed to reach any consensus.
Bean and Turnbull (1987) and Card (1986) have also tested the efficiency o f 
the contract by focusing on the significance o f variables that affect the 
alternative wage (i.e., outside variables) in the reduced form employment
equation. They also assume that the term enw in equation (2-3-6) depends on w. 
Bean and Turnbull use annual data on British Coal industry and Card uses 
quarterly data on 7 major airline union in the USA. Under the ECM, contract wage 
is endogenous, therefore, appropriate selection o f the instruments are necessary 
in order to identify the contract curve. However, Card treats contract wage 
exogenous on the ground that the lagged employment failed to Granger cause 
current wages in the autoregression o f wages. As Bean and Turnbull points out, 
Granger non-causality is not sufficient nor necessary for the weak exogeneity 
required for the estimation o f employment equation. Brown and Ashenfelter, on 
the other hand, has used the lagged contract wages while MaCurdy and Pencavel 
relied on the location dummies and time trends. Identification is ensured only 
i f  the instruments do not come into the union’s u tility  function, while at the
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same time, affect the bargaining power. Therefore, Bean and Turnbull have chosen 
the variables that affect the status quo utilities o f both parties as 
instruments. For a given production technology and u tility  function, they 
estimate reduced form labour demand equation using the appropriate instruments 
and find the outside variables such as benefits or manufacturing wage
significant. However, they argue that i f  the labour market tightness (i.e ., w) 
predicts future contract wage and employment depends on future as well as 
current wages, then the significance o f alternative wages in the static 
employment equation may not necessarily mean a rejection o f the LDEM. When such 
intertemporal relation exists, alternative wage can affect the level o f 
employment not only directly but also indirectly via its effect on the future 
contract wage.
Hence, they introduces a possibility o f such intertemporal relation by 
imposing a decision making on the firm  whether to mine now or later, on the 
basis o f the exhaustiveness o f coal. The union is assumed to remain having a 
myopic view while the firm  maximizes the expected present value o f profits 
subject to non-negative unmined reserve o f coal at any time. They then derive 
and estimate the Euler equation. The instrument are any variables belonging to 
the information at (t-1) by rational expectation assumption. This enables us to 
see i f  the outside variables are correlated with employment such that they help 
determine the future contract wages. Results are rather consistent with the ECM 
prediction with the significant alternative wage variables.
Card has also introduced such dynamics by considering adjustment cost in the 
firm ’s objective function that include hiring, firing cost and cost o f 
rearranging schedules. The firm  minimizes the expected present value o f total 
cost subject to the expected utility requirement o f workers, and derive a 
reduced form employment equation where such adjustment cost yields a serial 
persistence term. I f  it is the labour demand model, so that the alternative wage
has only indirect effect on n via future contract wage, then w and the contract 
wage should both have positive signs in the employment equation provided that 
the future contract wage and alternative wage is positively correlated. On the 
other hand, i f  the model is strongly efficient, so that there is only a direct 
effect o f alternative wages on employment, it ’s effect on n should depend on the 
role that product price plays in forecasting the future contract wage. However,
w and w are found to have opposite signs in the employment equation. And w 
reversed its sign when the product price was also introduced in the wage 
forecast equation. Hence, these two polar models are both rejected against a
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general unrestricted model where the employment depends on w as well as w. Their 
point estimates suggest negative effect o f alternative wage and positive effect 
o f contract wage on n, although neither o f them are significant. On the whole, 
the reduced form employment equation derived from the formal bargaining model 
has not performed better relative to the unrestricted model o f auto regression.
The significance o f alternative wage found in these models, however, does 
not yet mean an acceptance o f the ECM. It may well be due to misspecifications 
o f the production technology or the union’s u tility  function. These results are 
consistent with the bargaining over man-machine ratios, in which case, the 
solution w ill be o ff the contract curve. Moreover, other theory o f wage- 
employment relation such as the efficiency wage predicts that the discrepancy o f 
w from w is necessary to prevent shirking, to reduce turnover or to induce 
effort, thus, leading to productivity growth. Under this theory, improvements in 
the outside opportunities w ill reduce productivity and increases the number o f 
quits. Employment in such case w ill depend on the alternative wage even i f  
bargaining does not take place over the level o f employment. N ickell and 
Whadwani (1987) gives a similar explanation for their finding o f the positive 
alternative wage effect in the employment equation. Their employment equation 
uses 219 U .K. firms over the period 1974-82, is particularly rich in financial 
factors by considering that the employers should sensitive to the costly 
bankruptcy. They argue that their finding is explained by the LDE model modified
to allow for the efficiency wage considerations. As w increases, the employer 
raise w as long as the gain from increased productivity outweighs the labour 
cost. As can be seen, these considerations cast further doubt to the rejection 
o f the LDEM merely on the basis o f significant alternative wages in the 
employment equation. This is making it more and more d ifficu lt to empirically 
test between the LDEM and the ECM.
So far, we have been discussing the empirical studies that test between the 
labour demand and the efficient contract model o f the union-firm bargaining. 
Discrimination between such models is possible for the u tility  function that has 
uw> 0  and un>0 . As has been pointed out previously, when the union is indifferent
to the level o f employment (i.e., u =0), this discrimination becomes impossible
n
since the labour demand curve coincides with the contract curve. Let us call 
such model where the union is indifferent to the level o f employment as the Flat 
Indifference Curve model (FIC) (Carruth, Oswald and Findlay (1985)). Some o f the 
rationales for the FIC model are as follows: (l)layoffs take place by the order
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o f inverse seniority (or o f any known order) in the majority voting union,
(2)there is a distinction between members and non-members and that the members 
are only interested in their own employment status (see section 5). This model 
provides many predictions that are not given by the previous models, in 
particular, the existence o f wage differentials between workers in different 
plants despite controlling for their non-pecuniary characteristics. Such 
differentials are, instead, explained by the financial performances and the 
market conditions.
Carruth, Oswald and Findlay has tested the behaviour o f the union at the 
flat segment o f the indifference curve against the LDEM by estimating the 
reduced form wage and employment equation. Direct estimation o f the reduced form 
equation avoids making any ad hoc specifications o f the agents’ objective 
functions. A t such point, the variables that affect alternative wage should not 
affect the union’s indifference curve since the employed members are indifferent 
to the welfare o f the unemployed. They test the exclusion hypothesis o f 
variables such as unemployment benefit and unemployment rate in the reduced form 
wage and employment equation. But using the annual data on British steel and 
coal industries for the post war era (1950-80), these variables are found 
significant, leading to a rejection o f the FIC model. One o f the explanation to 
this finding is the outside wage that was used to capture the comparison effect 
in the union u tility . It is very likely that the average wages and unemployment 
benefit are collinear, hence, making it d ifficu lt to disentangle their effect in 
the wage equation. In other words, union’s indifference over employment does not 
necessarily mean the absence o f alternative wage effect in the wage equation 
since they may affect the union’s fa ll back wage. Moreover, the unions they have 
chosen may not have been the most appropriate candidate for the FIC model, since 
the steel industry was experiencing massive layoffs at a time and the coal 
industry is regarded as having one o f the most altruistic union.
Similar finding can be seen in Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1988) and 
Beckerman and Jenkinson (1989) who have constructed a simple model o f FIC for 
the union which is indifferent to the level o f employment. Assume a risk neutral 
union so that their u tility  is linear in wage, and the bargaining outcome 
maximizes a Nash formula:
max (w -w ^ tt-tt) 
where n=  max R-wn-k. The first order condition gives:n
(n - n)*(r +  (w - w) =  0
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while 7Tw=-n by duality, hence:
. <r(n - n) w =  w +  ——-— L n
Thus, the equilibrium wage is a weighted average o f fa ll back wage and profit
per employee. As this simplified case suggests, one can view the wage
determination as a kind o f rent sharing where the workers’ bargaining power is 
influenced by the external labour market conditions. Hence, pay depends not only
on the external pressures that affect w, but also on the internal pressures,
that are, profitability o f the firm  including the market power and the market 
condition o f the firm . And the relative importance o f these two components 
depends on the power o f insiders as opposed to that o f outsiders. Note that this 
argument holds also for the non-union environment as long as insiders are not so 
close substitutes o f outsiders.
Their regression estimates o f the wage equation on internal and external 
variables have found both o f these factors influential. In particular,
Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett have shown that internal factors do not have 
strong impact amongst the unskilled non-union sector; the sector w ith easily 
replaceable workers. As representing outsider pressures, they have found the 
regional, global unemployment, or the outside wages significant in determining 
the contract wages. On the other hand, since this theory assumes the insiders 
who only care about the size o f their pay so as to set the expected employment 
to equal the union’s membership, any increase in demand tends to translate into 
a wage gain rather than to an employment gain. This, in the empirical wage 
equation, should give rise to a positive industry or firm  specific unemployment 
effect. This causes persistent unemployment despite the fluctuations in the 
aggregate demand; the hysteresis effect in the economy. Its pure insider view 
predicts their wage setting to be completely independent o f the outside labour 
market conditions (Blanchard and Summers (1987)). In the work o f N ickell and 
Whadwani (1989), they use the disaggregated firm  level data and also found the 
role o f insider and outsider pressures significant in their wage determination. 
In particular, they have found the hysteresis effect, as insider variables, that 
strengthened for the firms with decentralized bargaining. As for the outsider 
variables, they have found variables representing the state o f labour market, 
particularly, the level o f aggregate unemployment and the proportion o f long 
term unemployed playing a significant role in the determination o f contract 
wages at the firm  level, therefore, rejecting the pure insider view. In
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Beckerman and Jenkinson, they have found the significant negative aggregate 
unemployment and positive industry specific unemployment effect on the industry 
wages; a finding also consistent with the insider-outsider hysteresis. However, 
N ickell and Whadwani (1987), also using the firm  level data, have found both 
aggregate and industry specific unemployment to depress wages. They resort rises 
in average wages to the extent that higher unemployment level boosts 
productivity, rationalised within an efficiency wage framework, and the rise in 
the long term unemployed.
2.3.3 Conclusion
It seems that the unions do care about wages as well as employment, but 
their exact form is still unknown. Based on the certain form o f agents’ 
objective functions, both the strong efficiency and the pure labour demand model 
are often rejected, although this does not necessarily mean the acceptance o f 
the weaker efficient contract. Their test is mostly confined to the existence o f 
alternative wages in the employment equation which has to be derived from the 
particular u tility  and production structure. Hence, it is based on the 
maintained hypothesis that these objective functions are correctly specified, 
but that may not be the case. On the other hand, the pure insider-outsider or 
the seniority theory implies the observationally equivalent employment function 
under the LDEM and ECM. And it  seems to be able to explain the stylized facts 
that the union and employer both bargain over wages but only the employer 
retains the power to determine employment except in the case o f massive layoffs 
(i.e ., bargaining takes place on the labour demand curve). S till, empirically, 
the pure insider model where the outside labour market conditions becomes 
irrelevant, seems too simple. This may invalidates their assumption that workers 
do not care about employment, but introducing the possibility o f comparability 
(relative wage) effect in the union’s u tility  function can help avert the 
rejection o f the model. On the whole, the more sophisticated version o f the 
labour demand model which takes into account o f considerations such as the 
efficiency wage theory seems better able to explain the wage-employment nexus. 
Last point: unions located in different cities have shown substantial variations 
in their objective functions, hence, empirical studies o f bargaining seem to 
crucially depend on the union’s institutional and local labour market 
characteristics.
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Footnotes to chapter 2
1. Under general equilibrium, contract wage is equal to outside wage. (pp. 16)
2. However, even i f  one believes that such situation may arise due to insider-
outsider consideration or LIFO, there still is a ground for testing such 
framework against the LDEM. For as long as the level o f employment is less 
than the level o f membership, outcome should lie  on the contract curve and 
not on the labour demand curve. This means that testing between LDEM  and ECM 
by exclusion condition may be more applicable for the industry which is 
declining than that o f expanding, (pp.31)
3. Weak efficiency means that the level o f employment is affected both by
contract wage and alternative wage.(pp.32)
4. Example o f such quasi-concave utility function is: u=(w /w )a</>(n) where 0(n) is
some increasing function o f n. In this case, value o f marginal product is 
independent o f n, so as the marginal rate o f substitution, (pp.32)
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Chapter 3: The Data
3.1 Aberdeen database
The primary data to be used in our study is the "Aberdeen wages rate database" 
which was constructed at the tfniversity o f Aberdeen by Elude, Steele and Bell (1977). 
Figures are collated originally from the Department o f Employment publications, 
"Time rates o f wages and hours o f work" and "Changes in rates o f wages and hours 
o f work", where the exact level o f wages were mainly collected from the former 
source. The data contain the details o f all the wage settlements o f the 191 largest 
national negotiating groups o f manual workers between 1950 to 1975 inclusive. Those 
groups had to be covering at least 5000 workers some point in the sample period. They 
are divided into 2 files.
3.1.1 The agreement data
The agreement data file  details information on all o f the 191 agreement titles where 
the agreement title  being the name o f each bargaining group. They include the 
bargaining system employed, the trade unions involved, the geographical area covered 
and the number o f workers covered. In general, each agreement title  involves more 
than one trade union and the same trade union often appears in more than one 
agreement title. The file  lists the outcome o f centrally determined arrangement only and 
the changes negotiated at district, establishment or shop floor level are not reported. 
The bargaining systems are categorized into wages council, Whitley Council, local 
authority, nationalized industries, or private sector employers and others. This is 
important since each can face a very different bargaining environment. For example, 
public sector, in general, incorporates more sophisticated bargaining process and tends 
to be influenced more frequently by the government controls or arbitrations.
3.1.2 The settlement data
The settlements file  contains information regarding each settlement fo r a ll 
bargaining groups over time. The data include settlements made up to 1975, where 
applicable, although the data start at different dates for different groups owing to the 
nature o f each agreement. Note also that a number o f settlements is not equal for each
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group which gives rise to the unbalanced nature to our panel data. They contain, for 
each title  o f the agreement, the date o f implementation and settlement. These dates 
sometimes differ, particularly for the staged implementations. Any set o f im ­
plementation dates that constitute stages have the same settlement dates but the 
converse is not necessarily true. While the former is always reported, the latter date 
is mostly not available. The file  lists rates o f basic wages or minimum entitlement and 
normal weekly hours negotiated at each settlement. Series o f hourly rates were 
calculated as a weekly figure divided by normal weekly hours. Wage rates recorded 
are those o f the highest paying district outside London. Wages reported o f manual 
workers are categorized into several types, namely, top male, semi-skilled male, 
bottom male and female. They also contain several codings. First coding gives a 
detailed sources o f government intervention or arbitration whenever they interfere with 
the negotiations. There are 8 categories o f interventions and those are namely, National 
Arbitration Tribunal &  Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Industrial Court or Industrial 
Arbitration Board, Court o f Inquiry, Ad hoc Arbitration Boards &  Single Arbitrators, 
Public Sector Arbitration Board, Committees o f Inquiry &  Investigation, National 
Board for Prices &  Incomes and lastly, other forms o f intervention. There is also a 
binary series which indicates the presence o f indexation clause. When applicable, a 
wage change takes place in accordance to some formula based on the movement o f 
retail price index rather than as a result o f negotiation. There are very few groups who 
incorporates COLA clause as principal means in determining wages. We can identify 
these groups since the majority o f their wage changes are coded as COLA induced. 
Basic wages are recorded in the data set in most cases, although the data identifies 
when only the minimum earning levels are available. The data also identifies any wage 
changes implemented as a part o f long-term staged settlement. A staged settlement is 
part o f the multiple wage changes that stems from one negotiation. The data records 
the dates o f a ll wage changes as long as they arise from the different negotiations. W ith 
respect to the staged settlements, therefore, only the last implementation is recorded 
together with the wage changes that are aggregated to this last date. However, when 
the stages are implemented over more than one calendar year, they are recorded each 
year as separate settlements. In such cases, the coding distinguishes whether the stages 
were implemented across different calendar years or they a ll took place w ithin one 
calendar year.
There are few information that we would like to know but were not available in this 
data set. The details o f every implementations, when and by how much the wages have 
changed are crucial in our study o f wage determination process. Although a distinction 
is made for each individual bargaining whether it is a part o f staged settlements, it is 
not often possible to identify the date o f the original settlement. Sometimes unplanned 
bargain takes place between the staged settlements. Different sets o f long-term staged 
settlements may overlap with each other. Each consecutive staged wage changes are 
not necessarily coming from the same original settlement. It is then d ifficu lt fo r us to 
clarify the starting and the ending o f a certain staged settlement. This is because o f the 
nature o f this particular coding employed in this data, and also, the settlement dates 
that are not available most o f the time.
Secondly, the data set does not record every stages i f  they take place w ithin the 
same calendar year. Hence, when the multiple stages were implemented w ithin one 
calendar year, we need to unearth the details o f every stage which has occurred in that 
same year prior to the last implementation date. Aggregation o f wage changes to the 
last implementation date clearly understates the number o f actual settlements occurred 
to this bargaining group over time, while, overstates the magnitude o f wage changes 
at this last date. Same thing applies to the wage changes triggered by the indexation 
clause. For instance, under the threshold arrangement governed by the Counter- 
inflation order, which took place mainly from May 1974 t ill the end o f the year, same 
amount o f special payments, determined every month according to the movement o f 
price index, were made to all the groups which joined the policy. In the data set, only 
the last implementation date in November 74 is recorded together with the wage rates 
that include the sum o f the threshold payments summed up to this last date. In the 
process o f retrieval, we assumed such special payments to have been incorporated into 
the basic pay on the date o f the payments.
Thirdly, from the early 70’s, a movement which aimed to achieve the equal pay for 
male and female engaged in equivalent jobs have prevailed throughout the industries. 
This was initiated by the b ill presented in 1970 to the Parliament in which it 
recommended such objectives to be achieved by the end o f 1975. During these period, 
there often were stages aimed only for female workers or sometimes, female workers 
and juvenile workers. It was considered, therefore, useful to distinguish such staged 
settlements aimed for particular workers from the rest o f staged settlements.
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Lastly, any planned wage changes known to be deferred due to the standstill 
arrangement need to be identified.
For these reasons, it  was necessary to go back to the monthly Labour Gazette from 
which these data were originally collated. The additional information extracted are then 
summarized into the following new seven series, created for each wage change.
3.2 The new series
ista: (knot staged, 1:staged, 2:staged according to the data but the gazette does not 
specify, 3:gazette specifies as staged while the data does not.
It indicates i f  a change in hourly wages is a part o f a long run staged 
settlement. This distinguishes the case when it was recognized as staged only 
in the gazette but not in the original data, and vice versa.
insta: (knot applicable 1:1st stage, 2:2nd stage, 3 :.......
Given that this wage change is a part o f staged settlement, this variable states 
the stage o f this particular implementation, 
id fix : (knot applicable, l:no t known, 2:staged but the date is not planned,
3:staged and it took place at planned date, 4:staged and had a planned date but 
altered.
This variable indicates whether the date (up to a month) o f this particular 
implementation were planned when this settlement was first agreed, and i f  they 
were, whether they in fact took effect as planned. When the agreement is 
amended, the succeeding stages are treated as stemming from the separate 
settlement. However, since the first stage o f amended settlement was planned 
at the beginning o f the original settlement, it is coded as 3. Rest o f the time, 
id fix =1 for the first stage o f any staged settlement. When the plan was altered 
due to the standstill arrangement, id fix =4, and it  is further indicated in another 
series called ifrez.
ifix : (knot applicable, l:no t known, 2:staged but the size is not planned, 3: staged and 
the size was realized as planned, 4:staged but the size was not realized as 
planned
This variable states i f  the magnitude o f wage change was planned at the in itia l
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agreement and i f  so, whether they actually took effect as planned. I  assumed all 
o f the following cases to have the planned wage changes:(l)wage changes 
planned in terms o f a percentage o f previously determined wage, (2)wage 
changes planned so as to achieve equal pay with the compatible male workers,
(3)wage changes planned so as to equate the current minimum earnings level 
to the basic minimum wage, (4)hourly wage changes to take place as a result 
o f planned changes in hours worked without a loss o f pay, and this change in 
weekly hours were planned, 
ifem: 1:staged implementation for female workers, 0:no
This is a binary variable indicating whether this implementation is a part o f the 
staged settlement for female workers as a movement towards equal pay. This 
includes the case when the wage changes take effect both fo r male and female 
but the gazette states that only the female wages were planned. In most cases, 
staged wage changes for the female workers are also designated towards the 
juvenile workers who are mostly male workers, 
ifrez: l:deferred due to freeze policy, 0:no
This is a dummy variable indicating that the planned implementation date was 
deferred in accordance with the standstill arrangement, 
ich: 1:working hours change, 0:no
This dummy variable states whether this wage change took effect as a result o f 
planned change in hours worked without a loss o f pay.
3.3 Series o f exogenous variables
(l)Retention Ratio: Retention ratio was calculated as the ratio o f disposable income to 
the income before tax, both derived before providing for the depreciation and stock 
appreciation. They are seasonally adjusted figures. The definition o f personal 
disposable income is the total personal income before tax less tax on income, less 
national insurance and health contribution, less remittances abroad. Both series were 
taken from the appropriate series in Economic Trends (ET) which gives annual figures 
from 1946 to 1954 and quarterly figures from 1955 onwards up to 1975.
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(2)RPI: Monthly, seasonally unadjusted figures for the general index o f retail price on 
a ll items (as compared to that o f foods or wholesale goods) are available from January 
1949 to 1975 inclusive (1962 Q3 =  100). The monthly figures from mid 1947 to 1949 
were derived from the series o f interim index o f retail prices from the Monthly Digest 
o f Statistics (MDS) which was the only price index available fo r the pre 48 era. 
Figures for the later years are collected from ET. They were made consistent to the 
series o f 1949 onwards through the figures in the overlapping periods.
(3)Unemployment: Quarterly figures for national unemployment levels in GB are 
extracted from British Labour Statistics (BLS) between 1948,Q2 and 1975 inclusive. 
They are the actual numbers in thousands who are registered as wholly unemployed 
excluding school leavers in GB and are seasonally unadjusted.
(4)Productivity: Annual index from 1950 to 59 and quarterly index from 1960 to 75 
o f output per head are extracted from ET (1960=100). They are the gross domestic 
product at constant prices (output-based) divided by total number o f labour force which 
includes not only employees but also employers and self-employed persons. This series, 
"output-per-head" was first introduced in 1968, at the time, the series was re-calculated 
from 1950. The figures prior to 1950 were computed from the existing series o f total 
labour force and index o f gross domestic product according to the definition o f this 
series. There was a problem since the series o f total employed labour force changed 
its definition and began including private indoor domestic services since October 1948. 
From the overlapping periods, we deduced the numbers engaged in such service to be 
2850 and computed the corresponding figures for pre 50 periods.
(5)Employment: Total number o f employed labour force in thousand defined as total 
c iv il employment plus H .M . forces in GB. This is seasonally unadjusted and collected 
from BLS.
(6)Eamings: The level o f average weekly earnings in pence are collected from MDS 
(originally from Labour Gazette). They are general averages covering all classes o f 
manual workers, including unskilled, general labourers, and operatives in skilled 
occupation. They represent the actual earnings per week, including payments for
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overtime, night work, and those provided by payment by results. They also include 
non-contractual gifts and bonuses paid that are averaged out to give weekly figures.
(7)Wholesale input and output prices: Quarterly, seasonally unadjusted wholesale input 
price index (on materials and fuel purchased by manufacturing industry) and wholesale 
output price index (on all manufacturing products) are available from BLS since 1954 
(1975 =  100).
(8)Unemployment per industry: Industry specific unemployment figures are available 
only for the manufacturing industries. They are "numbers o f persons registered as 
wholly unemployed, by industry order" which were available quarterly from BLS.
(9)Profits per industry: Trading profits per industry is available only for the 
manufacturing industries from National Income and Expenditure. There are few 
difficulties in treating this series as consistent throughout our sample period. First, 
figures are only available according to the 1948 SIC coding for the earlier period. But 
their categories do not exactly match with the recent SIC. Second, figures are derived 
based on the tax assessment. Problem occurs since the particular tax system, on which 
the trading profits measure depends, has changed in 1965 from the profit and income 
tax to the corporate tax. The corporate tax is levied on total net income including non- 
trading income after deducting for capital allowances. But prior to 65, income and 
profit tax was levied on the gross trading profit. Hence, figures fo r later years are 
subject to wider margins o f errors to the earlier figures. Nonetheless, there was no
variable mean std dev min max
rpi 108.35 40.04 55.3 264.3
retention ratio 0.842 0.029 0.761 0.876
earning 15.65 10.04 4.95 49.79
productivity 105.20 21.46 63.1 144.3
unemployment 419.46 168.20 162.5 928.6
employment 24385.1 801.83 22965 25358
(Table 3.1.A) Descriptive statistics
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other series which reflects industry specific economic situation throughout our 
sampleperiod, hence, we had no choice but to resort to this series. In particular, we 
use the "gross" profits, that is the value before deducting for depreciation allowances.
These series are only available discretely, although they are supposed to be 
continuously changing over time. In particular, corresponding values o f these series at 
the week o f every negotiation are necessary for our analysis. We therefore interpolate 
the available data points linearly, constructing the time path made out o f linear 
segments. This enables us to assign the weighted average o f adjacent available values
industry variable mean std dev min max
Food, drink profits 413.34 131.52 195.0 641.5
unemp 17.26 5.50 7.8 33.6
Chemical profits 338.96 147.26 128.0 879.3
unemp 7.18 3.11 3.2 16.9
Metal profits 208.65 62.18 79.9 311.5
unemp 9.78 7.98 2.7 48.4
Engineer profits 571.90 228.84 250.0 1141.2
unemp 26.59 15.81 9.7 83.4
Ship bldg profits 22.93 8.58 10.1 42.0
unemp 10.22 3.53 4.9 23.4
Vehicles profits 193.27 64.0 107.0 437.2
unemp 10.29 7.38 3.7 5.0
else Metal profits 133.89 44.78 64.0 258.4
unemp 9.95 6.48 3.3 34.1
Textile profits 199.64 48.14 127.3 376.0
unemp 14.67 6.28 5.9 34.0
Leather profits 12.45 4.59 7.0 26.9
unemp 1.10 0.41 0.5 2.4
Cloth, foot profits 62.57 22.49 30.9 127.3
unemp 7.87 2.68 3.8 18.1
Bricks,pottery profits 129.91 79.40 46.0 340.9
unemp 6.17 2.75 2.2 15.3
Timber, furniture profits 37.93 24.70 20.1 128.3
unemp 5.65 2.15 2.7 11.7
Paper,printing profits 191.28 74.17 89.3 425.8
unemp 5.77 3.28 1.8 16.7
Others profits 77.55 35.98 31.5 159.5
unemp 5.70 2.89 2.2 16.8
Construction profits 187.21 119.33 46.0 496.1
unemp 72.95 37.53 21.9 173.7
(Table 3.1.B) Descriptive statistics: profits and unemployment per industry
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to be the corresponding value for the each implementation date recorded in the data 
set.Their movements overtime are plotted in figures (3.1)-(3.8) and their descriptive 
statistics are listed in table 3.1.A and 3 .I.B .
3.4 Importance o f National Agreement during 1947-1975
Increase in the size o f earnings drift, the difference between the actual earnings and 
the basic wage rates, since the war drew concern o f the Donovan Commission who 
blamed the cause o f such gap to be the growing popularity o f informal shop-floor 
bargaining. They argued that this phenomena has led to inefficiency by providing a 
ground for the shop stewards to exploit the plant-level institutions with their own 
interests which are not necessarily justified in the economic ground (E lliot, (1976)). 
They recommended to institutionalize the plant/company level bargaining so that the 
wage setting can keep stronger link with the level o f productivity, therefore, leads to 
higher efficiency. In 1973 and 78, New Earnings Survey published the details o f a 
number o f workers affected by the various types o f collective agreements, namely: 
national agreement only, national plus supplementary company-district-local agreement, 
company-district-local agreement only and no agreement. The actual question which 
was asked in the survey was, ’please indicate the type o f negotiated collective 
agreement, i f  any, which affects the pay and condition o f employment o f this employee 
either directly or indirectly’ .
Comparing the figures between 73 and 78, there indeed is a small but clear trends 
towards the disaggregated level o f agreements (i.e., company, district, local 
agreements), particularly in manual groups. However, 72% and 64.6% o f manual male 
workers were still affected by some form o f national agreement in 73 and 78 
respectively,(that is to say, they belong to either first or second categories above) 
indicating quite a substantial coverage.
Another source o f information is the data from 1973 Department o f Employment 
publication on their estimates o f number o f manual workers covered by national 
agreements and wages council boards. The coverage by such agreements has increased 
substantially from 48% to 65% over the period o f 1950 to 1972. The percentage 
figures were computed by E lliot and Steele (1976) where the number o f manual 
workers were taken from the seasonal population census. The proportions o f coverage
111
were then computed within each Main Order Heading (MOH). Although figures were 
adjusted to 1968 SIC basis, during the time o f rapid employment decline, the number 
o f coverage are likely to be overstated due to lags in adjusting the figures from the 
census, resulting in more than 100% as a proportion o f coverage for these times. 
Provided that we take this into account, these percentage figures s till provide useful 
information.
These two data sets are obviously not comparable to each other, basically due to 
difference in the method o f deriving their information. Also, NES’s figure excludes 
part time workers whereas the latter includes them. The former records the numbers 
affected while the latter records the numbers covered by the national agreements. 
Number o f those merely affected can well be higher than those covered. And lastly, the 
firs t and the second category in NES can together cover wider agreements than the 
category o f the "national agreements" in the latter data. Overall effect o f these 
differences are not clear, although the chances are that the coverage in the NES data 
be biased towards overstatement.
Given these evidence, it  is safe for us to say, that as far as our sample periods are 
concerned, the coverage o f national agreements is significant.
Consider, now, the importance o f basic rates out o f the level o f earnings. Donovan 
Commission blamed the increasing popularity o f the informal shop-floor bargaining to 
the growth o f earnings drift. Earnings’ biggest component is the basic rates and the rest 
is mainly divided into shift payments and payment made under the payment by result 
scheme (PBR). New Earnings survey in 1968, 70 and 73 (with adjustments) has 
published the details o f the earnings make-up for the fu ll time males covered by major 
national collective agreement and wages council order. This enables us to decompose 
the earnings so as to derive the percentage o f basic pay out o f standard weekly 
earnings. According to them, although there are different tendencies for the public and 
private sectors over time, the basic rates were never less than 80% o f the earnings for 
those periods, and was the growing factor o f earnings for most o f the industries. 
Payment by result scheme is essentially connected with productivity so that we should 
find the appropriate effect o f productivity change on the earnings d rift. The evidence 
shows that the average size o f payment made under PBR has increased in most cases 
while the number o f workers who received such payment have decreased. E llio t and
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Steele argued that the latter effect outweighed the former, hence, reducing the overall 
size o f wage gap overtime.
We have shown the followings: l)the large proportion o f earnings accounted for the 
basic wage rates negotiated at the national level, and 2)the coverage o f national 
agreement/wages council has increased from 1950 to 1972 and had a significant 
absolute coverage level at 1978. From these evidence, we can conclude the importance 
o f a role that national agreement played in the wage determination process in Britain, 
therefore justifies the use o f data on national bargaining in analysing the wage 
determination process between 1950-75.
Few remarks can be made regarding the recent tendencies. The recent micro survey, 
CBI data bank, reveals the depressing role played by the national agreements. Their 
data were collected from the annual survey on each settlement group, the actual survey 
being answered by the management representatives o f these groups. It was confined to 
the manufacturing sector only, and the "settlement group" can refer to the even more 
disaggregated level than the establishment itself. On average, 1.7 settlement groups per 
establishment were observed. According to the survey, most o f the agreements were 
made at the disaggregated level and national agreements, i f  any, were popular only 
among smaller sized establishments and manual workers. Also, only around 49% o f 
the basic rates were determined at national or national together with supplementary 
bargaining. CBI Data also shows that the 90-93% o f the contracts have the duration o f 
exactly 12 months (Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1985)), which obviously is not the 
case for our data set throughout our sample periods. Since the late 70’s, the tendencies 
towards more disaggregated level o f bargaining grew stronger than what we observed 
in the early 70’s. Disaggregated bargaining enables the negotiating group to have more 
frequent negotiations. These days, the annual contract seems to be a norm.
3.5 Duration o f contract
Duration, 5^ o f the s-th contract for the n-th group is computed as a difference in 
weeks between the s-th and (s-l)-th implementation dates, (T ^ -T ^ ) .  In the data, they 
are listed together with the prevailed wage, w ^ j,  that was implemented at the (s-l)-th 
bargain (See figure 3.9).
O f a ll the implementation o f wage changes recorded, some o f them are designated
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only for a particular category o f workers. Also, not all the bargaining group have the 
usual 4 categories o f workforce: top-male, semi-male, bottom-male and female. In this 
sense, a problem arises in deciding which category’s wage change should be 
appropriated for each implementation, It may be possible to take some weighted 
average o f all the wage changes that took place at the same bargaining as a measure 
o f w ^  corresponding
oo
IaW i' “
TnS—| T n ,
(Figure 3.9) Timing o f settlement
to the s-th contract which lasted for 5^. Although a decrease in sample size is 
inevitable, a less arbitrary way is to create 4 different files according to the categories 
o f workers, and this is the method adopted in our study. In this case, not the length 
between any successive bargains but the length between the consecutive bargains that 
determine wages for a certain type o f workers is recorded as the contract length to be 
studied.
O f all the 147 negotiating groups, 84 groups included all 3 grades for male workers, 
namely, top, semi-skilled and bottom. 92 groups included both top and semi grade 
while 87 included both bottom and semi grade. Only 36 groups did not have female 
grade.
3.5.1 Indexed contracts: wages council groups
Before start analysing the data, we had to drop some observations in order to satisfy 
certain criteria. First o f all, we exclude any groups that has missing implementation 
dates in the midst o f its time dimension. Any missing observation at the start or at the 
end o f the sample periods are just discarded. This should not affect our study which 
requires the stream o f multiple bargaining history that is continuous. In this process, 
we have to drop 16 groups from our analysis.
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Secondly, we exclude those groups who utilize the cost o f living allowance clause 
(COLA) as a main means o f wage determination. We are interested in the duration 
between the settlements that are properly negotiated via bargaining rather than 
determined automatically by some function o f retail price index. When a group has 
COLA as a primary mode that triggers wage changes, it  can be thought o f as having 
one long term settlement with a protection measure against inflation. I t  is different 
from  the staged settlement where workers know a priori when and by how much the 
wage w ill change in the future, since under COLA, neither size nor tim ing o f such 
payments are known a priori. This kind o f indexation provision in the contract is 
common in North America. With such contracts, the elasticity o f indexation becomes 
one o f the key choice variable in addition to the contract length. A t the moment, we 
are applying our analysis to the open-ended contracts that was started w ith the 
negotiated bargaining. Any fixed length contract with the indexation clause should be 
distinguished from the others because o f the differences in their nature o f wage 
determination process. The groups belonging to the building, construction, and printing 
industries apply to this category, and altogether, there are 30 such groups out o f 191 
groups in our total sample (this 30 groups includes 3 groups which were deleted from 
the sample due to the missing observation).
There have been a few wage changes which were made by COLA even amongst 
those groups who don’t utilize COLA as principal wage determining mode. They are 
usually due to temporarily imposed government policy in 1974-1975. The threshold 
arrangement was introduced in May 1974 and continued t ill the end o f the year (or on 
to 75 for some groups). There, a special payments o f 40 pence per week for every 
percentage rise in RPI above 7% was made as a compensation for a rise in inflation 
fo r a ll groups who joined the policy. Amount o f payment was revised every month, as 
can be seen in figure 3.10 where the mode is around 4 weeks. For these groups, 
COLA is not the primary mode o f wage change determination, but was due to the 
government policy which is completely exogenous to the bargaining. Hence, it  is not 
necessary to exclude the whole observations belonging to such groups, but important 
to bear in mind that these few wage changes were determined entirely by different 
nature than by bargaining. Fortunately, these policy took effect during the last few 
years o f our sample period, hence, we can exclude those COLA induced wage changes 
by discarding all the observations made after the second quarter o f 1973 without
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distorting the rest o f the sample.
Few cases (4 cases) remain where the indexation was adopted to determine the wage 
changes. But their involvement o f COLA itself are likely to have been determined 
during the negotiation without any intervention from outsiders. Hence, it  is different 
from those groups who utilize COLA as a main tool o f wage determination, and we 
regard the 4 cases as ordinary wage determinations.
The durations which are affected by the indexation clause are either started o ff by 
the policy or ended due to the commencement o f such policy. Excluding the groups 
with missing observations and groups with principally indexed wages, we divide the 
sample o f contracts into COLA and non-COLA categories. Using 3944 observations 
on spells between wage changes that apply to any one type o f workers, a mean o f 
contract length is 47.79 weeks, which is just under one year, with a standard deviation 
o f 28.9 weeks, indicating significant variations in the duration. Once we exclude the 
contracts affected by the indexation clause (mainly due to 1974’s threshold policy), a 
mean contract length increases to 54.11 weeks with still a significant variation o f 25.77 
weeks. 12.6% o f contracts are affected by COLA in a way stated above, exhibiting a 
mean o f 9.73 weeks with a standard deviation o f 13.5 weeks. The same analysis is 
given in table 3.2 below for the data on wage changes for the top-male, semi-male, 
bottom-male and female categories (for bottom male, see figure 3.10 and 3.11).
In the analysis which follows, we exclude all the observations after second quarter 
o f 1973. This eliminates most o f the contracts which were affected by COLA without
non-COLA COLA
top-male nob 2499 415
m 54.39(25.1) 16.97(20.9)
semi-male nob 1977 329
m 55.32(25.1) 15.91(23.0)
bottom-male nob 2500 460
m 56.26(26.1) 17.0(21.4)
female nob 2353 377
m 56.1(27.1) 16.60(21.7)
(E(5)=mean duration in weeks, standard deviations in parenthesis.)
(Table 3.2) Number o f wage implementations and 
the mean analysis o f contract length induced by COLA
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destructing the continuous time dimension o f our panel.
Consequently, there are 108 groups altogether in a bottom-male file . Amongst 
those, 61 groups belong to manufacturing industries. For the top-male file , there are 
106 groups altogether with 52 groups belonging to manufacturing. 83 groups in the 
semi-male file , amongst which there are 45 manufacturing. Lastly, female file  contains 
data on 98 groups, where 61 belongs to manufacturing.
W ith respect to the bargaining system employed, see the table below. The 
bargaining groups that typically employs Whitley Council system are railway and 
hospital staffs, and those belonging to "others" category includes police, prison, 
government establishments, and atomic energy. Hence, i f  a group neither employs 
wages council nor private bargaining system, the group is identified as being in a 
public sector (i.e., they employ either (2), (3), (4) or (6) bargaining systems in table 
3.3). Wages council is the statutory body that fix  and monitor the rates o f pay o f many 
low paid occupational groups. They function in a similar way to the other negotiating 
bodies, with either side having the right to initiate a negotiation at any time. They often 
sets "Wages Regulation Orders" which is to be followed by the members o f Wages 
Councils. These are usually in accordance with the social target aimed by the 
government, such as increase in the minimum level o f wages to achieve equal pay for 
female and juvenile workers or decrease in the working hours. This distinctive, rather 
bureaucratic system, might have played influential role in the process o f bargaining 
compared to the others with the independent systems.
Bargaining system Bottom Top Semi Female
(1) Wages Council 43 36 30 50
(2) Whitley Council 2 2 2 1
(3) Public/Nationalized 7 6 6 2
(4) Local Authority 3 6 5 0
(5) Private employer 51 53 38 43
(6) others 2 3 2 2
Public sector 
((2),(3),(4),(6))
14 17 15 5
Total 108 106 83 98
(Table 3.3) Number o f groups by the bargaining system employed
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Nonetheless, as far as the frequency o f wage implementation is concerned, we found 
them broadly similar, although the wages council groups tend to have a longer contract 
and larger variation (mean=64.78 and standard deviation=25.91) compared to the 
others (mean 52.35 and standard deviation 20.95 weeks). See figure 3.12 and 3.13.
The data also lists i f  any wage change was associated with the government’s 
arbitration. In particular, table 3.4 lists the number o f wage changes in a sample o f the 
bottom-male file  which was affected by 8 different forms o f government interventions. 
The average length o f spells terminated by the settlement affected by the arbitration and
sample size variable mean standard dev
National arbitration 
Tribunal/Industrial 
Disputes Tribunal
34 8
%w
59.08
0.048
10.36
0.017
Industrial 
arbitration board
24 8
%w
52.63
0.046
25.50
0.017
Court o f Inquiry 4 8
%w
57.50
0.133
6.35
0.102
Ad hoc arbitration 
boards
10 8
%w
54.70
0.060
10.07
0.027
Public sector 
Arbitrator
3 8
%w
52.0
0.044
12.0
0.006
Committees o f Inquiry 
and Investigation
1 8
%w
18.0
0.102
-
Prices and Income 6 8
%w
57.83
0.101
30.08
0.055
Others 1 5
%w
39.0
0.022 -
No Arbitration 1673 8
%w
56.58
0.067
23.73
0.046
Total 1756 8 56.53 23.48
%w 0.067 0.046
(Table 3.4) Number o f settlements affected by 
the government’s arbitration - bottom male
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the mean o f corresponding wage changes are also listed in the table. Even though it 
would be o f an interest to examine the influence o f the arbitration on the tim ing or the 
degree o f wage changes, unfortunately, the sample size o f those affected by such 
intervention is too small to draw much inference.
In the light o f recent finding that about 90 percent o f the settlement takes place 
annually, (Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1985)), we have examined the sample 
distributions o f spells that occur before and after 1965, in figure 3.14 and 3.15. 
Despite such evidence, there still seems to exist substantial variations in the contract 
length during the period 1960-1970. Although the mean spell length falls somewhat 
from 57.90 to 54.65 weeks, there is no corresponding decrease in a dispersion about 
this mean. On the contrary, the standard deviation increases from 19.79 to 27.63 
weeks.
3.5.2 Details o f staged settlement
14.6% o f the wage changes recorded in the data are staged a priori (excluding those 
brought about by the indexation clause). When a particular wage change is staged, such 
change is brought about as a consequence o f the agreement that plans to yield wage 
changes in some stages. Although 2.4% o f such settlements were not found as staged 
in the gazette, we treat all the settlements recorded as staged either in our original data 
or in the gazette to be the ’staged’ settlements. 38.5% o f staged settlements are known 
to have magnitude o f future wage changes fixed at the time when the first stage was 
negotiated. Only 0.9% o f those were altered when implemented (this figure increases 
to around 2.4% when including data for post 73 Q2 periods). Out o f a ll the staged 
wage changes, 72.3% were known to have planned dates (up to a month) at the time 
o f first stage, out o f which, 15.02% failed to take place as planned. Moreover, 20.8% 
o f these were in fact deferred due to wage freeze. Incidence o f such a deferment took 
effect mostly from 1966 to 67, during the time o f 6 months stand still, a statutory order 
imposed by the government.
When we look at the length o f spell which is associated with the staged settlement, 
they have significantly shorter duration exhibiting a mean o f 45.24 weeks compared 
to non-staged counterparts with a mean o f 59.24 weeks (bottom-male file). Associated 
duration o f a spell here implies either its start or its end is the staged bargaining.
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Proportion of staged settlements 
(bottom-male)
Figure 3.18
Freqency of staged settlement (bottom) 
staged for change in hours of work
Figure 3.19
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non-staged staged
Top
nob
m
E(%w)
18770
56.48(22.75)
0.067(0.046)
341
42.87(21.16)
0.07(0.059)
nob 1569 267
Semi-male m 58.83(25.23) 43.79(21.83)
E(%W) 0.015(0.207) 0.060(0.09)
nob 2009 325
Bottom male m 60.00(24.6) 44.00(23.7)
E(%w) 0.067(0.047) 0.066(0.053)
nob 2343 387
Female m 52.74(30.03) 38.22(24.57)
E(%w) 0.082*0.08) 0.08(0.071)
(Table 3.5) Mean analysis o f contract length and rate o f wage changes for the
staged and non-staged settlements
Nonetheless, there remains a substantial degree o f dispersion around these means with 
standard deviation 25.80 and 22.05 weeks, for staged and non-staged, respectively (see 
figure 3.16 and 3.17).
Look at the figure 3.18 which plots proportion o f the staged bargains out o f entire 
settlements that occurred each year during the sample period. Clearly, peaks are found 
in 65, 66, and then again in 71 and 72. In 65 and in 66, there was major movement 
towards less working hours (mainly from 42 to 40 hours per week) without the loss o f 
weekly pay. As can be seen from the figure 3.19 which shows the frequency o f staged 
settlements that specifically reduces hours o f work, such stages are most frequently 
seen in 65 and 66. There was another major movement towards fewer working hours 
seen in 60 and 61 (mainly from 44 to 42 hours a week), but this time, they didn’t take 
form o f stages. Another peak in the early 70’s for the staged settlements are to make 
women and juvenile workers equal with respect to their pay. Specifically speaking, 
equal pay act was put into operation in 70 and 72 which aim to achieve equal pay by 
the end o f 1975. Mean analysis o f duration (5) and rate o f change in wages are given
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in table 3.5 for staged and non-staged implementations. It is clear from the table that 
the bargaining involving female wages are more often staged than the others, and also, 
the rate o f change o f wages brought about at those staged implementations are on 
average, higher. This is explained by the frequent staged settlements for women that 
took place in order to achieve the equal pay, since the level o f female wages were so 
much lower than the male equivalents until the early 70’s. The women’s pay just about 
caught up with the male counterparts by 1975.
3.5.3 Mean analysis for each industry
Significant variations can be seen in the frequency o f bargaining across different 
industries. Focusing on the bottom-male category, the manufacturing and construction 
industries have slightly shorter contract length on average (see figure 3.20 and 3.21) 
than they do otherwise (manufacturing mean=55.5 weeks, others mean=58.7 weeks), 
although both have similar standard errors at around 23 weeks. In particular, the Dock 
industry, fur industry and hat, cap millineries have very infrequent negotiations, lasting 
at least for 1 and a half years on average, as a result, there are as few as 10 
negotiations during our sample period. The longest contract length o f 285 weeks 
observed is in the fur industry. On the other hand, industries such as saw m illing, food 
manufacturing, and post offices derive wage changes as often as every 6-7 months on 
average, reporting more than 40 negotiations over the sample period. For the top-male 
category, 13 bargains were observed on average during the entire sample period 
(excluding Q3,1973 onwards) with standard deviation o f 7 bargains. The Aerated 
water, licensed residential and non-residential establishments, merchant navy and police 
have relatively infrequent negotiations with mean duration o f above 76 weeks. Plastic, 
heat installment and forestry, on the other hand, have bargains on average every 40 
weeks or less. Even within an individual agreement group, there is a significant 
variation in the contract length with average standard deviation o f around 20 weeks.
What is interesting, however, is that those groups with infrequent negotiation does 
not necessarily come up with larger percentage change in wages at each settlement. 
Look at table 3.6 which shows the mean and standard deviation o f the duration and the 
percentage wage changes realized during the sample period for the groups with 
particularly infrequent negotiations (Top-male wage changes). Compared to the
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merchant navy and police groups, the licensed residential/non-residential groups exhibit 
much lower rate o f wage changes despite o f their having longer contract length on 
average. This is probably due to difference in their size o f wage d rift between private 
and public sectors. During the early 1960’s, rates o f pay in the public sectors were 
considered heavily controlled by the incomes policies, while the earnings in private 
sector rose rapidly. A sharp rise in the wage rate o f public sector manual workers took 
place towards the late 60’s in order to narrow the gap between two sectors.
no. o f settlements m E(%w)
Licencenonresident 12 92.3 0.09
(37.17) (0.045)
Licenceresident 12 84.9 0.029
(22.3) (0.067)
MerchantNavy 14 75.9 0.1
(33.4) (0.08)
Police 15 73.0 0.11
(44.3) (0.089)
Heatlnstall 31 38.7 0.05
(18.82) (0.039)
Forestry 28 40.7 0.06
(20.18) (0.05)
whole group 2211 54.38 0.068
(23.03) (0.049)
(Table 3.6) Mean analysis o f contract length and rate o f wage changes 
for some groups (Top male category)
3.6 Incomes Policy
Since the mid 1960’s, the incomes policy emerged as an additional instrument o f 
macroeconomic policy by the government in reducing the rate o f change o f nominal 
wages by intervening the mechanism o f wage setting.
The policy takes variety o f forms. It may be a wage freeze that demand a complete 
nominal wage standstill, or a twelve months policy that restricts no more than a single 
settlement per year, or a ceiling that specifies a certain target level in the rate o f wage 
change. The coverage o f these policies vary so that they may be aimed only towards 
the public sector or also to the private sector. Furthermore, the degree o f enforcement
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period norm comment
1948 Feb-51 June 
(2501) (2677)
1956 Mar-56 Dec 
(2921) (2964)
1961 Jul-62 Mar 
(3202) (3237)
« n l
1962 Apr-63 Mar 
(3238) (3288) 
Cdnl
1963 Apr-65 Apr 
(3289) (3392)
cd„2
1965 Apr-66 Jul 
(3393) (3458) 
cdrf
1966 Jul-66 Dec 
(3459) (3484) 
fd2
1967 Jan-67 June 
(3485) (3510) 
fd2(contd’)
1967 Jul-68 Mar 
(3511) (3544) 
cd4
1967 Jul-70 Dec 
(3511) (3692) 
d l2
wage freeze 0
wage plateau
wage freeze 0
2-2.5%
3-3.5%
3-3.5%
stand still 0
severe 0
restraint
relaxed severe 3-3.5% 
restraint
Twelve month rule
(Table 3.7) History o f i
not clear whether 
applied on the 
earnings or basic 
wage
voluntary for the 
nationalized sector not 
to increase prices
enforced in the 
public sector, 
voluntary for the 
private sector
in line with 
national output, 
enforced in the public 
sector only,
voluntary for the private
enforced in the public 
sector only
enforced in the public 
sector only
statutory in all 
sectors
statutory in 
all sectors
voluntary
restraint
minimum o f 12 
months to separate 
the settlements
policy
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period norm comment
1968 Mar-69 Dec 3.5% statutory lim it
(3545) (3640) to all sectors
cd5
1970 Jan-70 Jun 2.5-4.5% statutory lim it
(3641) (3666) to all sectors
cd6
1971 Aug-72 Sep N -l 1% less than
(3723) (3779) last wage change
1972 Nov-73 Mar wage freeze 0 statutory to all
(3788) (3809) sectors
fd3
1973 Apr-73 Nov £1+4% statutory lim it
(3810) (3840) (*6 .7 % ) to all sectors
1973 Nov-74 Feb 
(3841) (3853)
1974 Feb-74 Jul 
(3854) (3874)
1974 Jul-75 Jul 
(3875) (3926)
1975 Jul-76 Jul 
(3927) (3978)
8.5%
approx
13%
£6/week
(*10 .4% )
statutory lim it 
to all sectors
statutory lim it 
same as before 
plus cost-of- 
living payment
voluntary pay 
increase to cover 
the cost o f living
zero for those 
earning more than 
£8500 per annum
(Table 3.7) (contd’)
also varies from voluntary to statutory.
Table above lists the brief history o f the incomes policy since 1948. (The figures 
in the parenthesis are the absolute weeks since 1900.) First major freeze policy was 
in effect between July 1961 and March 1963, but was only enforced to the government 
and wages council employees and was left voluntary for the private sectors. Second 
freeze that lasted for 5 months between July and December 1966 was a statutory policy 
to a ll sectors and any wage implementation dates planned to take place during this
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period had to be deferred. This freeze policy was in effect until June 1967, although 
the deferred wage changes during the first half o f the policy were honored during this 
period. The third statutory standstill policy took effect between November 72 and 
March 73 for 4 months.
The average level o f rate o f wage changes that took place during each quarter and 
the average length o f contract which ended at each quarter are computed and plotted 
against time in figure 3.22 and 3.23, respectively. It is clear from figure 3.22 that 
there are sharp drops during the second and the third freeze policies and moderately 
stable level o f rate o f change in wages during the ceiling policies. The level o f wage 
changes are high during the fd l freeze policy, although the graph plots the average 
over whole groups while the fd l policy was only enforced towards public and wages 
council groups. Notable point is the sharp increase in the level o f wage changes starting 
in Q2 1970, around the time the cd6 was called off. According to figure 3.23, there 
is a sharp decline in the contract length that terminates during the first few quarters o f 
the freeze policies, fd l and fd2. Also look at figure 3.24 which plots the number o f 
negotiations occurred during each quarter. There are sharp decline in the number o f 
wage changes during all the freeze policies. In principal, there should not be any 
bargaining occurring during the freeze policy, but i f  they do, we observe that they have 
short contract length during such period. This is true even for fd l, during which the 
average wage changes did not decrease (first quarter has seen a sharp increase). This, 
again should be explained by the extent o f coverage o f this policy. Otherwise, before 
the policy comes into fu ll effect, a number o f groups may well have rushed to have
policy number o f bargaining
« n l Freeze (61 Jul-62 Mar) 21
<**n l Ceiling(62 Ap -63 Mar) 50
Cdn2 Ceiling(63 Ap -65 Ap ) 88
cdrf Ceiling(65 Ap -66 Jul) 85
fd2 Freeze (66 Jul-67 Jun) 49
cd4 Ceiling(67 Jul-68 Mar) 71
cd5 Ceiling(68 Mar-69 Dec) 165
cd6 Ceiling(70 Jan-70 Jun) 54
fd3 Freeze (72 Nov-73 Mar) 3
d 12 Twelve (67 Jul-70 Dec) 358
(Table 3.8) Number o f bargaining occurred during the policy
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wage changes, resulting in small number o f settlement with short durations. Number 
o f bargainings occurred during each incomes policy period is listed in table 3.8 for the 
bottom-male category o f our sample which is truncated at 73, Q2. fd ^ , cdn l, cd^, and 
cd^ are enforced only towards non-private groups, therefore, the table lists number o f 
bargaining struck by non-private groups during the corresponding period.
3.7 The Empirical Hazard
Figure 3.25 shows the empirical hazard function, estimated as a step function over 
the 23.4-week intervals (sub-divide maximum duration observation length =  234; into 
10 equal intervals) using 850 observations on durations for the manufacturing and 
construction groups, bottom-male category. It was calculated according to the life  table 
method (see section 4.2), which computes the hazard rate in each interval as a 
proportion o f number o f spells terminating in that interval out o f a size o f the "risk 
set": set o f duration observations that have not terminated at the interval’s lower lim it. 
This figure suggests a rising hazard rate, at least up to around 22 months, with a 
substantial jump at 52 weeks. Due to the nature o f the life  table method, the empirical 
hazard is high towards the maximum length o f duration observations. O f course, such 
calculations take no account o f the behaviour o f the explanatory variables, and do not 
necessarily reflect accurately the behaviour o f the baseline hazard. It is also sensitive 
to the width o f the intervals assumed, and to the size o f observations. When we 
exclude observations which recorded longer than 130 weeks, the shape o f the empirical 
hazard becomes monotonically increasing (fig 3.26), although a jump at around 1 year 
still exists.
A notable point emerging from all this information is the importance o f the peak 
around 52 weeks, corresponding to a regular pay round. These 52-week spells are 
distributed quite evenly across the bargaining groups apart from the concentration 
observed in spells terminating in 1971 (17% o f annual contract length are observed in 
1971, see figure 3.25). In the whole sample, however, there is s till considerable 
dispersion around the annual peak. The major aim o f our study is to explain this 
dispersion in terms o f the economic influences, in particular, o f the income policies.
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Chapter 4: Economic framework
4.1 Introduction
Data on individual pay settlements are a valuable source o f evidence on the 
nature o f bargaining behaviour and the effects o f government intervention in the 
labour market. By analyzing the results o f individual wage negotiations, it  is 
possible to avoid the severe aggregation problems inherent in a study o f wage 
determination at the macro level1 and take into account o f the complex 
institutional features o f the labour market such as varying contract length, 
differed increments, varying bargaining calendar and the degree o f 
centralization in bargaining. However, a fu ll dynamic analysis o f micro 
bargaining data raises formidable methodological issues since it must explain 
both the magnitude o f wage changes and their timing against the backdrop o f 
continuously evolving economic environment.
The timing o f wage changes is particularly d ifficu lt to analyse, and has 
received much less attention in applied econometrics literature than have the 
magnitude o f those changes. This is so despite the fact that by analyzing both 
tim ing and magnitude o f wage changes, it is possible to discriminate the 
effectiveness o f a government control policy on the two, hence can test a 
widely-held view that past incomes policies have been effective only as a means 
o f delaying, rather than moderating pay increase. Notable exception to this 
neglect o f the timing issue include Pencavel (1982) and Lee (1987) using British 
data, and Christofides and Wilton (1983), Christofides (1985) and Cecchetti 
(1985) who use North American data. However, analytical methods used by those 
authors do not reflect the fu ll dynamic nature o f the wage determination process 
which is very important in the case o f open ended contracts.
The purpose o f chapter 4 and 5 is to develop and apply a method o f modeling 
the occurrence o f wage settlements and the magnitude o f wage changes associated 
with those settlements. In our data we observe, for each discrete event, not 
only the time since its last occurrence (i.e., duration, 5ns), but also the 
realized wage change at the end o f each duration (i.e ., wns). The task is 
therefore to build a model that simultaneously determines such pair o f 
variables.
It is important, before embarking on the statistical model, to recognize the 
stylized fact on the nature and the degree o f organization o f the bargaining 
system so that the assumption about the way timing and wage is determined can be 
made appropriately for our data. Unlike in North America, agreement groups in
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Great Britain during our sample period (1950-75) generally negotiated open ended 
agreements which fixed the nominal wage but le ft unspecified the date o f the 
next negotiation2. Those negotiation were made mostly at national level which 
was the most prevalent at least in the manual sector at a time, hence,
government control policy such as incomes policy was easy to implement. There 
were rarely indexed contracts, and even in few cases where a contract length was 
determined a priori (as a staged settlement), they were often violated. Hence, 
under this system o f pay bargaining, there was a probability that a contract 
ends at any point in time. In other words, duration o f a contract could be 
influenced by events occurring after a negotiation took place; such as an
introduction o f incomes policy or a sudden rise in the unexpected inflation. The 
mechanism, then, o f a process towards a new negotiation can be plausibly 
considered as being triggered by the accumulation o f such events in the economic 
environment. The accumulation w ill consequently put enough pressures towards 
unions so that a new negotiation w ill be called for when the potential gain 
exceeds, for the first time, the cost o f having a new negotiation. Therefore, 
spell length w ill depend on the entire time path o f all the relevant 
determinants observed from the previous bargain onwards.
This form o f relation cannot be appropriately estimated by conventional 
regression methods but by a duration model. A probability o f having a new 
negotiation at any point in time, once a contract starts, is analogous to the
notion o f the hazard rate, which can depend on the entire time path o f the
evolving environment up to a given point in time during the spell. Precisely 
speaking, the hazard rate at elapsed duration, s, is defined as a probability o f 
the spell ending at t conditional on all the currently observable values o f 
explanatory variables and on the fact that the spell has not previously 
terminated since t periods ago. This hazard rate outlines the process up to a
point o f renegotiation. Given such point, the variables that have exerted
influence on the hazard together with other forward-looking factors w ill then 
determine the magnitude o f wage changes via bargaining. In this way, it  is 
possible to consider separately the determinants o f the hazard rate for 
renegotiation and the agreed wage changes conditional upon a new settlement 
taking place. This composes a jo in t density function for the pair o f
observations, {wns, Sns}, therefore, completing a system o f simultaneous
relation between the timing o f a bargain and a concomitant wage changes.
In this chapter, economic model is presented and specification o f suitable 
variables is discussed on the bases o f which an econometric model is bu ilt and 
applied to a British bargaining data in the following chapter 5.
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4.2 Conceptual framework
Suppose that union and firm  come to an agreement on the level o f nominal wage 
and the timing o f such a wage change via bargaining. They may decide some o f the 
wage changes to be implemented in multiple stages whose dates are determined a 
priori. Nonetheless, such planned dates may be violated and eventually, a new 
negotiation w ill take place. Hence, under this system o f bargaining, there is a 
possibility o f a new negotiation occurring at any point in time. Once the 
nominal wage is fixed, it  stays invariant or changes only as much as planned 
until new negotiation. Meanwhile, economic environment continues to vary, and 
the rigid nominal wage becomes more and more unfavorable to the workers. Workers 
w ill decide to step forward for a new negotiation only when the gains from the 
negotiation outweighs the cost o f doing so. And here, we assume such criteria to 
be the difference between an optimal real wage, real take home pay and 
transaction cost.
Transaction costs involve resources necessary in conducting negotiations 
during the process o f preparation as well as administration o f having 
negotiations, implementing a wage change and a potential cost o f industrial 
actions. In a latter case, there w ill be a further cost o f industrial relation 
deterioration, cost involved in settling internal equity problem when wage 
change occurs. Their cost should largely d iffer for different bargaining 
machinery involved in negotiations (whether it takes place with private 
employers, with nationalized industry or with wages council). Different firms or 
industries may also have different likelihood o f a strike occurrence, ways o f 
implementing wage changes. Size o f union members or number o f unions involved in 
a bargaining unit can also be considered to play a role.
The optimal real wage is the outcome o f a bargaining given the economic
environment and the bargaining power o f each group were they to bargain 
continuously. Consider the case o f n-th bargaining group, s-th observed 
contract. Let us denote t as an elapsed duration since calendar time Tns_!, 
hence, a duration t corresponds to T ^ + t  in calendar time. Denote the time 
path o f such optimal wage for the n-th bargaining group as w * (t), retentionn
ratio as rr(t), retail price index as p(t) and a cost o f negotiation as c(t) 
where t corresponds to any point in time between T ^ j and Tns. Then, 
renegotiation takes place when,
wn(T„s-i )rr(t)
w *n(t) - c „ ( t) -------------------------  a 0 (4.2.1)
for the first time since the last negotiation, Tns.}. To be more general,
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(4.2.1) can be written as:
w *n(t) - c„(t) - Wn(Tp (t ) ) r r ( t )  - ®n(t) -  0 (4.2.2)
where en(t) is some random non-observable cost element idiosyncratic to the 
particular bargaining group, n. As long as above inequality is false for any t 
from the start o f a contract, such a contract continues to survive. The hazard 
formulation takes into account precisely o f this relationship continuously from 
the start o f the contract up to the point o f actual renegotiation.
hns(t) =  Prob( w *n(t)-cn(t)- = en(0 f° r the first time
since the start o f (s-l)th contract | contract has
already lasted at least for t period)
= h (-^ (t), c„(t), w*„(t)) (4.2.3)
where (rr/p)(t) and w *n(t) are the entire time path o f each variable since Tns-l 
up to t where t can be any point in time between [T ,T 1. We consider thens-l ns
likelihood o f a departure from the current contract defined between t€[0,5ns], 
hence the corresponding duration density for this observation is a function o f 
the entire time path o f explanatory variables up to time Tns. Note that the 
hazard at Tns with elapsed duration sna includes time path o f explanatory 
variables up to Tns, however, not the information that this contract actually 
terminates at Tns. The hazard is greater (i.e., the likely occurrence o f 
renegotiation is higher), larger the gain compared to the cost. Therefore, the 
hazard should be decreasing in (rr/p)(t) , cn(t) and increasing in w *(t).
On the other hand, the wage equation is the realization o f w(t) at t where 
the inequality (4.2.2), for the first time since t= 0 , is satisfied. We observe 
such threshold to be reached for the n-th group’s s-th contract at time Tns. 
Then a potential wage level which triggers renegotiation for the n-th group’s s- 
th contract is:
w ns =  (W*m -  c j  ( - y ) m
=  w ( ( - ^ - )  c w* ) (4.2.4)P ns ns ns
where (rr/p) , c and w* are the entire time path o f those variables up tons ns ns
and including T . Although this is the value which triggered renegotiation,
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once the contracts terminates, the level o f wns that merely satisfies inequality 
(4.2.2) is not necessarily the wage to be claimed by the workers at the 
negotiation. This is because workers, knowing that the contract w ill last for
some time, not only take care o f their past uncompensated inflation, but also
try to make as good ex-ante provisions as possible for the future uncertainty.
Such provisions depend on workers expected length o f next contract and general 
uncertainty over future, in particular, over price and income tax. In this
sense, the agreed wage becomes:
Wns =  W ( ( - | i ) ns, c„s> w *ns, ) (4.2.5)
where, again, subscript ns refers to their entire time-path up to and including 
Tns. nns is the forward-looking expectational element made at Tns over the 
future uncertainty. It is decreasing in first and second arguments and 
increasing in w *ng and future uncertainty.
4.3 Bargaining
Let us now turn to the nature o f optimal real wage variable, w *(t), which is 
the outcome o f bargaining between firms and unions were they to bargain 
continuously overtime. Since bargaining takes into account both o f demand and 
supply constraints, optimal wage w ill depend not only on the wage setting 
behaviour o f both parties, but also on factors such as firm s’ profitability or 
their pricing policies. There are several theories that depicts union-firm 
behaviour in determining wage and employment (chapter 2). Essentially, firm  and 
union each tries to optimize their profit and u tility  function subject to 
constraints. In the monopoly union model, union chooses the level o f wage given 
the labour demand curve (i.e., which is a locus o f firm ’s profit maximizing 
pair, (w,n)). On the other hand, the efficient bargain model has both parties 
bargain over employment and wages. Seniority or insider-outsider model provides 
a rationale for the union to be indifferent over employment above a certain 
level, hence a bargaining takes place only over wages. A large number o f 
empirical studies have been carried out to test the validity o f these models, 
however, these tests do not provide conclusive results. First o f a ll, their 
tests rest on the specification o f either a form o f bargaining (i.e ., the 
efficiency o f the outcome) or the agents’ objective function. Hence, a rejection 
o f the hypothesis is often skeptically dependent on the correctness o f the 
maintained hypothesis. In particular, these studies often test the presence o f
140
alternative wages in an employment function based on the assumption that it 
affects marginal rate o f substitution o f the union. But the presence o f the 
alternative wage does not necessarily mean an acceptance o f the efficient 
contracts. Labour demand model (LDM) in conjunction with efficiency wage 
consideration can explain the role o f alternative wage in an employment function 
even i f  a firm  and union bargain over wages only. On the other hand,
insignificant alternative wage may not always lead to the LDM . Insider-outsider 
or seniority consideration gives rationale for a flat indifference curve (FIC) 
which yields observationally equivalent employment function for the LD M  and 
efficient contract model. This model has an advantage since its fundamental
assumption o f layoffs by seniority is commonly observed in practice, and is also 
able to explain the recent phenomena o f persistent inflation and concomitant 
high unemployment rate. The test o f the FIC is usually based on the claims that 
the level o f wages determined during the bargaining should not be affected by 
any indicators o f outside opportunities such as unemployment or unemployment 
benefit, since workers do not care about the welfare o f the unemployed members. 
This restriction is often violated in the empirical studies. However, violation 
o f such claims does not necessarily lead to the rejection o f the FIC i f  a
comparison effect is found to exists in the union u tility  function, which is
often the case.
As one can see, empirical evidence is far from conclusive with respect to 
which model best suits the reality. Nonetheless, we adopt a simple version o f 
the FIC model in our process o f generating the determinants for the reduced form 
optimal wage equation. This choice o f model is not crucial to our analysis, 
however. Derived determinants for the optimal wage is very similar and also 
easily generalized to accord with other bargaining setup.
Consider a simple bargaining where workers and employers can bargain over 
the level o f wages and employment. Suppose a lay o ff takes place by some known 
order, such as that o f inverse seniority. Then, a firm  and union bargain only 
over wages since union is indifferent over the level o f employment (see chap 
2.1.5) even though workers can bargain over employment i f  they want to. A firm  
sets the level o f employment unilaterally for a given wage by maximizing its 
profit so that the outcome lies on a labour demand curve. That is, i f  a firm  
maximizes its profit:
max [ R(n,pp) - w n - k ] /  p (4.3.1)
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where R is a revenue function, k is an exogenously given level o f capital, p is 
retail price index, pp is wholesale price. Then the solution lies on the labour 
demand curve, n*(w/p), hence, a profit function is:
n =  R (n*(w/p),pp) - w n*(w/p) - k (4.3.2)
For a firm  facing a monopolistic competition, demand function for its product is 
affected by its own product price as well as other prices and real demand shock 
(e). In that case, labour demand becomes:
n = n *( w/p, pp, p, e) (4.3.3)
F irm ’s fa ll back profit, ir, corresponds to its level during a strike, which 
would be -k, in this case.
On the other hand, union, who is only interested in demanding higher pay is
simply assumed, without a loss o f generality, to have u tility  level which equals
real wage.
u =  - j * -  (4.3.4)
Their fall-back u tility  is w/p where w denotes alternative wage or wage
attainable elsewhere. The bargaining solution is then assumed to be derived by 
maximizing a Nash maximand:
, - \ i-07 w w <^r /a(*  - " )  ( -p  5-  ) (4.3.5)
where <r is the relative bargaining power o f the union. The first order condition 
o f this maximization problem yields:
w =  < r £ r >  - I T -  +  *  <4 -3 -6)
since TCw=-n by duality. Therefore, in this very simple model with risk neutral
unions, wage is a weighted average o f alternative wage (fa ll back level o f 
wages) and profit per employee3. Profit term is a function o f the "internal 
variables" that affect firm ’s financial performance which in turn determines the 
size o f rent to be shared between two parties. They include technological
progress, input/output prices, demand shock and its product market 
competitiveness. In addition, i f  a firm  is constrained in their borrowing , the 
liquid ity and cash flow consideration may play a role since they can restrict
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firm ’s activities. Outside wage, on the other hand, is a measure o f "external 
effect" reflecting outside opportunities that can be represented by unemployment 
benefit, average earnings elsewhere, or global and local unemployment rate. The 
weights, cr, reflects bargaining power, which can be influenced by virtually any 
variables that affect bargaining environment. They may include indicators o f 
bargaining machinery, external market situation, number o f members or union 
density within an industry or government wage policies. Some o f these factors 
are also considered to affect the derived wage level through alternative wages 
and cost o f negotiation.
4.4 S pecification o f variables
4.4 .1  The duration component
In view o f equation (4.2.3), we categorize the influence on the hazard as: 
(l)change in real take home pay, (2)outsider influences, (3)capacity-to-pay o f 
the firm , and (4)negotiation cost. In particular, we categorize their effect on 
the hazard into those in itia lly existing at the start o f a spell (they may 
contain group’s entire history o f past failures and wage changes, as well as an 
indicator o f secular trend- a calendar time - i f  it  is considered to affect the 
level o f hazard) and another which continues exerting effect during the spell 
through their values at each point in time. With respect to the w ithin spell 
varying covariates, it is important to make sure such explanatory variables are 
deterministic or i f  not, that they carry no information about the parameter o f 
interests. So that for example, for our particular interest lies in the effect 
o f incomes policy on the timing o f negotiation, we have to assume that the 
tim ing o f incomes policy is not endogenous to the other environmental variables 
that are also considered to affect the hazard, such as inflation. Otherwise, we 
w ill have difficulties in interpreting the coefficients o f incomes policies 
since the incidence o f such policies themselves may well be affected by the 
inflation.
First criteria is attributed to the real purchasing power o f the workers who 
wish to keep up their standard o f living. Declining real take home pay makes a 
new negotiation more likely as contract proceeds. In our model, we have 
decomposed this factor into two. Ex-post uncompensated part known at T andns-l
another part which have accumulated since the start o f the contract. The former 
is represented by the percentage change in the real take home pay received at 
the last consecutive bargains (i.e., between Tns_2 and T ^ ) ,  denoted as DRW1, 
and the latter is its changes since the start o f the current contract (i.e .,
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between Tns.j and t where te[Tns.1,Tns)), denoted as DRR(t).
DRW1 serves a role o f the "price-catch up" variable in Christofides and 
W ilton (1980) paper, which is an indicator o f uncompensated inflation carried 
over from the previous contract. This variable essentially states whether the 
level o f real take home pay has declined or increased between the last 
consecutive bargains. I f  workers aim is to keep up their standard o f living, 
failure to do so at the beginning o f the current contract, so that the 
uncompensated inflation is carried over into the following contract, should 
induce workers to have another pay rise quickly irrespective o f what happens to 
the economic environment after Tns_j. On the other hand, a large positive DRW1 
suggests overcompensated workers who should be content with the existing wage 
level may economic environment stays the same . In general, the latter case is 
more plausible since workers, knowing that the contract w ill last for sometime 
would take into account o f the ex-ante provision for the inflation uncertainty 
(see specification for the wage equation). In general, a high value o f DRW1 may 
suggest two things: workers expectation o f high inflation over the next 
contracts or high cost o f negotiation. Their perception o f high cost should make 
them claim for high nominal wage at Tns.j since they expect not to have another 
negotiation for a long time. Hence, this would lower the hazard. Effect o f 
rising expected inflation depends on its realized values, which w ill be picked 
up by the following, DRR(t).
Given the in itia l condition, DRW1, it is then the accumulated changes in 
real take home pay that concerns workers, hence, its entire time path from the 
start o f the spell becomes relevant. This is captured by the latter variable, 
DRR(t). This variable is measured as a difference in the net real pay between
each month t ‘ s ( i= l,2 ,..k ns) and the starting month o f the contract ( x ° s) ,  
reflecting the buildup nature o f the decline in real purchasing power. This 
variable measures how better or worse o ff the workers have become in terms o f 
their real take home pay at a given nominal wage since the start o f the 
contract. When this value declines, we would expect unions more like ly to step 
forward to the new negotiation therefore ’increases’ the hazard. However, as far 
as the average real pay is concerned during our sample period, it  is found 
consistently increasing with much higher rate than did inflation. This fact is 
confirmed by looking at DRW1 whose mean is 0.01655 and standard deviation,
0.0386. Its positive average indicates inflation rate that is lower that o f net 
nominal wage. This may suggests that workers, during our sample period, were 
almost always compensated above the inflation rate, therefore did not care very 
much about its movement. It makes sense then, that only when the decline in real
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take home pay becomes large enough to threaten their standard o f living, does it 
start giving a push to the occurrence o f new negotiation. Against the backdrop 
o f such rising real take home pay over the period, we assume this threat to 
operate through expectations, so that we expect the unexpected rather than 
expected decline in the real take home pay to affect more strongly the 
probability o f negotiation.
Original variable expressing a change in real take home pay is decomposed 
into expected and unexpected component. Hence:
= unexpected +  expected (4.4.1)
We assume that the rr/p series can be explained by distributed lag o f its 
previous values and assume also that the knowledge o f such relationship is used 
to form future expectation o f rr/p. We consider 12 months lag structure fo r the 
monthly rr/p  series for our sample. Denoting rr/p(T») as Pt> rr/p(TM) as PM, 
and so on, the estimated equation is:
Pt =  1.95 Pt l  - 0.97 Pt2 - 0.70 Pt3 +  1.40 PM - 0.70 Pt5
(0 .06) (0 .13) (0 .14) (0 .14) (0 .16)
- 0.34 P ^ +  0.70 Pt7 - 0.38 Pt8 - 0.14 Pt9 +  0.34 Pt 10 
(0 .16) (0.16) (0.16) (0 .14) (0 .13)
- 0.21 Pt l l  + 0.04 P .,, +  2 .1*10‘6 
(0.12) (0.06) (0.4*10-5)
R2 (adjusted) =  0.99993
standard error is in parenthesis. Result o f this estimate is then used to 
generate the sequence o f i future monthly rr/p.
First, consider that the i-th future expectation is formed at the start o f 
the spell, t ° ,  without further updating o f information. For a typical n,s-th 
spell observation:
i > k j  =  E [  i < > ]  <4-4-2)
where f2(rJJs) is the information set available at t „8 and E denotes expectation 
operator that uses relevant information set to derive i-th month forecast. 
Specifically, this is:
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Under this assumption, workers form their expectation over future uncertainty 
based on the information at the start o f the spell.
Meanwhile, our second assumption that assumes workers to update their 
expectation with one month lag throughout throughout the contract spell gives:
=  e [  I I ( t ' )  | fi(T ^ ,T ")l (4.4.3)p ns I p ns ns ns I
Q is the information set available at the month x ^ 1 or x°s, whichever comes 
later. Hence at the start o f a contract, the workers know the level o f rr/p , and 
they derive the monthly update o f rr/p levels thereafter. Specifically:
~—(t ° ) for i= 0p ns
‘ z b :^ (T i j) +  b0 for i> 0j = 1 J p v ns7 u
In practice, we use the rate o f change o f unexpected and expected terms in 
equation (4.4.1) and may also include log o f real wage level at the start o f a 
spell to measure any existence o f secular trend effect on the hazard. That is, 
i f  there is any tendency for the average duration to shorten due to higher real 
take home pay.
Figure (4.1) and (4.3) plots the actual and expected real take home pay 
according to the expectational form (4.4.2) and (4.4.3) for typical observations 
taken from a sample and comparing it with the actual series. As can be seen from 
the figure, expectation with 1 month lag provides as good prediction as the 
actual series while the forecasts based on the first assumption is rather like a 
monotonic linear function o f time. Third dotted line represents expectations 
made with 3 months rather than 1 month lags. This assumption is the halfway 
house between the other two extreme cases set forth. Interestingly, expectation 
with 3 months lag traces rather closely with that based on (4.4.2), even though 
update o f information still takes place with additional two months lag. Figure 
(4.2) and (4.4) plot unexpected component corresponding to the expectational
IT ,  i v 
— (T ) PV ns'
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assumptions depicted in figure (4.1) and (4.3), respectively. These figures 
suggest that unexpected component largely differs according to the expectational 
forms assumed. The second assumption with as little  as 1 month lag provides very 
small magnitude o f unexpected component, which may seem too unrealistic, 
however, considering that the monthly inflation index is available to the 
public, it  may not be so implausible after all. Typically, these forecasts tend 
to diverge away from the actual level as the spell lengthens even though this is 
not always the case. There also is a tendency for such divergence to be negative 
implying pessimistic attitude o f workers who tend to expect fo r worse. 
Uniqueness o f our model enables to measure the response o f the hazard to such 
continuously varying factors throughout the contracts.
It is possible to a certain extent to insulate workers from this aspect o f 
pressure by adopting a cost o f living allowances which links nominal wages to 
the rate o f inflation (Gray (1978)). However, this introduces a new variable, 
namely, an elasticity o f indexation as a determining factor in the contract. In 
our current context, we excluded any bargaining groups which employed COLA 
system (Cost o f Living Allowances) as a main device o f wage determining process 
and our sample period do not include early 1974 when the majority o f bargaining 
groups adopted threshold payment scheme introduced by the government. 
Nonetheless, Gray concludes that even with the optimal degree o f indexation, 
contract length is affected inversely by uncertainty and positively by
transaction cost. Empirically, Christofides (1985), Christofides and W ilton 
(1983) found that uncertainty induces noncontingent wage changes and such 
unexpected rise in inflation was found to play a significant role in a
determination o f contract length both for an indexed and non-indexed contracts.
Secondly, we consider external factors that affect w. According to our 
formulation, they affect the hazard via the effect on the optimal wage, w *. In 
view o f this, we have considered two factors, namely, unemployment and relative 
wages. Global, as well as industry-specific measures o f unemployment are
considered and are both expected to exert negative effect on the hazard since 
their signaling for the excess demand for labour w ill lead to stronger
bargaining power o f the union, hence, push up w *. On the other hand, relative 
wage measured as the ratio o f current level o f average earnings in the whole 
economy to the previously agreed basic weekly wage for each t, also serves as a 
surrogate to the excess demand in the labour market, hence, affects bargaining 
power. However, this is not the only way that relative wages can affect w*. 
Comparative wage effect, fairness among workers is usually important in 
determining wages (Beckerman and Jenkinson (1989)). It reflects how better or
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worse o ff the workers belonging to this agreement group are compared to 
everybody else in the economy. The effort is not so much to narrow a gap with 
the others but rather to avoid the gap to widen. Hence, when this ratio becomes 
very high, even i f  the real take home pay has not changed, there is an incentive 
fo r the union to go ahead with a new bargaining since they now realize that the 
wages outside are getting higher faster than theirs.
Let us now consider the "internal” variables (Oswald and Blanchflower 
(1988)) which affects firm ’s financial performances. In a view that the wage 
determination via bargaining is sharing o f a rent which is the surplus above the 
mere production cost, the size o f this rent itself should play an important 
role. And this "ability to pay" serves as third criteria. Variables such as 
productivity, profit or sales per employee can be used as a direct measure o f 
the size o f rent. Competitiveness o f the product market, changes in the number 
o f employment as representing a growth or decline o f a firm  can also be o f 
influence.
Rent sharing view also casts importance on the variables that affect 
bargaining power o f the participants. Not only the size o f the cake to be shared 
but also the relative power o f two parties together determine the final size o f 
each share. The existence o f various forms o f bargaining machinery or trade 
union, higher union membership or density should increase workers bargaining 
power in addition to the labour market variables discussed above (i.e., 
unemployment, outside wages). Note that even without a trade union, groups o f 
workers with skills can have similar effects on their bargaining power due to 
their replacement cost both in terms o f money and time. (Lindbeck and Snower 
(1986,1988)). Then, higher the proportion o f skilled worker, higher the 
bargaining power o f the workers. Also, given a certain size o f rent, capital 
intensive firm  maybe more w illing to accept higher wages.
W ith respect to the actual data availability, unfortunately, it  was not 
possible to find many disaggregated variables that reflects above measures. We 
have trading profit measure per industry, and the number o f negotiators for each 
bargaining group. Number o f workers covered at each agreement is known for each 
negotiating group at 1950, 55, 60, 65, 70 and 72. These figures are interpolated 
to give appropriate values at the time o f each negotiations, and its value 
relative to total working population at a time is used as a measure o f 
"membership". We also incorporated global productivity measure to take into 
account o f the technological growth. When unions are informative about the rise 
in profit or productivity, they may expect a greater chance in exploiting the 
gains from increased productivity by claiming for higher wages and also, may
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wish to claim for it sooner than they would otherwise. Number o f trade unions 
involved is indicated for all the bargaining groups. For the majority o f them, 
the numbers involved does not change over the sample period.
Lastly, we consider factors that influence transaction cost or bargaining 
power, including factors that affect bargaining environment. The values o f past 
duration are incorporated in order to test the possibility o f lagged duration 
dependence, that is, whether exiting rate from the current contract depends on 
the history o f past contract length. I f  some group who negotiate infrequently 
tend to do so due to high cost inherent to this group irrespective o f the 
economic environment, such attribute should be captured by the group specific 
factors. However, there may be a case for such cost factors or the way it 
affects the hazard to change overtime. Other exogenous factors such as incomes 
policy dummies, existence o f government’s arbitration, i f  the industry involved 
is nationalized or it  belongs to Wage Council, manufacturing or non­
manufacturing, geographical coding, number o f unions involved w ithin the 
bargaining group and number o f workers involved in the negotiation (i.e ., 
membership) are also incorporated. Higher such proportion, higher the bargaining 
power, higher the cost o f industrial action, hence stronger the tendency for 
new negotiation. W ith respect to the incomes policy, there are several forms 
such as wage freeze (or stand still) which put severe restraint on the frequency
o f bargaining and the ceiling policy or the policy with the specified target
level for the wage increase which put restraint both on the magnitude and the 
frequency o f bargaining. And the policy can be statutory or voluntary as well as 
enforced only on public sector or on all the sectors. In this sense, it  is not
enough to capture the effect o f different forms o f policies by simple dummies,
however, we adopt this for the moment as a preliminary analysis. These dummies 
are at least capable o f distinguishing the effect o f these different policies on 
the magnitude and on the frequency o f wage changes.
4 .4.2 The wage change component
On the basis o f the equation (4.2.5), we now discuss the exact 
specifications o f the explanatory variables which, we have assumed, comes in 
linearly to the rate o f nominal basic wage equation. According to the equation 
(4.2.5), basic influences on the wage changes are : price/retention ratio 
changes, labour market condition, firm ’s internal situation, cost o f negotiation 
and future uncertainty. Note that this equation is conditioned on the fact that 
the contract has just terminated at Tns. This is the major deviation from the 
hazard counterpart. Hence, workers, when determining their wage claim, are aware
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o f the total decline in their real wage during the last contract between Tns_j 
and Tns, as well as the average earnings level and the unemployment level at 
Tns, and most o f all, the fact that the contract terminated at Tns. Knowledge o f 
these information are used basically to make up for the losses workers have 
experienced throughout the previous contract during which nominal wage was 
constant. In addition, workers, knowing that the new contract w ill again fix  the 
level o f nominal wage for some time, w ill demand much more than a mere 
compensation for the past. They w ill try incorporating the ex-ante expectation 
for the future, in particular, o f negotiation cost and price/retention ratio 
uncertainty. In this way, we can consider the determinants o f current wage claim 
in two components over time: compensation for the past and the ex-ante 
provisions for the future.
First o f all, we consider the ex-post compensation against the lost real 
take home pay at Tns in a comparable form found in the hazard equation. Obvious 
variables that describes such loss is a change in real take home pay between 
Tns_j and Tns while nominal wage were fixed at wns.j (DRR). This variable 
depicts a rate o f change in infla/retention ratio during the previous contract. 
Additionally, we may consider a variable, DRW1, a change in real pay between 
Tns_2 and T ^  with nominal wages wns_2 and w ^ ,  respectively. This 
represents a sort o f "in itia l condition" for the ns-th spell. In a world o f 
continuous contracting between two parties, there may be a case when losses 
experienced during a certain contract is not totally compensated at the end o f 
such contract, but is carried over to be compensated in the successive wage 
bargain. Hence, a negative DRW1 can be incorporated at the following negotiation 
into the wns, although, our sample shows such case is very rare (i.e ., DRW 1>0 
mostly). S till, larger the real wage increase at the last negotiation, smaller 
the increase we would expect in the following negotiation i f  everything stays 
constant. However, as have been discussed in the duration component section, 
this w ill not be true i f  the DRW1 signals as the latest trend in the negotiation 
cost and the future uncertainty, hence w ill help predict the future contract 
length. I f  that is the case, this explanation may suggest an opposite positive
effect o f DRW1 on \Vns, in which case, we tend to observe groups succeeded in 
obtaining large real wage change tends to do the same in the future.
Labour market condition, we assume, as considered in the duration equation 
to be represented by the relative wage and unemployment variables. Relative wage 
not only captures excess demand but also "fairness" criteria which must be 
important in this competitive world. Unemployment, global and industry specific 
can be both included. Hysteresis effect o f the outsider-insider consideration
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can be informally tested by observing their effect on the wage claim. I f  
hysteresis exists, industry specific unemployment, unlike global unemployment, 
should exert positive effect on the wage claim. However, this test is not very 
precise since bargaining group which our data is based on contain several unions 
o f several industries, hence industry specific unemployment does not necessarily 
reflect any particular union’s membership consideration. Other variables which 
may explain excess demand, such as vacancy rate, unemployment/vacancy ratio are 
also experimented but found insignificantly superior to the unemployment 
variables.
F irm ’s internal situation is again mainly reflected by industry specific 
trading profit since no other disaggregated data, particularly those concerning 
sales, product market competitiveness and financial situations were available. 
Global productivity measure represents technical progress. We have tried to seek 
an effect o f input prices but they were found insignificant. Under the profit 
sharing framework, more profitable the firms is, more rent there is for the 
workers to exploit in terms o f higher wages.
Consider the future uncertainty and negotiation cost. Workers, expecting a 
rise in inflation during the future contract period, w ill demand and obtain a 
larger current wage settlement to compensate them for the future expected rise 
in prices. I f  workers know the timing o f the next negotiation, their wage claim 
w ill be such that it just covers their expected rise in inflation up to the 
planned date. However, without such knowledge, it  all depends on the ex-ante 
expectation o f how long the contract w ill last. Cost consideration is an 
important determinant o f future uncertainty. I f  workers feel that such cost is 
high, they w ill try to derive the best out o f the current negotiation, therefore 
bargain harder for they know it w ill be a long time before they can negotiate 
again. On the other hand, i f  workers know such cost is low, they may not claim 
high wages since they feel they can negotiate for higher wages whenever they 
like. Such negotiation cost is generally determined by the time invariant group- 
specific factors such as bargaining system employed, number o f trade unions 
involved. However, these factors miss out the elements that fluctuate over time. 
Probably, the best indicator that can be used to help workers gauge expected 
future contract length and inflation are simply the value o f wage changes over 
the last consecutive negotiations (i.e., DRW1) or/and the lagged duration.
Obviously, i f  a wage change is determined a priori as a stage 
implementation, nature o f wage determination process may be completely 
different. ISTA depicts those determined a priori and amongst the staged wage 
changes, i f  the dates as well as the magnitudes are planned, they are coded in
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the ISFIX. Wage change, when staged, is usually smaller in magnitude than 
otherwise bargained.
Incomes policies also affect the nature o f wage determination. Ceiling 
policy is made to suppress rate o f wage rise henceforth, i f  effective, should 
exert a negative influence. The effect o f wage freeze policy, on the other hand, 
is not too clear. During such a policy, there should not be any wage changes 
unless it is completely backed with a rise in productivity. Twelve month policy, 
which is aimed to restrict wage rise at most once a year, may raise the size o f 
wage rise because o f the lessened frequency o f wage changes. Although each 
policy differs in their degree o f enforcement and their extent (some ceiling 
allowed up to 3.5%, some up to 6.7%), we have resumed using separate dummies for 
each policies. In this way, we can at least separate out policies with different 
ceilings and voluntary from statutory policies. W ith respect to the extent o f 
the coverage, policies enforced only to the public sector have corresponding 
dummies only for the public sector bargaining groups.
4.5 Summary
What matters to the unions in determining when and by how much to negotiate 
involves past, present and future consideration given the fact that these two 
parties, namely unions and employees, renegotiate continuously overtime. How 
much o f uncompensated pressure factors have been carried over into this new 
contract, what is the prevailed economic situation since the last bargain and 
how is such a loss compared to the cost o f renegotiation? And when the bargain 
is struck, apart from the ex-post loss compensation, workers need to incorporate 
the prospect for the future. These are the problems facing the unions. Our 
formulation o f separating the effect into the ex-ante factors, within the spell 
factors and the future expectation factors should be able to cover a ll o f above 
accumulating effect. By considering the determinants for the timing o f a bargain 
and wage change given that bargain takes place, we can deal w ith them 
separately, and yet, be able to embody fu ll simultaneous relation between the 
two. The important fact is that these explanatory variables are continuously 
varying overtime and their entire time path during the course o f contract is 
naturally, considered to affect when the next negotiation occurs. The great 
advantage o f our model as compared to the conventional studies o f wage 
determination process using a simple regression analysis is that our model can 
take into account o f these dynamic effect o f time varying regressors on hazard.
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Footnotes to chapter 4
1. See, for instance, Black and Kelejian (1972) who formulated wage variable as
one-quarter percentage change while assuming uniform quarterly bargaining 
pattern with one-year contracts, Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1975) who took 
into account o f the proportion o f workers who experienced change in wages in 
a given quarter and Smith and W ilton (1978) who extended to accommodate 
multi-year variable length contracts and deferred increments by using 
weights
2. In North America, they typically agree fixed term contracts often with
indexation provisions. Length o f contract as well as the size o f wage 
increase are determined at the time o f bargain, hence, events occurring 
after the bargain is struck play no role in determining when the next 
bargain w ill take place (though, there are cases where contingent wage 
changes occur). Also, in Britain, between 1979 and 84, Gregory, Lobban and 
Thomson (1985) found that over 90% o f settlements recorded in the CBI survey 
o f pay settlements were made on a strict annual basis. This may be due to an 
increasing number o f settlements which were bargained at a very 
disaggregated level (phenomena started in late 70’s), or the absence o f 
formal incomes policy during the 80’s. This rig id ity has not always existed 
in the past (as our data show), and may cease to exists in the future i f  
circumstances change.
3. For a more general u tility  function u(w,w,p,t,n), where union may care about
the level o f employment, the comparative statics are very similar. First 
order condition o f Nash maximization yields:
Differentiating this equation gives comparative statics: dw /du>0 and
dw /dp*>0, where p* denotes profit per employee above its fa ll back level. 
Tax (t), retail price index and input prices have ambiguous effect on wages.
s P " P u - u-
1 - s n uw
which defines the bargained u tility  level:
s
u
1 - s n
  p* uw +  u
1 - s
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Chapter 5: The Model and Estimation
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we build a model that simultaneously determines the 
occurrence and the magnitude o f wage changes based on the economic framework 
discussed in the preceding chapter.
During our sample period, bargaining groups in U .K . generally negotiated 
open ended agreements which fixed the nominal wages but le ft the date o f the 
next negotiation unspecified. There were cases where a contract length was 
determined a priori as a staged settlement. However, even in such circumstances, 
there was no legal compulsion to adhere to the agreement, and as a result, 
deviations from agreed negotiation dates were common. Hence, under such system, 
re-negotiation was a possibility at any time once a contract began. In other 
words, there always was a non-zero probability o f re-negotiation that was 
subject to the influence o f events that took place after the commencement o f the 
contract, such as a sudden rise in inflation rate or changes in the incomes 
policy regime. This probability at any point in time is easily associated with 
the hazard rate, which, in this case is analogous to the probability o f 
negotiation conditional on the elapsed length o f the current contract.
For each discrete wage change, we observe the elapsed time since the last 
settlement and the associated wage variable which comes about as a result o f the 
termination o f such contract. This setting, in a duration model, is best 
represented as the marked failure type (see Cox and Oaks (1984)) where there is 
a measure o f a certain variable, "mark'', (i.e., magnitude o f wage change) 
corresponding to each failure (i.e., occurrence o f wage change). Generally, 
there is a strong relationship between the timing o f a failure and its mark, and 
our case is certainly not an exception. This necessitates a simultaneous 
equation system in order to understand the possibly dynamic interdependence 
between the two. It is surprising, however, that they are very often treated as 
exogenous and merely thrown into each others regression equation as an 
independent variable.
Here, we propose a duration model o f the marked failure type that explains 
the occurrence o f wage settlement and the magnitude o f concomitant wage changes. 
In this way, it  is possible to distinguish the two separate effects o f any 
external influences, in particular, o f incomes policy, on this system o f wage 
determination process. Namely, on delay and moderation o f wage changes.
The relation w ill be based on the jo in t distribution function o f the 
duration and the wage changes where the former is represented by the hazard
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rate. Modeling the hazard rate directly enables us to analyze the effect o f the 
accumulating explanatory variables that trigger wage changes more naturally and 
intuitively than modeling the duration distribution itself. Furthermore, because 
these pressure factors are continuously evolving and exerting influence on the 
negotiation probability throughout the spell, it is crucial for the analysis o f 
the observed spell length to depend on the entire time path o f these variables 
rather than their values at any one point in time. This sort o f duration 
relation is a junctional rather than a function, and is not appropriately 
estimated by the conventional regression method.
In addition to the introduction o f the time varying explanatory variables in 
the duration component, our model faces some other complications. First is a 
clear existence o f the group-specific effect. Some bargaining groups seem to 
have tendencies towards relatively long or short duration spells, often in a way 
that is not clearly related to the observable characteristics such as degree o f 
unionization or the bargaining machinery (e.g., private, wages council, 
nationalized industry). Thus our model must allow for the presence o f 
unobservable group-specific effects. Secondly, we have very little  a prio ri 
information about the nature o f the unobservable influences in the model. In 
order to make our model as free as possible from the dependence on ad hoc 
assumptions about the random disturbance terms and their lack o f correlation 
with the explanatory variables, we opt for statistical techniques that are 
robust in this sense. This method bears a further advantage in dealing with the 
multiple spells nature o f the data. Since our data contains multiple
observations recorded by a single group over time, the hazard associated with 
one duration observation depends on the entire bargaining history o f its group, 
in particular, its lagged durations. Therefore, a jo in t density function for the 
duration observation is a product o f distributions, each conditioned on its 
history and the unobservable factors. Then, the marginal distribution can only 
be derived by going through a multiple integrations which w ill be terribly messy 
for any functional forms assumed for the unobservables. Inclusion o f the time 
varying explanatory variables can further complicate such integration. Our model 
is totally devoid o f such multiple integrations as well as any ad hoc 
distributional assumptions, yet, capable o f deriving the estimates o f
interesting parameters.
Final note on the applicability o f the model developed here. Although we
focus on the particular issue o f the wage determination process, this model can
be applied to many other phenomena which involve a study o f spell durations
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whose termination probability may depend on the events occurring during the 
spell. In particular, i f  there were an endogenous "response" variable associated 
with each duration spell, their dynamic relation can be determined 
simultaneously. For instance, the strike duration can be studied together with 
the wage level achieved at the end o f each conflict.
In this chapter, we w ill discuss our statistical model separately fo r the 
wage change and the duration component, followed by a discussion o f the 
estimation methodology. Last section is devoted to the results.
5.2 The s ta tis tic a l model
5.2.1 N otation
We have data on N  bargaining groups, indexed by a suffix n. We observe Sn  
bargains for the n-th group over a historical period, and these are indexed by a 
suffix s. For each bargain, we observe the following:
<5ns the s-th spell duration for the n-th bargaining group
wns the rate o f change in nominal wage brought about at the s-th bargain,
at the termination o f the s-th spell. 
zns,Cns vectors o f explanatory variables (used respectively in the duration and
wage components o f the model) which are spell specific: they may vary 
across the spells, but invariant within the spells: they may contain 
lagged 8 and w .
ns ns
cn,dn vectors o f explanatory variables that vary across bargaining groups but
are constant over the whole observation period: they represent time
invariant idiosyncrasies o f each group and tend to include qualitative 
variables.
xn(t) vectors o f exogenous variables that vary continuously over time, both
within and between contracts. 
uq an unobservable, invariant effect specific to the n-th group.
vns,^ ns spell-specific random errors relating to the duration and wage
components o f the model, respectively.
5 .2 .2  The jo in t d is trib u tio n  o f duration and wage increase
We assume the existence o f a random group specific effect uq. Conditional on
all unobservable variates and past history, 8^ and w ^ have a jo in t
distribution that can be decomposed as follows into the duration and the wage
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change component.
f (5  ,w  | c  ,d  ,z  ,€  ,X  ,u  ,v  ,v  ) =  f (5 | c  , z  , X  ,u  ,v  )
ns ns1 n n ns ns ns n ns ns ns1 n ns ns n ns
* f  (w Id ,£ ,5  ,u ,v ) (5-2-1)
w ns' n ns ns n ns
where X represents the time path o f x (t) between the (s-l)-th wage bargain
ns n
onwards. fw is conditioned on the current duration, 5^, hence the density o f 
current wage change is conditional on the timing o f the bargain. Note that with 
zns and £ns defined appropriately, the jo in t distribution is conditional on all
the past bargains for this group, n.
By parameterizing the distribution in the form (5-2-1), we are assuming that 
the timing o f negotiation is determined prior to the size o f the resulting wage 
increase. In other words, negotiators first decide when to increase and then
consider the size o f increase that is appropriate. This is reasonable
considering that, in practice, the amount o f wage change is determined at the 
time o f bargaining which can be different from what negotiators wished to
achieve prior to the negotiation (section 4.4.2). In this way, the length o f the 
current contract may affect the size o f wage changes achieved at the end o f such 
contract, although the current contract length is not affected by the amount o f 
realized wage changes agreed when the contract is over. We consider the two 
components o f (5-2-1) separately.
5 .2 .3 The duration component
The distribution o f observed duration is conditioned on the information set 
at the time o f the last negotiation and the time path o f the explanatory 
variables xn(t) since then. We start indirectly with the hazard function rather
than the distribution o f duration itself, since the hazard is the most natural 
way o f representing the accumulating pressures on negotiators, hence makes more 
economic sense in interpreting the effects o f these pressure variables. Here, 
the hazard rate at duration t is the probability o f a renegotiation occurring at 
the elapsed duration conditional on the present and past circumstances and the 
fact that the spell has already lasted for t. In other words, it  is the 
instantaneous exit rate from the current contract which has lasted fo r t 
duration periods. To be more precise:
Pr(a e (t,t+d t) | « st,c ,z ,x (t),u ) =  h(t|c ,z x (t),u )dt (5-2-2)
ns ns n ns n n n ns n n
where h (t|.) is the hazard function. Adopting the conventional proportional
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hazard specification:
h ^ lc .z  ,x (t),u ) =  exp{p’x (t)+ y  + y  ’c + y  ’z +u  } h (t;a) (5-2-3)n ns n n n u i n z n s n u
where a , /3, r 0, and r 2 316 ^ xe(  ^ parameters requiring estimation. The 
function h0(t;a) denotes the baseline hazard which represents the pressure on 
negotiators engendered purely by the passage o f time. When this baseline hazard 
equals 1, the conditional probability o f renegotiation depends on time only 
through the time varying covariates x (t) and not on time itself.
n
Using standard results (see, for example, Pudney (1989, chapter 6)) the 
probability density o f duration can be written as:
f a ( 5 J C„>Z„ , ’ X n ,’ U „>V J  =  h ( 5 J Cn’ Z„ , ’ X „( t ) ’ U n’ V J  e X P H J  C5 ' 2 ' 4 )O ns n ns s n ns ns  ns n  ns ns
where I  is the integrated hazard:ns
5
-  ns
I =  h(t|c ,z ,X ,u ,v )dtns J 1 n ns ns n ns* 0
5
P ns
=  exp(y0+ r 1’cn+ 3'2’zm+ un+ vJ  J exp{p’xn(t)}ho(t;a)dt (5-2-5)
0
The theory o f the hazard function implies that the integrated hazard has a 
standard exponential distribution, thus the variable t ns= -ln (Ins) is distributed 
unconditionally as type I  extreme value distribution. To see this, the Jacobian 
o f the transformation from 8 to t is:
ns ns
a 8
ns —
a G h (5  | z  , X  ,u  , v )
n s 1 ns ns n ns
(5-2-6)
and thus the density function o f l^ is the following:
f  (0  =  exp( - i - e"c) (5-2-7)
This is the density o f a type I  extreme value distribution with mean ^(1) and 
variance i//’ (l)> where 0(.) is the digamma function, dlnr(£)/d£.
Now define a variable:
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ns
(5-2-8)
Equations (5-2-5) and (5-2-8) imply a random effects regression structure with
7) as its dependent variable:
where the intercept is y0* = ^0+ 0(1) the spell-specific error term is 
cns=stns+ v ns"^(l) which is constructed to have a zero conditional mean.
Note that, although t ns must be distributed as type I  extreme value, much 
can be said about ens unless we assume a particular distributional form for vns. 
Even i f  such assumption is to be made, conventional maximum likelihood 
estimation w ill not be straightforward. Recall that the jo in t density function 
is the product o f conditional distributions, each conditioned on the past 
contract history and the unobservables that include un and vns. The maximum 
likelihood estimation then requires the distributional assumptions for both un 
and vns to conduct a formidable multiple integration that removes these 
unobservables to derive a marginal density for the observed s . Such
distributional assumption tends to be very ad hoc and the likely correlations 
between the error term and the explanatory variables, in particular, the lagged 
durations, creates further difficulties. Moreover, when the hazard involves the 
time varying explanatory variables, the integrand becomes a very complicated 
function o f t, which leads to a very complicated and expensive numerical 
integration. For this reason, we choose to work with the regression formulation, 
(5-2-9), making only relatively weak assumption on the structure o f serial 
correlation across settlements1 and that ens has a conditional mean o f zero. In 
this sense, our methods w ill be semi-parametric.
We now turn to the dependent variable, yna which is not directly observable 
because o f its dependence on the parameters o f the model. The main problem in 
constructing i)ns concerns the vector xn(t). These are potentially continuous 
variables, but are only observed at discrete monthly or quarterly intervals. 
There are two options open to us. We can either interpolate these discrete 
observations with some form o f spline function (as is done by Diamond and 
Hausman (1984)), or we can treat the time path o f xn as a step function with 
discrete jumps at each o f the observation points. The latter alternative is much 
simpler, and not obviously more arbitrary, and is the approach adopted here.
Assume that, for the s-th bargain struck by group n, the tim ing o f
ns
ns ns
(5-2-9)
ns
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observation is as illustrated in figure 5.1. W ithin the interval between the 
(s-l)-th  and s-th bargains, sn8, there are monthly observations on xn(t);
these occur at dates xns[0 ], xns[ l ]  ,xns[2] . . . . x j k j .  The dates o f the month 
o f the observation immediately prior to the start o f the spell is t [0], and
ns
the date o f the first observation recorded after the end o f the spell is 
t [k +1 ].
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F igure 5.1 The timing o f observations 
I f  x (t) remains fixed between each monthly interval during the duration, 6r
n can be written as:
ns
k n ,bns[/]Ans r -i .uns[(j
v =  -In { E e x p k x  (x [/]) I h (t;a)dt } (5-2-10)
j_o L 4 “  J Jan»[i] 0
where:
a [i] =  max { T , , r  [i]}  - T  , (5-2-11)
ns ns-1 ns ns-1
b [i] =  min { T , z [ i+ l ] }  - T (5-2-12)
ns ns ns ns-1
There is no convincing economic theory available to tell us the nature o f 
the baseline hazard function, h0(t;a), beyond a presumed tendency towards an 
annual pay round. Approximating h0(.) directly requires the computation o f the 
integrals in (5-2-10). We have therefore approximated the integrated baseline 
hazard,
* (t;a )= f  hQ(t;a) dt.
Generally, our dependent variable is:
=  - ln { ! ”'  exp[p’xn(Tnm )]] [ t ( b j®  - * ( a j/ ] ) ]  }  (5-2-15)
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Note that neither the linear form /3’x n nor the polynomial in (5-2-13) has an 
intercept, since this can be absorbed into 7 * in (5-2-9).
For given parameter values, and any o f our approximations, ^(t;a), i)ns is 
easily computed. However, the specification o f ¥(t;a) has to be very carefully 
chosen, for otherwise, the model becomes quickly unidentified. As can be seen 
from the definition (5-2-15), i f  there exists a parameter vector, a *  say, for 
which tf(t;a*) is constant for any values o f t, there is an identification 
problem. I f  we set /3 to zero and allow a to approach a * ,  the tj w ill be
constant given that tf(0;a)=0 by definition. The dependent variable in a 
differenced equation, At) , becomes zero, hence, choosing the 7 parameters to bens
zero w ill give a zero residual: a perfect fit for the regression equation (5-2-
8). The following is examples o f such approximations that are inappropriate for 
this reason:
¥(t;a) =  exp(at) - 1
In both cases, <x*=0 leads to a constant dependent variable for any value o f t. 
The integrated hazard corresponding to the second example is the W eibull 
duration distribution, whose unidentification problem is well known in the 
context o f static regression analysis. There, the dependent variable is log(t) 
and the structural parameter, 3 cannot be separately estimated from a . In 
practice, these identification problems can become more intractable by the 
insensitivity o f numerical computation process. Nonetheless, we have 
experimented with a wide variety o f forms for $(t;a) with appropriate 
normalizations in order to avoid above identification problems. These include a 
flexible polynomial:
which has to have constraints on the a’s so that a negative value fo r ^(t;a) is 
avoided. Another approximation is the constant baseline hazard w ith a 
superimposed annual jump:
*(t;a ) =  ta
tf(t;a ) » exp { t  +  a  t2 + . . . .  +  a  tm } -  12 m (5-2-13)
¥(t;a) *  t+ a 2X(t) (5-2-14)
with a restriction that a^O and:
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A(t) =
0 for t< 4 8  weeks
t_4g for 4 8 =st^72 weeks
12 for t> 7 2  weeks
We have also experimented with a step function with jumps at fixed 13-week 
intervals.
5 .2 .4  The wage change component
The rate o f wage change, conditional on the occurrence and timing o f a 
bargain, can be modeled by means o f a linear regression:
w =  0 4- ^ d +  0 ’£ +  <f> u -I- v  (5-2-16)ns 0 I n  2 ns 3 n  ns
where dn and £ns 316 vectors o f observable explanatory variables. Note that £ns 
may include current and lagged duration and lagged wage changes. The random 
effect, un, is included to allow for the same group specific factors that 
influence both the duration and wage change decisions o f the bargaining. The 
disturbance term, v ns, is assumed to have zero means conditional on the
explanatory variables.
5.3 E stim ation : fixed effects
We have already ruled out maximum likelihood for its complexity and lack o f 
robustness and chosen instead to work with the regression format o f equations 
(5-2-8) and (5-2-16). However, ordinary regression analysis is inappropriate for 
the following reasons.
(i) The dependent variable o f the duration equation, i?ns, is a nonlinear 
function o f endogenous variable, <5ns, and some unknown parameters, which makes 
it  inappropriate to use the standard nonlinear least squares format.
(ii) In practice, lagged durations and wage changes w ill be included in the
spell-specific explanatory variables, zns and £ns, that are not independent o f
the group-specific effect, un. This correlation leads to inconsistent least 
squares estimation.
(ii) Since we have little  a priori information about the nature o f un, it  is
best to avoid making strong assumptions about it. Therefore, elimination o f un 
before estimation is appropriate.
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The first and the second issues call for a general method o f moment type 
estimator where the moment restriction is considered with the appropriate 
instrumental variables which, according to (iii), should be applied to the 
transformed model so that the group effects do not appear. These objections have 
already been discussed in the literature (see N ickell (1981) and Bhargava and 
Sargan (1983)), but the kind o f transformation and the form o f moment 
restrictions particularly, the set o f appropriate instruments, have to be 
uniquely considered for this model so as to avoid any inconsistencies.
Consider the method o f eliminating un. The usual within-group transformation 
(i.e ., covariance model) is inappropriate for the fam iliar reason that the
transformed error, is correlated with all the observed durations, wage
changes and spell-related values o f xn(t). Although the asymptotic bias created 
as a result o f such correlations w ill approach zero as the time dimension o f our 
sample approaches infin ity, that is not the case here2. This makes it almost 
impossible to find a set o f admissible instruments. Instead, we have chosen to 
use a simple first-difference transformation. Under this transformation, the 
admissible instruments can be found amongst suitably lagged variables as long as 
we assume the serial correlation structure between the settlements. Note that 
Arellano’s (1989) estimator would be a worthwhile alternative in deriving a set 
o f admissible instruments. Thus, the system transformed for the estimation is:
l  -  l  = y ’(z - z  ) +  e  - e  (5-3-1)
ns ns-1 ns ns-1 ns ns-1
W - w =  0 ’(£ - c  ) +  V -  V  (5-3-2)
ns ns-1 2 ns ns-1 ns ns-1
Another difficu lty, unique to this model, concerns the treatment o f the 
exogeneity assumptions. Suppose for example that the variables in the vector 
xn(t) are exogenous in the sense that their entire trajectories are 
statistically independent o f the unobserved part o f the wage determination 
process: a very strong definition o f exogeneity. This implies that the value o f 
xn(t) at any exogenously determined time t is also independent o f a ll random 
elements in the model. However, the value o f xn(t) observed at an endogenously 
determined time t is a variable endogenous to the bargaining model. To see this 
more clearly, consider the likelihood function o f the entire observed samples 
while assuming that each duration and wage change component depends only on 
their most recent lagged values:
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• • • v a- i 3. - 8- i * wi" w* i ' x:  *ej f.<w- i ai - a-*wi" w- i * €:  ’vJ
where x* and §* are the time-path o f exogenous variables excluding the lagged
endogenous variables that affect the duration and wage distributions. Subscript, 
n, has been dropped for simplicity. More specifically, for each s-th observation 
on duration, x* includes spell specific exogenous variables known at the 
beginning o f the s-th spell (i.e., Ts_j) and the time-path o f exogenous 
variables from then onwards. On the other hand, for the s-th wage change 
observation, includes variables observed up to and including the end o f the 
s-th spell (i.e ., TJ. The difficulty in defining the exogeneity o f variables 
occurs particularly with respect to the duration component. For a typical s-th 
observation o f duration, recall:
7) =  7 *  +  r ’c +  r ’z +  u +  e
s 0 1 2 s s
Where c, z and Xns in vs, excluding the lagged endogenous variables, constitutes 
x * in above notation. Then:
E O l+ e . l^ .a ^ w .- .w ^ x ; =  0 
E(u+ usI5i " 5<>w1"W m ,Cs) =  0
Any exogenous variables observed at times related in any way to the duration o f 
the current spell, Ss, are not exogenous to the s-th duration equation since 
they are determined in part by the length o f the current spell, which in turn 
depends on es. While for the wage equation, since the wage is determined after 
the decision to terminate the contract is made, the current duration, 5S, is 
strictly exogenous with respect to i>8, and so as the other variables as long as 
they are observed prior to or at the end o f the s-th bargain (i.e ., up to and 
including Ts).
The presence o f lagged endogenous variables in zs or £s makes this problem 
even more complex for the differenced equation (5-3-1) and (5-3-2). Now, the two 
compound error terms, {es-es-i) and {vs-v8.j} are correlated with {zs-zs l } and 
f e ' € s-i}> respectively. Assuming no serial correlation in {e8}:
E ( e -e  15 . . .6  ,w  ...W ,X * ) =  0
S S-l 1 1 8-2 1 8-2 8-1
However,
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E (e  -e |5  . . .6  ,w ...W , ,x* ) *  0
V S S-l 1 S - l ’ 1 8 -1 ’ 8 7
Thus, the exogenous variables x*_j and the lagged endogenous variables up to (s- 
2)th bargain are appropriate instruments for the duration equation (5-3-1). In 
other words, the variables observed at the end o f (s-2)-th spell (i.e ., Ts_2) or 
earlier are all admissible instruments. Note that, in addition, exogenous 
variables observed after the end o f the (s-2)-th spell are s till valid 
instruments as long as their observation points are not related to the time o f 
bargaining, Ts.j or Ts. Consequently, in practice, admissible instruments are 
a ll the explanatory variables observed at the (s-2)-th bargaining (i.e ., 
or earlier, as well as the exogenous variables observed at fixed intervals o f 12 
and 24 months after the end o f the (s-2)-th spell (i.e ., T8_2+12-months and 
T8_2+24-months). This is because the spell length o f around 12 months is the 
average in the data.
For the wage equation (5-3-2), is correlated with v8_i since v8_j affects 
the timing o f the following s-th bargain, the time that is observed.
Nonetheless, since the wage equation is conditioned on the timing o f wage 
change, Ss_, is strictly exogenous with respect to v8_i. Therefore, 5 ^  and any 
exogenous variables observed at the end o f the (s-l)-th spell (i.e ., T ^ )  are 
all admissible instruments.
E(v-v 15 , . .6  ,w ..w  ,€* ) =  0
V 8 8-1 1 l ’ S - l ’ 1 8-2’ S - l7
Estimating equation forms (5-3-1) and (5-3-2) has the advantage that the 
unobservable group effects, un, are eliminated, but it  also has some 
disadvantages. The intercepts and the observable group idiosyncrasies, cn and 
dn, are also eliminated and their coefficients are not directly estimable. 
Moreover, in performing this covariance transformation, we are eliminating a 
large amount o f variation in the sample, therefore sacrificing efficiency. 
Nevertheless, this is the price one has to pay for computational convenience and 
statistical robustness.
5.3.1 E stim ation o f the wage equation
In writing our estimators, we use the following notation for sample moments. 
A matrix M ab is the matrix o f cross-moments between the differenced forms o f two 
vector variables, a^ and bns, while a vector mab is the vector o f cross-moments 
between the differenced vector a^ and the differenced scalar bns. Thus:
M ,b =  N-1 Z z " ( v U M n . . ) ’ (5-3-3)
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N Sn
^ a b  ^   ^ n ^  (^ns”^ns-l)(^ns”^ns-l) (5-3-4)
where bns is a vector in (5-3-3) but a scalar in (5-3-4).
Assume a vector o f variables, qns, to contain suitable instruments. Then, 
this vector w ill satisfy the following conditions3:
p lim  m e =  0 (5-3-5)
N-*»
p lim  m ^ =  0 (5-3-6)
N-*»
Provided the matrix inverses exist, the usual instrument variable estimator 
can be defined for <p2 in the linear rate o f wage change equation, (5-3-2). This 
can be derived by considering the minimum o f the criterion function with respect 
to 02:
m,v ’ (W)-1 mqL, (5-3-7)
in which, we can choose the weighting matrix to be W =  M qq, and derive:
$ =  (M - m  'm  M , M ''m  (5-3-8)
2 qq qq qq qq qq qw
This is consistent for N -» » under standard conditions. To see its asymptotic 
distribution, expand (5-3-8) to derive:
✓N (*2 - <t>2) =  (M?,M -i M ?)-' M ?qMqi (VN m ,„) +  op( l)  (5-3-9)
where M ^q and M qq are plims o f M ^q and M qq. The last component o f (5-3-9) can be 
written as:
N 1/2 m „  =  ]Sr1/2 Z e (5-3-10)
n n
where:
Sn
e =  s (q - q )(v - v ).n s=2 ns ns-1 ns ns-1
But en has a zero mean vector and a covariance matrix that can be consistently 
estimated by:
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s s
A II f l A  A  a  4
A = S2 ti 2 e„ e„ (5-3-11)
where:
Specifically, expression o f A reduces to the following i f  we assume vns to be 
independent and homoscedastic both across groups and over time (i.e ., E(i>J,)=<r£
for a ll n and s):
s sn n
A  =  , h  t=2 (5-3-i2)
where A  ^ is the Kronecker delta. And the variance o f vns conditional on q^and 
Qns-i can be estimated consistently by: 
n s n
Z Z (w  - w -(f> (c -€ ))
^ 2    n =  1 s =  2 ns n s - 1  2 ns n s - 1  ~
^ V )
2 ,S .< S. '
It  then follows from the standard arguments that VN(4>2 - 02) is asymptotically
A*.
(in N) normal and that a valid asymptotic approximation to cov(02) is:
V,* =  [M -M '*M  j  'tM , M  '(X ) m  'm - ] [ M - m  'm  j  '/N 2 (5-3-14)
^ 2  L qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq qq
In applying our estimators, it is important to check the specification o f
the model by means o f some suitable misspecification test. The obvious test to
apply in this context is a development o f Sargan’s (1985) Instrumental Variable
* A  .
x2 test for covariance between the errors and instruments. Since 02 we ^ave Just 
derived is not efficient, the form, mq^ ’ (Mqq)-1mqV<r2) does not have the usual
asymptotic x2 distribution even under the hypothesis o f correct specification. 
Instead, expand the estimator o f expression (5-3-10) about the true parameter 
value:
✓N m ,, =  [ I  - +  op( l)  (5-3-15)
=  6  /N  mq„  +  op( l)
Therefore:
169
N mqI/(BAB’)' m qV g x 2 (r) (5-3-16)
where A =p lim A , []" denotes a generalized inverse and r=rank(BAB’) is the number 
o f instruments minus the number o f coefficients in <p2. A can be consistently 
estimated by A, by expression (5-3-11) which is based on the consistent 
estimator o f <f>2, J2- Thus, an asymptotically valid specification test statistic 
which w ill follow x2(r) under the null hypothesis o f correct specification is 
the following:
AAA
C = N mql,’ [ BAB’ ] ' mqV (5-3-17)
where:
B =  I  - M qC[M € (5-3-18)
However, estimator <t>2 described by (5-3-8) is consistent but not efficient. 
Efficient estimator o f <f>2 can be derived as a second step, once having derived 
%2. Let:
A  A
Ay =  Aw -  A£  0  ,n n n 2
M  n = 1/N Z {Aq ’Ay Ay’ Aq }
qi«l n n n n n
And use M  ^  as a weighting matrix, W, for the minimizing problem (5-3-7):
m in M VqM q^ M qV (5-3-19)
^2
Hence the optimal estimator for <f>2 is:
?  =  (M , M 'i, M  M , M '* m (5-3-20)
2 Cq q^q qq qq q^q qw v 7
Its asymptotic variance is now estimated by:
a v a r(*2) =  (M?q M ^ ) '1 / N (5-3-21)
Given this efficient second step estimator, the Sargan statistics for over 
identifying restrictions which is asymptotically equivalent to (5-3-17) is 
straightforwardly:
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sar =  N (M -  M '‘ M  ~ )  (5-3-22)v V q qQq qV '  v '
— (Z A v ’Aq ) (Z Aq’Av Av’ Aq )_1 (Z Aq’ Av ) ~  x  (r)
n n n n n n n n n n n
where A v n is the residual given 0 2, Avn the residual given 4>2 and r  is the
number o f instruments minus the number o f coefficients in <f> . This can be seen2
by rewriting above statistic as:
sar =  N m C (I - G(G’G )''G ’)C ’m (5-3-23)
Vq N p N qV v 7
where: C C ’ =  M ‘ ‘ , G =  C ’ M  .  and p is the number o f instruments. Also,
N N qfiq’ N q£ V ’
/N m  C ~ N (0 ,I) and rank(I -G(G’G)'1G’)= r, hence (5-3-23) follows x2 .
Vq N p p (r)
The intercept, 0O, and the coefficients o f the group-specific explanatory 
variables, 4>u cannot be estimated without some assumption about the nature o f 
the unobservable group-specific effects, un. Assume that un has zero mean 
conditional on all exogenous variables, then a regression (with an intercept) o f
wns-02^ ns or wns"^2^ ns on dn generate consistent estimates o f 4>0 and 4>x.
Consider only the second step estimator, 0 2 ^ d  suppose that the firs t element 
o f vector dn is one. And let <f>x now has 0O as its first element. Then:
? .  -  s . d . d„’)-i (E E dn(w„s- ? ;? J ’) (5-3-24)
Then, its asymptotic covariance matrix is consistently estimated by Ea„ai where:
=  t 2Sn(dnd„’) ] '[  2 (d„S„(^7 u j +  d „E 7 „
+  dnEC„;(M?q Mq’ q M q?)-' M ?q M q^  mq_ ) ]
where (« 7uJ= E cra/Sn, v ns=cn,-(^7 u n) and Note that:
js ( w -<t> -* ’d -*;c ) ,
plim  — -------" 8Z g 1 ° 2 ° ‘  =  <r*+ (5-3-25)
n n
and this residual variance can be used to estimate 03 when independent estimate 
o f <Ty is available.
5.3.2 Estim ation o f the duration equation
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Although the duration component o f the model is highly nonlinear, only 
slight modifications to the estimation described in the previous section are 
necessary. First step instrumental variable estimator is calculated by 
minimizing the following criterion function which is analogous to (5-3-7). 
However, such minimum has to be located numerically since the dependent variable 
is a non-linear function o f the unknown parameters.
where # ’ = (£ ’ ,a ’ ,*£) and the vector qns contains the admissible instrumental 
variables which are different from those used to estimate the wage equation.
Denote this estimator ■&. Under the standard regularity conditions, this 
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal. Our asymptotic approximation
0(0) = n v f lv y 'm ,, . (5-3-26)
c
to the covariance matrix o f # is:
(5-3-27)
where:
A
M = 5  m_p / d&
dq
and A is now redefined as:
(5-3-28)
where:
e =  j "  (qns-q„s-i)(^„s-’i „ » - r ^ ’ (z„!-ZnS-i)) (5-3-29)
The Sargan test statistic is a similar variant o f (5-3-17):
C =  N mqc’ [ BAB’ ] mqe (5-3-30)
where:
(5-3-31)
Under the null hypothesis o f correct specification, C is asymptotically x2(r), 
where r is the number o f instruments minus the number o f elements in #.
Again, since & is a consistent but inefficient estimator, we can conduct
another numerical optimization to derive the efficient second step estimator, & , 
o f The criterion function is now:
" I j e W V  
where:
(5-3-32)
V „ =  1/N I  Aqn’AenAe„’&qn (5-3-33)
where Aen=AT)ns-r2,Azns. Since we treat Vn as fixed, the gradient o f (5-3-32)
(i.e ., value o f objective function) during the iterative computation o f the 2nd 
step estimator is given as:
a vo f 
a e
2 V i1 M,e 1
2 3 ^ qC V i1 M,ea a M
2 0_Mqe y-1 ^  J
dr 2
(5-3-34)
Covariance matrix o f the 2nd-step estimator is:
co v(e ) =  (D Vn1 D )'1/ N
3Ae’
(5-3-35)
uut I
where D =  1/N £ q q L  AcL- Corresponding Sargan statistic is:
C =  (S Ac ’Aq) (Z  Aq’Ae Ae’ Aq )_1 (I Aq’ Ac ) ~  *  (r) (5-3-36)n n n n
where A c ^=A rj ns- y 2 ^™ and r is again the number o f instruments minus the number 
o f parameters.
Recovering o f the character variables estimates can be done again by 
assuming u to have a conditional zero mean. Then regress e =  - 7 ’Z onC  , an n 2 n n
vector o f character variables whose first column is one. Let y* be the first 
element o f y lf then the covariance matrix for their coefficient is derived as z 
a a’ where :n n
a,=(zs c c y 1n n n n n
S n ~
zS C u +ZC ( z cn n n n n n s ns')+ e [c  Z - f - f?  (D V 1D )'ID V '1Mi  ^ ns 3 0 ^  n n q£ J
0= 0
(5-3-37)
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and: u » =  <5'-™ySn’ fo r *•"»=  ’> * - » r2,zii.-3r r c »
5.4. E stim ation : random effects
The fixed effects IV  estimation has the major advantage that it  provides 
consistent estimates o f a, /3, r 2 ^  02 quite independently o f any assumptions 
about the nature o f the group effects, un. However, i f  we are prepared to assume 
that the un are stochastic and distributed independently o f the instruments, 
for the duration equation and q js, for the wage equation, a more efficient IV  
estimation can be used.
Consider the n-th bargaining group. For this group, we can define the 
following residual vector:
V 0) ’ =  [(l^ *0-KCnKZJ -
-  <wra- W » - ^ „  H
=  [ un + eal> •• .Un+ e aS„' 'M a +l'nl> •• (5 -4 *1 )
where e is now (a, /3, rg , r 1? y2, 0o> 0i> 02)* Conditional on the exogenous 
variables, An(e) has a zero mean and a covariance matrix:
Q =
n
2 , 2  2 2  <T *t* <T . . .  O' O' 
G u u u
i 2 
0 . 0* . • 3 u
. 2 
0  O'
3 u
2 ‘ 2 , 2  0* . . . O' T(T  
u C u
• 2
0 /  . 3 u
. 2
. , 0 /• • 3 u
2 ,  . 2 
O' +  0  O' 
v 3 u
. 2
. . 0 , ° *• • 3 u
, 2
0 * ° *  . . 3 u •
2 , , 2 
O' + 0  <T 
• v 3 u
=  A ® I  +  bb* ® ee’
(Sn>
where e is the Snx l unit vector and:
(5-4-2)
A  =
cr
0
0
b’ =  [ cr <r 0 ]
u u 3
(5-4-3)
(5-4-4)
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The unknown components o f (5-4-3) and (5-4-4) can be estimated from the 
fixed-effect residuals, which can then be used to construct an estimated
A
covariance matrix, n . The optimal IV  estimator is the value o f 0 thatn
minimizes:
N -1z a (e)’cT Q
n= I n n n
N -  , 
z Q’n lQ
n =1 n n n
-1.
„? lQ? n A„(9) n=  n  n (5-4-5)
where Q’ =  [qnl ...qnS_,... q*, ...q *s 1. The inverse o f £2 can be written as:
(5-4-6)£2"' =  A '1 ® I  - B ® ee\
n
where:
B =
A2 *2 A2 
O' O' O' 
u e v
2 2 , e  2 /  2 , ^ 2^ 2^o' o' +  S cr (<r + 0  <r )
G V  n u v v 3 C
1
A
<t>3
A 4 ^ 2  ^ 2
C e v
A.
3 %23
a 4
c v e
Thus the product sum in the objective function (5-4-5) is:
I  Q’ £2'' Q
n n n n
Sn
A-1 ® Z q q’ - S2 B ® q q’
s=1 *ns ns n n n
and:
z Q’n_1A (e)
n n n n
J s q ( t  - r *  -<r!c - r ’ z )
s= i ns ns 0 1 n 2 ns
<re
J— z ” q (w K - M  )a. 2 8=1 ns 0 I n  2 ns
(5-4-7)
(5-4-8)
• c -? *-r’c -ar’z "
A n 0 1 n 2 n
B *
w -0  - 0 ’d - 0 ’£n 0 1 n 2 n
Under standard conditions, this nonlinear 3SLS estimator is consistent and has a 
lim iting normal distribution with the approximate covariance matrix:
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(5-4-10)
where:
G
ax (e)n (5-4-11)
n
5.5 Results
Based on the economic framework discussed in chapter 4, we present some 
results for one class o f observations: wage agreements affecting unskilled males 
in  the manufacturing and construction industries. Narrowing the scope o f our 
study to these industries was inevitable due to restricted availability o f the 
industry specific data availability. We also lost some observations through the 
construction o f lagged values as instruments. Consequently, our sample consists 
o f 61 bargaining groups with 850 wage agreements altogether.
Following are the definitions o f the variables used in the equations to be 
estimated. W (t) denotes the negotiated wage at calendar time t, R(t) is the 
retention ratio and P(t) is the retail price index. The s-th spell started at
T8_, and ended at Tg in calendar time, where T.-T^j =8a. The continuously 
varying explanatory variables are typically available only on quarterly or
monthly basis. Their spell specific values corresponding to each settlement date
are interpolated appropriately. During the spell, they are assumed to take the 
forms o f step functions with monthly increments.
W ith respect to the incomes policy, we use simple on/off dummies for each 
episode. Although we cannot derive any implications on the impact o f each degree 
o f norm and enforcement, it enables us to find out which policies were
successful in delaying or moderating the pay rise. We have consistently failed
to detect any influence o f the pre-1961 or post 1970 incomes policies (only
three settlements are observed in our sample during the 1972/73 policy), and 
they are consequently excluded form the analysis. The list o f dummy variables we
have used to generate the results are listed below.
Variables with argument, t, vary with time during the spell, while the 
others are either spell or group specific.
Real pay variables
lnrw(t) =  ln(WCTi.1)R(t) / P(t))
D rr(t) =  R ^PCT^) /  R(Ts.1)P(t) - 1
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D n*(t) =  E [R (t)/P (t)|fi] J>(TsA)/R(TaA) - 1 
D rr^ t) =  E[P(t)/R(t) | n] R(t)/P(t) - 1
where n is the appropriate information set 
D rw l =  W(Ts.1)R(Ts.1)P(Ts.2) / W ^ R C T ^ P ^ )  - 1
Dw =  WCTJ/WCTg.!) - 1 : dependent variable in the wage equation
Capacity to pay variables
lnprin(t) =  log o f the industry’s gross profit at time t;
prin(t) =  rate o f change o f industry’s gross profit at time t since T ^ ;
p r in ll( t)  =  rate o f change o f industry’s gross profit at time t since 11 months
ago;
prod(t) =  rate o f change o f global productivity since Ts_j; 
whip(t) =  rate o f change o f whole sale input prices since T ^ ;
whop(t) =  rate o f change o f whole sale output prices since T ^ ;
Outsider influences
rel(t) =  the ratio o f average UK earnings at time t to the group’s current 
wage;
lnun(t) =  log o f the aggregate unemployment in 1000’s (excluding school 
leavers);
lnunin(t)= log o f the industry specific unemployment in 1000’s;
Other variables
size(t) =  changes in the number o f workers covered by the bargaining
group as a proportion o f total UK employment at time t since T8.j.
stageds =  1 i f  the s-th wage increase (made at TJ is part o f a staged 
settlement, = 0 otherwise; 
sfixg =  1 i f  the s-th wage increase is fixed in advance as a part o f a
staged settlement, =  0 otherwise; 
d fixs =  1 i f  the date o f s-th wage increase is fixed in advance as a part
o f a staged settlement, =  0 otherwise;
WCouncil =  1 i f  the group belongs to the wages councils sector, =  0 otherwise; 
Public =  1 i f  the groups belongs to the public sector, =  0 otherwise;
TU =  number o f Trade Unions involved in the negotiation group.
Incomes policy 
Wage freeze
fd l(t) =  1 for non-private sector groups at time t€(Jul 61-Mar 62),
=  0 otherwise; 
fd2(t) =  1 for t e(Jul 66-Jun 67), = 0  otherwise;
Wage ceilings
cd l(t) =  1 for non-private sector groups at time te(Apr 62-Mar 63),
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=  0 otherwise;
cd2(t) =  1 for non-private sector groups at time t<=(Apr 63-Apr 65),
=  0 otherwise;
cd3(t) =  1 for non-private sector groups at time te(Apr 65-Jul 66),
=  0 otherwise; 
cd4(t) =  1 for te(Jul 67-Mar 68), = 0  otherwise;
cd5(t) =  1 for ts(Mar 68-Dec 69), =  0 otherwise;
cd6(t) =  1 for te(Jan 70-Jun 70), = 0  otherwise;
Twelve months policy
d l2 (t) =  1 for te(Jul 67-Dec 70), = 0  otherwise.
5.5.1 D uration equation
Equation (5-3-1) is estimated by the iterative generalized method o f
moments, where the iteration is mostly done by DFP. The programming language 
used is GAUSS, in particular, a routine called OPTMUM. This routine increased 
its speed immensely when we provided analytical gradients. Nonetheless, in
general, we have found a convergence o f such a complicated nonlinear objective 
function with numerous instruments very hard to achieve. In particular,
attainment o f the global minimum seems to depend, to a certain extent, on
starting values and the scaling o f the explanatory variables. The best way, it 
seems, is to start the estimation only with a handful o f covariates then 
gradually increase the number o f explanatory variables.
In interpreting the estimates, note that a positive coefficient implies 
that an increase in the corresponding variable reduces the duration o f the spell
on average. This interpretation o f the coefficient on the average ex-post
duration is only strictly valid for the spell specific variables such as lagged
durations, DRW1, D fix and group idiosyncrasies. W ith respect to the time varying 
covariates, their immediate impact is exerted on the hazard, and their
coefficients represent the comparative statics impact on the log o f duration.
( i)  D uration dependence (1)
As we have discussed in the section 5.2.3, it  is a very tricky task to find 
a general parametric form for the baseline hazard that w ill not lead to an 
identification problem. Look at the expression o f our dependent variable, vns'.
(5-5-1)
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In the simplest o f all cases where there is no time-varying covariates, x, t)ns
reduces to -In ,(u)du. There is a well known identification problem with the
baseline hazard distribution assumption such as Weibull (h0(t)= ta), where our 
dependent variable becomes i?ns=-aln(3ns); the parameters are only estimable up 
to a scale factor. Our regression type model, in general, is prone to an 
identification problem o f the slope parameter in the integrand, since the slope 
cannot be identified as long as the area under the curve (i.e ., the integrated 
values) remains unchanged. Provided the appropriate normalization and/or 
sufficient nonlinearity to the functional form o f ho(t;a) should solve this
problem. It is not certain, however, whether that is also the case empirically.
Moreover, even i f  the functional form is appropriate so that the duration
dependence can be identified, the collinearity amongst the time path o f x(t) and
the elapsed duration during the spell w ill bring about another source o f
identification problem. Theoretically speaking, this issue is not a problem i f
there are enough within spell variations in x(t) across the observations. 
Nonetheless, in practice, variables such as inflation, productivity and profit
move very closely with the time trend.
The first issue precludes a form o f the integrated hazard, $(t;a), that has 
a value o f parameter a which makes ^(t;a) constant for any elapsed duration, t. 
I f  * (t;a *)= tf* , which is independent o f t, then, as a approaches a*, the
dependent variable w ill be reduced to a simple linear form:
making /3 unidentified. According to this restriction, following approximations
for tf(t;a) also lead to the unidentification problem: ta (W eibull), exp(at)-l,
or ln (l+ (A t)a) (log logistic). Moreover, there are other specifications that do 
not fa ll into the restriction above but still result in the similar
identification problem. Such examples are: h0(t)=exp(at) or h0(t) =  l+aA (t) where 
A(t) is a dummy for a certain interval o f t. In these specifications, the
coefficient estimates representing the duration dependence tend to converge to 
values that are independent o f the duration observations.
Consider again the simplest case with no explanatory variables, and simply 
minimize the residual sum of squares (therefore ignoring the group random 
effect). Based on the hazard, h(t)=h0(t)e*, our problem reduces to minimizing:
o
Vos =  - 1 ( 4 ^  - In * * (5-5-2)
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= z z { -In [ / “  h0(u) du ] - 7 P
n s 0
= z z { -In 9(sm,a) -r }2 (5-5-3)
For example, i f  h0(t)=exp(at), a has to be non-negative for the implied duration 
distribution to generate a proper distribution, so that $(<x>)ey =co. S till, i f  a is 
allowed to be negative, the minimum is achieved at a sufficiently negative value 
o f a such that exp(a5ns)= 0  for any 5ns, therefore making our dependent variable 
constant. On the other hand, i f  a is constrained to be non-negative, there is no 
longer a value o f a that leads to a constancy o f the dependent variable. 
Nevertheless, the convergence is reached at a=0, implying the constant hazard. 
In this particular case, the corresponding integrated baseline hazard is, 
^(6ns)=(exp(a5ns)-l)/a , which is an increasing function o f a for a>0. Nonlinear 
minimization o f the difference between the log o f ^(6ns;a) and a constant term 
has resulted in a comer solution at a=0. In the case o f ho(t)=(exp(at) +  l) ,  non­
negativity constraint on a is not necessary for the admissibility condition. The 
minimum is again derived at a sufficiently negative value o f a that makes 
exp(a<5ns)=0, reducing our dependent variable to be -ln(5ns-l/a ). Even for the 
specification with a normalization such as ho(t) =  l+aA (t) or h0(t)= t-faA (t), where 
A(t) =  1 for a certain range o f t, the optimum is again at a=0 (a^O constrained). 
Also, for tf(t)=exp(t+at2) - l,  which directly approximates the integrated baseline 
hazard, the minimum is reached at 0, again failing to capture any form o f 
duration dependence.
These simple models can be easily extended to include explanatory variables 
that are both spell specific and time-varying. The hazard is now written as: 
h (t)=h0(t)exp(/3’x ( t)+ r ’zns). The inclusion o f such variables, however, is 
irrelevant to the property o f the resulting estimates o f a. For example, table 
5.1 lists the coefficient estimates o f the hazard equation with a baseline 
hazard that has a discrete annual jump:
r 1 t<  48 (weeks)
hQ(t;a) = - 1+a 4 8 ^ t^7 2
I  1 t >72
(5-5-4)
which, in terms o f the integrated baseline hazard, is:
t t <48
tf(t;a) = « t+  a ( t -48) 48^ t ^72 
- t +24a t >72
(5-5-5)
180
where a > 0  is constrained by setting a=exp(b) and the value o f b is iterated 
during the estimation. I f  there exists a sudden increase in the hazard at around 
the 52nd week that is not explained by any other variables considered in the 
equation, we should find a significantly positive value for a. On the contrary, 
as can be seen, the estimates for b is largely negative, hence, <x=0. Table 5.2, 
on the other hand, lists the coefficient estimates when we approximate the 
continuous duration dependence to be discrete. We assume that the elapsed 
duration affects the hazard discretely at every month just as the other time 
varying covariates do, instead o f letting them affect the hazard continuously as 
they have been so far. Since this eliminates the difference term in the
integrated baseline hazard, a is allowed to become negative, although this means 
the admissibility condition may not be satisfied for some time path o f x(t). We 
can write the baseline hazard as having its argument, (TArTS!s); an
approximation for 5ns. Our dependent variable now has an expression:
=  - In |™  {  e X(T^  hoOc-TSJ [b jj-a iJ  }  (5-5-6)
where bj,, =  max { } - T,,,.,
aj, =  min { t^ 1 ,Tns } - Tns_, as before.
In particular, consider the simplest monotonic duration dependence such as: 
ho(Ti8-TS8) =  exp[“  (Ti r T2s)] (5-5-7)
A
In our data, a converged to a negative value exhibiting an acute negative
duration dependence, which is pulling the hazard down to zero soon after the
commencement o f a spell (see the estimated average hazard3 in fig  5.2). Recall 
the simple case with no explanatory variables where h=exp(a5ns)y. The
convergence was achieved for a sufficiently negative a, because it made the 
dependent variable, vns, constant for any sns. Likewise, in this case, a
sufficiently negative value o f a deprives x(t) o f any impact on the hazard soon
after the start o f a spell. In fact, large and negative a can reduce our
nonlinear optimization problem to the simple linear regression with a dependent 
variable:
s -0’X(T°J - ln fr j. - Tn)„_,) (5-5-8)
where the parameters are only estimable up to a scale factor. As expected,
estimated coefficients, particularly those o f incomes policies are markedly
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different from those o f table 5.2. For example, neither o f the freeze policies 
exerts any significant impact, which is totally unreasonable considering the 
marked reductions in the occurrence o f negotiation found in a sample during 
these policies. In spite o f this, when we include a discrete annual jump in 
addition to the model (5-5-6), so that:
ho(TL-T2s) =  exp [ai (5-5-9)
where d (x ij = 1 f o r l l s i s  13 
0 otherw ise
Surprisingly, is found significant (table 5.3). It may be that due to 
numerical insensitivity, the noise, albeit small, around the 52nd week in the 
residuals is taken up by this additional variable4. Consequently, the average 
estimated hazard has a jump at around 1 year (fig  5.3) and its decline is still 
implausibly sharp. This acute decline in the hazard is not due to the spell 
specific terms. To see this, we can examine the movement o f the estimated hazard 
over time conditional on the values o f spell specific factors and the timing o f
A
starting point, by choosing an arbitrary observation point and plot h(t) over t. 
Fig 5.4 is such a plot for a private group and fig  5.5 is for a wages council 
group. They both represent the hazard that declines very fast over time. 
Obviously, the negative value o f a is exerting the dominant impact in pulling 
the hazard down to zero irrespective o f the time path o f x(t).
What happens, then, i f  we just keep h0(t) =  l  and assume that the hazard is 
only affected by the elapsed duration via x(t)? This is a reasonable assumption 
provided that the variables considered in x(t) sufficiently captures the 
accumulating pressure depicted by the theory in chapter 4. But then, the same 
identification problem with the duration dependence is replicated as long as 
there is at least one covariate which is collinear with the elapsed duration 
during the spell across observations. In table 5.4, coefficients on Dn^5 and 
the log o f real wages are behaving in a way a did in table 5.2 or 5.3, 
exhibiting the wrong positive signs and pulling the hazard down to zero. Decline 
in the level o f real take home pay should, ceteris paribus, increase the chance 
o f new negotiation which implies a negative coefficient for both variables. 
However, our estimates show a strong tendency that the lower the expected real 
take home pay, the more unlikely the contract w ill terminate, which is hard to 
comprehend. These puzzling coefficients are reflected in the form o f declining
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average estimated hazard, as can be seen in figure 5.6. Also, there is no sign 
o f an annual jump in the residuals (fig 5.7), nor is such jump significant when 
actually allowed for in the equation. Again, the movement o f the estimated 
hazard over time, for the same groups as those in fig  5.4 and 5.5 is shown to be 
declining implausibly fast (fig 5.8, 5.9: other groups showed sim ilar figures).
Despite their possible shortcomings, these results so far do emphasize one 
important point: that the timing o f wage bargains in this period was endogenous, 
and strongly influenced by the economic developments. For example, the incidence 
o f 1966-67 freeze policy (fd2) increases the average duration by 84.5% and 1% 
point decline in relative wage variable, Rel, reduces the contract length by 
2.08% on average.
( i)  D uration dependence (2 )6
We have found strong influences o f the time varying covariates on the hazard 
despite the tendencies for the coefficient estimates o f few monotonic variables 
to converge to values unrelated to the duration observations. As can be seen in 
table 5.2-5.4, such monotonic variables pull the hazard down to zero so fast 
that it is, in effect, nullifying any contribution o f other x variables on the 
hazard, soon after the start o f a spell. This is due to the multiplicative 
nature o f the way x ’s affect the hazard. Consider, instead, specifying the 
hazard as:
h (t) =  exp{r + r  ’c + r  ’z +u  } n {expO /x/t)) +  1} (5-5-10)ns U l n 2 n s n j _ j  J J
where nb is the number o f time-varying covariates. This allows variables to 
continue exerting impact on the hazard even when fyXj -> -» for any j-th  
explanatory variable. In fact, when fyXj -» -« for all j ,  h(t) reduces to a 
constant hazard. Corresponding expression for the dependent variable is:
n  =  -In { E (a^ - b J  n {expO /x/t)) +  1} (5-5-11)
(=o j=>
This is an arbitrary specification in as much the same way as the proportionate 
hazard specification. The coefficients, however, no longer represent 
elasticities, therefore are more d ifficu lt to interpret. Table 5.5 lists the 
first step estimates based on above specification. Negative coefficient still 
represents an inverse relation with the hazard, although the coefficient that 
makes jSjXj largely negative now simply provides quantitatively trifle  effect on
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the hazard. Hence, a large negative coefficient estimates seen in table 5.5 for
a l suggests an unimportant and insignificant pure elapsed duration effect on the
hazard. The first three incomes policies, aimed only at wages council and public 
sector, have been also quantitatively unimportant and statistically 
insignificant (because o f their huge standard errors, it was not possible to 
proceed with the second round estimator). Inclusion o f these variables has led 
to a large Sargan statistics. Other variables have shown signs that are 
consistent with the theory. The overall movement o f the hazard implied by these 
estimates are in figure 5.10. It is still decreasing, at least up to 2 years o f 
duration observation, though its slope is no longer sharp enough for the 
admissibility condition to fa il (see fig 5.11). Since there is no dominant time 
effect that is significantly affecting the way the hazard moves over time, it  is 
all the more misleading to gauge a duration dependence solely from this figure. 
Recall that it depicts the average estimated hazard computed at one point in 
time for each observation, namely, at the completed duration. Instead, look at 
figures 5.12-5.13 which plot estimated hazard over a 50-month period for an 
arbitrarily chosen observation, one from a private sector and another from the 
wages council. The level o f the estimated hazard varies for each observation 
partly due to differences in their in itia l condition, and their movement is 
largely affected by the time path o f x(t). For a fu ll analysis, we need a
dynamic simulation to measure the impact o f each x, in particular, o f the
incomes policies.
S till w ithin the framework o f the original parametric specification, we have 
considered estimating the hazard excluding variables such as Drr* and log o f 
real wages7 that has been causing the implausible decline in the hazard. In 
other words, we exclude any time varying factors whose coefficient estimates had 
the tendencies to converge to the comer solutions that are independent o f the 
duration observations. Look at table 5.6. Here, all the signs o f estimated 
coefficients are consistent with the theory, including profit and relative wage 
variables which tend to vary monotonically during the spell. The incidence o f 
fd l reduces the hazard amongst non-private groups by 70.8% which is as much as 
123% increase in the duration on average. Second freeze increases the average 
duration by 73% in all groups. Most o f the incomes policies are significant with 
around 43 to 75% impact on the hazard except for cd4 which is hardly effective 
in altering the timing o f wage changes. Static elasticity o f duration with 
respect to industry unemployment is 0.475 in a single spell and 
0.457/(1+0.09) =0.436 in the long run. Similarly, elasticity with respect to
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industry specific profit is -0.48. An interesting finding is the importance o f 
public sector dummy which has a tendency to raise the hazard and therefore 
shortens the contract length on average (out o f 850 observations on durations 
used in the analysis, 18 are o f public sectors and its mean duration is 47.33 
weeks with 23.22 standard deviation compared to the mean o f 56.01 and the 
standard deviation o f 24.68 o f private and wages councils combined). The average 
estimated hazard is found to be non-monotonic with a jump at around 2 years o f 
the completed duration. It still exhibits a decline for the first 2 years, as 
well as high residuals for the short duration (fig 5.14-5.16)8. Note that the 
relatively large mean residuals at the extremes o f the duration range are based 
on very small numbers o f observed spells, and that the negative correlation 
between the residuals and the observed duration is an inherent feature o f this 
type o f plot, even with a correctly specified model. Plots o f arbitrary wages 
council and private sector groups are in figure 5.17 and 5.18. As can be seen, 
their duration dependence through x(t) again varies largely with x, and their 
dynamic impact have to be examined by dynamic simulation.
Look at figure 5.19 which plots average estimated hazard based on the 
maximum likelihood estimates where all the explanatory variables except for the 
elapsed spell are those known at the start o f a spell (results listed in table 
7.4). Our data suggest an increasing hazard given the assumption o f the Weibull 
baseline hazard and no heterogeneity. Their estimated average pdf at completed 
duration observations suggests a plausible peak at around 6-15 months (fig 
5.20). One would ideally like to argue that the positive duration dependence 
observed from the M L estimates is misspecified since once we take into account 
o f the continuous varying economic environment, the underlying pure duration 
dependence is found to be actually negative. Nonetheless, the plot o f the 
estimated hazard averaged at each completed duration observation is still 
declining at least for the first 2 years. Moreover, it is hard to imagine the 
introduction o f a group and individual heterogeneity and their possible 
correlations with the other x ’s alone have caused the estimated hazard to 
decline. But can we draw inferences on the duration dependence from the shape o f 
estimated hazard, or to conclude the validity o f the hazard specification from 
the estimated pdf, both averaged at the completed duration observations? The 
answer to this has to resort to dynamic simulation which w ill be discussed in 
chapter 6.
But before concluding this section, let us consider the implication o f the 
declining average estimated hazard on the duration distribution that is required
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in the dynamic simulation. In particular, the extent to which the omission o f 
the pure duration dependence is responsible.
When only the static explanatory variables are incorporated in the hazard, 
the parameter estimates derived from the regression format are only estimable up 
to a scale factor, hence, they are the re-scaled values o f the true structural 
parameters. To see this, consider when x(t) are constant at the start o f a spell 
so that it is absorbed in zns, thus, h(t) =exp(?’zns+un)h0. I f  the true duration 
distribution is monotonic, such as Weibull, the corresponding hazard can be 
written as:
h(t) =  e x p frX + u J a t01-1 (5-5-12)
And the survivor function required for the dynamic simulation is:
S(t) =  exp(-exp(r’zns+un)ta).
The regression model derived on the basis o f this hazard formulation is: 
-lnsns= r * ’zns+ u j8, where the coefficient estimates derived are the rescaled 
values o f their true parameters, namely, 9r*= 2r/a and u j= u n/a. Substituting back 
the rescaled estimates into the estimated hazard gives: h*(t)=exp r*z ns+ u j8. The 
true hazard h(t) can then be written in terms o f h*(t) as:
h(t) =  {  h*(t)/(a ta l) }  “  (5-5-13)
And the true survivor function, S(t) is: S (t)=(S*(t))a, (5-5-14), where
S*(t)=exp{-exp(y’zn8+un)ta)1/a}. But S(t) and S*(t) are not the same. Even i f  
our estimated hazard declines over time, the true underlying hazard can be 
increasing for a certain range o f a. In this static case, one can identify the 
rescaling factor, a, so that the average estimated distribution implied by a 
best represents the actual sample distribution (for example, choose a so that 
the implied value o f prob(5<t<20months) is closest to its sample distribution).
Extending this argument to the case where x(t) varies during the spell, 
however, is not so straightforward. There is no reason why the time varying x(t) 
which has sufficiently non-collinear variation over t should not be identified. 
And indeed, we have seen their strong influences that are in accord w ith the 
economic theory in the previous analysis. In the presence o f such x(t) that are 
not constant during the spell, a simple relation shown in equation (5-5-14) is 
no longer appropriate to gauge the true duration distribution to be used in the 
dynamic simulation.
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Looking more closely into the issue, the timing o f wage change is simulated 
by a conditional probability to exit within a monthly interval, which in terms 
o f the survivor function, is: (S(t-1)-S(t))/S(t-1). Since x(t) are observed 
monthly, this probability can be written as:
1 - exp/ - exp(y’zns+ p ’x(Tns[kIJ )) / “  h0(u) du }
where k is the number o f maximum monthly x ’s observed during this n,s-th
ns
spell, which started at and lasted for <5ns. I f  the true underlying
baseline duration distribution follows the Weibull, the above conditional 
probability is approximately:
1 - exp{ - [ exp(*/a’zM+p/a ’x (T jk J ))4 .3  ] “  ( ( ^ + 1 ) “ - ^  “ ) ]•
where a month is approximated as 4.3 weeks, since 5ns is measured in weeks. 
However, this is different from the same conditional probability based on h*(t):
1 - exp{ - [ exp(r*’z„s+f?*’x(Tns[kJ))4 .3  ] ]■
even i f  the estimated comparative static effects o f the explanatory variables 
are the same between them, that is, i f  y *= r/a  and p*=p /a . Look at table 5.7 that 
lists coefficient estimates when the baseline hazard is restricted to follow  the 
Weibull with parameter a=2. This value is chosen since the maximum likelihood 
estimates with the Weibull duration distribution with no time varying x has a
value o f a =2.4. Implied elasticities o f duration (i.e ., p/a and y/a) are very
similar except for the relative wage. Even though imposing a=2 restricts the 
hazard to increase with time, as can be seen in the upward sloping average 
estimated hazard in fig 5.21, that o f the survivor function (i.e ., the area
under the hazard) is hardly different (fig 5.22). Since the exit probability 
that determines the timing o f wage changes in the dynamic simulation is a 
function o f monthly changes in the survivor function, these two specifications, 
even though the underlying pure duration dependence is different, may turn out
to produce similar results in the simulated wage levels.
We have found it d ifficu lt to identify the elapsed duration, as well as any 
other variables that are collinear with the passage o f time during each 
observation spell. Fortunately, relative wage and industry specific profit
series, even though their behaviour during the spell is almost monotonic, seem
to have enough variations across observations for them to be identified.
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Nonetheless, the question remains: i f  these x(t)’s we have taken into account in 
table 5.6 adequately represent the accumulated environmental pressure, or 
additional imposition o f a=2 is yet better. Dynamic simulation is the only way 
through which we can measure the appropriateness o f our specification and 
compare them with the estimates derived from the static M LE that assumes the 
W eibull duration distribution.
5 .5 .2  The wage equation
The coefficient estimates o f the conditional wage change equation are 
presented in Table 5.8. The majority o f significant coefficients have the 
expected signs. Possible exceptions are D rw l, the rate o f change o f real take 
home pay over the previous contracts, and the log o f global unemployment, 
although neither o f them are precisely estimated. The positive DRW1 implies that 
a high wage settlement in real terms, has a slight but weekly significant 
tendency to be followed by further high settlements, which is an unexpected 
finding. One would expect that i f  a contract starts o ff with a high real pay 
that more than compensates the inflation rate over the previous contract, 
ceteris paribus, then workers w ill not wish nor w ill be in a position to claim 
another high wage. Interestingly, in addition to this finding, we observe 
insignificant current and lagged durations.
Recall the economic framework discussed in chapter 4. We have assumed that 
workers w ill step forward for a new negotiation when, for the first time since 
the last negotiation, the real wage becomes less than the target wage net o f 
negotiation cost. Consider the role o f elapsed durations. The timing o f wage 
change w ill be affected by the elapsed duration if, for example, there exists a 
certain "norm” in the economy to have one negotiation per year. Then, deviation 
from such a "norm” becomes a costly behaviour that affects the renegotiation 
probability. Given the changes in the other explanatory variables over the 
spell, once the bargaining occurs, sns does not affect the wage claimed at the 
end o f such contract as long as <5ns does not help to predict future uncertainty 
or negotiation cost. We consider workers as having a certain target level o f 
potential remuneration that is a function o f all the economic variables, such as 
w *(t), c(t) and p(t). They w ill renegotiate whenever the potential remuneration
n
level reaches the target level (i.e., w J^-cC O -w ^p ^O ). The actual wage 
level, wns, w ill then be determined by additionally taking into account o f the 
future uncertainty. Since this target level is fixed a priori (to 0), wn8 is not 
affected by the contract spell, <5ns, unless it affect the component o f the
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target level. This interpretation may also be valid for DRW1. Even though DRW1 
indicates the existence o f any uncompensated inflation carried over to the 
current contract, its measure also embodies the length o f the last contract, 
5ns-i> together with the movement o f RPI and tax rates during the last contract. 
In this way, it can act to signal the latest trend in the negotiation cost and 
future uncertainty, hence, w ill help predict the future contract length. I f  this 
impact dominates the effect as a signal o f uncompensated inflation, it  should 
have a positive sign. And this is consistent with our observation that groups 
who succeed in obtaining large wage changes tend to do the same at the next pay 
round. Furthermore, in our data, we find the current and lagged durations 
insignificant when estimated with and without the DRW1. Our Conclusion, hence, 
is that DRW1 and neither 5ns nor 5ns_j helps predict the negotiation cost and 
the future uncertainty. High DRW1 suggests a high negotiation cost predicted at 
the last bargaining, which is likely to be inherited in the future cost. This 
makes workers to bargain harder for the current wages.
A possibility o f simultaneity o f 5ns in the wage equation is not a problem 
since the wage equation is conditioned on the timing o f wage changes.
Contrary to the hazard equation, the group’s wage relative to the average 
level o f earnings in the economy as a whole has a major influence on the level 
o f wage claim in terms o f the statistical significance in addition to the real
retained wage, the number o f workers negotiating, the change o f global
productivity, and o f course, the incomes policies. Wage rises achieved on the 
basis o f relative wage were the commonplace especially in the public sector. It 
is said that once a public sector group succeeded in deriving a favorable
settlement by claiming their wage level were too low compared to the private 
sector counterparts, such move was quickly followed by other public sector 
groups. We have seen the public sector catching up with the private sector in 
this way mostly between 1969-70. A one percentage point increase o f the global
productivity increases \Vns by 0.4 percentage points. On the other hand, 
industry’s trading profit exerts slightly negative influence. In view o f the 
fact that only sustained profits affect wage claims (Carruth and Oswald (1989)), 
we have included the log o f average profits over the last two consecutive 
negotiations, but it  was insignificantly positive. The global unemployment has a 
positive effect while that o f the industry specific is negative, and they are
both only weakly significant. This is contrary to the prediction o f the 
Hysteresis and the insider-outsider explanations. We have also included the 
lagged industry unemployment to incorporate the membership consideration (i.e .,
189
how quickly unemployed loses insider status), hence allowing for a possibility 
o f increased industry unemployment to be associated with higher wage demands in 
the future. It showed an insignificant negative effect. Also, when the
insignificant factors are taken away from the wage equation, as shown in table 
5.9, unemployment variables become totally insignificant. The number o f workers 
negotiating at a time varies from group to group, and is in the form o f
deviation since the start o f the last contract. It is also divided by the total 
UK employment in order to make this variable net o f aggregate fluctuations. Its 
significantly positive coefficient suggests the importance o f membership that 
enables the group to achieve higher wages by raising their bargaining power.
Our result also shows that wage changes, when brought about as a part o f 
staged settlement, are reduced by around 1.5 percentage points, although they 
are insignificant. Only about 38.5% o f the staged wage changes are recorded to
have their size planned in our sample, most o f which were tied to the
regulations that aim to achieve equal pay between male and female/juvenile 
workers. Considering how badly those juveniles were paid to start with, the 
effect o f the stages implemented by such regulation could well have been 
positive. In fact, the mean rate o f wage changes amongst the staged 
implementations is hardly different from that o f the non-staged (0.066 versus 
0.067). Significant group-specific influences are confined to the wage council 
sector, where a wage rise tend to be lower than that o f other comparable groups 
by as much as 5 percentage points. This observation, together with the evidence 
from the hazard equation o f table 6.4, indicates that the wages council groups 
derive lower average rate o f wage changes per unit o f time than the other 
groups. This is not an unexpected finding, since the wages council sector mainly 
covered a large group o f low-paid workers in the private sector. Not only was it 
hard fo r them to breach the lim its imposed by the policies but they also failed 
to derive some o f the fu ll benefit specified by the policies.
The incomes policy effects appear very strong for all the policies except 
for fd l. The estimated impacts o f the late 1960s policies (cd5) is as much as 7 
percentage points. It seems that not only the ceiling policy but also the freeze 
policy lowers the magnitude o f wage changes. Combining the results o f the wage 
and the hazard equations, we see very few wage changes that have taken place 
during either o f the freeze policies. But i f  they did, their size was relatively 
large during fd l while small during fd2. During the ceiling policies the size o f 
wage rises were severely suppressed. Amongst them, Cd5 seems to be most
successful in reducing \Vns although it did not appear to have any effect on the 
frequency o f wage changes. On the other hand, the 12-month rule policy seems to
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have had an opposite positive effect, as we might expect, with an impact o f 
about 1-2 percentage points. This policy was hardly significant in the hazard 
equation.
Finally, table 5.9 lists the estimates o f the preferred equation. Overall 
effects are intact. Industry unemployment now has the effect o f reducing the 
rate o f wage changes by 0.02 percentage points for its 1% increase.
5 .5 .3  Summary
In the model that takes into account o f the continuously evolving economic 
background, duration dependence (i.e., the way the hazard evolves with elapsed 
duration) arises from two sources: the baseline hazard and the time-varying 
explanatory variables. A problem inherent in our regression type model is the 
d ifficu lty in distinguishing between the duration dependence and the effects o f 
time-varying variables that are collinear with the elapsed duration during the 
spell. This problem w ill not arise i f  the economic factors supposed to affect 
the probability to negotiate have adequate variations across observations. In 
our model, we have been able to measure the impact o f several factors, both time 
varying as well as spell or group specific, that we consider appropriate in 
determining the negotiation probability. It was not, however, possible to 
estimate a coefficient o f pure duration dependence due to the identification 
problem. Hence, the question remains as to whether the true duration dependence 
has been adequately captured by the limited number o f time varying covariates we 
considered thus far. Nonetheless, an important point o f our model is the finding 
that the timing o f the wage bargains in this sample period was endogenous; it 
was strongly influenced by the economic developments. Our overall results (Table
5.5, 5.6 and Table 5.9) show the importance o f the real take home pay in 
determining the timing o f negotiation while a concern over the relative wage 
becomes paramount in determining the size o f wage claim. As expected, the 
overall impact o f the incomes policies is strong on both the hazard and wage 
changes, with an exception o f the ceiling policy, cd4, which has a particularly 
weak impact on the probability o f negotiation. Note also that irrespective o f 
the exclusion o f the duration dependence, our coefficient estimates on x(t) bear 
the interpretation o f comparative statics impact on the log o f duration.
A fu ll analysis o f the impact o f time-varying covariates has to be done 
using the dynamic simulation technique, which w ill be discussed in the next 
chapter. It would also be o f interest to find out how the prediction based on 
the static model, where the exit probability is not affected by any event once 
the spell starts, differs from that based on our dynamic model. This w ill also
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be done by means o f dynamic simulation in the following chapter.
We can put the duration and wage change equations together to yield a single 
combined incomes policy effect on the average rate o f wage change per unit o f 
time, namely, 1 year. I f  w denotes the rate o f change o f agreed wages, then w/s 
is the average rate o f wage change per unit o f time. Its response to a new 
incomes policy is:
A (w /5) as 5 '1 Aw - (w /S ) Aln(S)
by differentiation. Consider the effect o f fd2 (Jul 66 to Jun 67 freeze policy), 
for example. This has coefficients o f -0.730 and -0.037 in the duration and wage 
equations. The average value o f wage change that time was around 6%, with 
duration around a year. Thus:
A (w /5) as -0.037 - 0.06 x 0.730 
=  - 8 . 1%
Our estimates imply, therefore, that total incomes policy impact reduces the 
rate o f increase o f wages by up to 8 percentage points per year.
192
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
ha
za
rd
 
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 
ha
za
rd
Average estimated hazard
based on table 5.2
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.04
0.02
20 25
duration observations (months)
Figure 5.2
Average estimated hazard 
based on table 5.3
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.04
0.02
20 25 30 35
duration observations (months)
40 45
Figure 5.3 
193
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2..
51st grp(private).starting 65 Dec,
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06-
0.04-
0.02
2.80784E-15
33 39
months
Figure 5.4
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2... 
3rd grp(wages council),starting 61 May
0.1
0.09-
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05-
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
7.20477E-16-
30 33 36 39 42
months
Figure 5.5
194
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
re
sid
ua
ls 
(vh
at)
 
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
ha
za
rd
Average estimated hazard
based on table 5.4
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
I I i I i i iV I I I t TV TY  r  
20 25 30 35
duration observations (months)
45
Figure 5.6
Average estimated residuals 
based on table 5.4
1.5
0.5
-0.5
20 25 30 35
duration observations (months)
45
Figure 5.7 
195
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2..
51st grp(private).starting 65 Dec,
0 .008-
0.007-
0.006-
0.005
0.004-
0.003
0 .002-
0.001
36 42 4524 27
months
33
Figure 5.8
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2... 
3rd grp(wages council),starting 61 May
0.025-
0.02
0.015-
0.01
0.005-
24 2
months
33 36 39 42 45 48
Figure 5.9
196
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
su
rv
ivo
r 
fu
nc
tio
n 
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 
ha
za
rd
Average estimated hazard
based on table 5.5
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
5424 27 30 33 36
months
42 48
Figure 5.10
Average estimated survivor function 
based on table 5.5
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
39 45 48
months
Figure 5.11
197
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2..
51st grp (private) .starting 65 Dec
0.02
0.018-
0.016-
0.014-
0 .012 -
0.01
0.008-
0.006-
0.004
0 .002-
24 2
months
33 39 48
Figure 5.12
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2... 
3rd grp(WC),starting 68 May
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
39 42 4836
months
Figure 5.13
198
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
re
sid
ua
ls 
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 
ha
za
rd
Average estimated hazard
based on table 5.6
0 .06-
0.05-
0.04-
0.03-
0 .02-
0.01
24
duration (months)
45 5433 36 48
Figure 5.14
Average estimated residual 
based on table 5.6
2.5-
-0.5-
-1.5-
45 5424 27 30
duration (months)
33 36
Figure 5.15
199
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
su
rv
ivo
r 
fu
nc
tio
n
Average estimated survivor function
based on table 5.6
0 .8-
0.7-
0 .6-
0.4-
0.3-
0 .2-
0.1
5424 27 30
duration (months)
39 42 48
Figure 5.16
2 0 0
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2..
51st grp(private),starting 65 December
0.04
0.035-
0.03
0.025-
0.02
0.015-
48
duration (months)
Figure 5.17
Estimated hazard for duration=0,1,2.. 
3rd grp(wages council),starting 68 May
0.09-
0.08-
0.07-
0.06-
0.05-
0.04
0.03-
0.02
0.01
4830
duration (months)
Figure 5.18
2 0 1
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
pd
f 
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
ha
za
rd
0.16
Average estimated hazard
based on table 7.4, MLE Weibull
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
45 5439
months
Figure 5.19
Average estimated pdf 
based on table 7.4, MLE Weibull
0.018-
0.016-
0.014
0 .012 -
0.01
0.008-
0.006-
0.004-
0 .002-
36 39 5424 27 30
months
Figure 5.20
2 0 2
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
su
rv 
av
er
ag
e 
es
tim
ate
d 
ha
za
rd
Average estimated hazard
based on table 5.7, Weibull with a = 2
0 . 18-
0.16-
0.14-
0.1
0.08-
0.06-
0.04-
0.02-
48 5424 30 33 36 39 42
duration (months)
Figure 5.21
Average estimated survivor function 
when Weibull with a = 2  is constrained
0.9-
0 .8-
0.7-
0 .6-
0.5-
0.4-
0.3-
0 .2-
0.1
24 30 48 54
duration (months)
 Weibull with a = 2 --------a=1
Figure 5.22 
203
Table 5.1 Estimates of the duration equation8
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction industry)
Variable Coefficient 
spell specific and continuous-time
Standard error 
effects (p and
t-ratio
0.168 0.055 3.07
D rw l -1.860 1.112 1.67
staged^ 0.304 0.247 1.23
dfix„.i -0.366 0.216 1.70
D rr'(t) 8.361 3.129 2.67
D rr"(t) -87.229 89.470 0.97
lnrw(t) 2.843 2.054 1.38
rel(t) 2.093 0.725 2.89
lnunin(t) -0.696 0.144 4.82
lnprin(t) -0.237 0.751 0.32
size(t) 502.70 819.10 0.61
a9 -8.6*10-18 0.472 1.8*10-17
fd /t)
fd2(t)
-1.191 0.658 1.81
-0.945 0.316 2.99
cd,(t) -1.123 0.457 2.46
cd2(t) -1.116 0.345 3.23
Cd3 (0 -1.032 0.357 2.89
cd4(t) -0.271 0.327 0.83
cd5(t)+cdfi(t) -0.523 0.129 4.04
N =  61; z S = 850; Sargann x2(34) =  101.97 p-value
group-specific effects (yQ and r tJ
constant 13.128 0.0744 17.65
W Council 0.013 0.612 0.02
ublic 0.625 1.425 0.43
TU 0.055 0.325 0.17
1.0* 10*
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Table 5.2 Estimates of the duration equation10
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
spell specific and continuous-time effects (P and y^ )
In(s^i) 0.037 0.013 2.92
D rw l 0.492 0.279 1.76
staged,.! 0.241 0.068 3.55
dfix,.! -0.177 0.036 4.87
Drre(t) -13.891 5.413 2.57
D rr^ t) -4.812 3.407 1.41
lnrw(t) -0.586 0.337 1.74
rel(t) 0.092 0.172 0.54
prod(t) 6.623 5.565 1.19
lnunin(t) -0.002 0.041 0.06
proin l l( t ) 0.098 0.088 1.11
size(t) 2365.3 666.78 3.55
a -0.663 0.081 8.16
fd,(t> 0.185 0.171 1.09
« *(t) 0.085 0.075 1.14
cd,(t) 0.375 0.119 3.16
<4,(0 0.310 0.084 3.69
cd3(t) 0.156 0.083 1.88
cd4(t) -0.020 0.048 0.41
cd5(t)+cd6(t) -0.001 0.025 0.04
N  =  61; z S =
n
850; Sargan * 2(33) =  32.864; p-value
group-specific effects (yQ and y j
constant -6.098 0.127 48.02
W Council -0.084 0.087 0.97
Public -0.074 0.595 0.12
TU 0.006 0.042 0.14
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Table 5.3 Estimates of the duration equation10
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
spell specific and continuous-time effects (13 and
111(5.-,) 0.023 0.011 1.99
D rw l 0.428 0.262 1.64
staged,., 0.226 0.062 3.64
dfixs-i -0.168 0.041 4.11
Drre(t) -13.199 5.121 2.58
D rru(t) -10.496 2.901 3.62
lnrw(t) -1.172 0.395 2.97
rel(t) 0.334 0.193 1.74
prod(t) 9.488 5.061 1.87
lnunin(t) 0.001 0.050 0.03
p r in ll( t) 0.165 0.092 1.79
size(t) 1859.20 498.41 3.73
«i(o -0.728 0.079 9.26
«2(t) 4.641 1.077 4.31
fd,(t) 0.249 0.166 1.50
fd j(t) 0.093 0.082 1.13
cd,(t) 0.389 0.096 4.07
cd2(t) 0.320 0.085 3.77
cd3(t) 0.148 0.890 1.66
cd4(t) -0.068 0.058 1.17
cd5(t)+cd6(t) -0.035 0.028 1.25
N =  61; z S =  850; Sargan *2(32) =  31.992 p-value =0.467
n
group-specific effects (yQ and y j
constant -10.066 0.144 69.90
W  Council -0.199 0.098 2.04
Public -0.047 0.580 0.08
TU 0.006 0.051 0.12
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Table 5.4 Estimates of the duration equation11
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
spell specific and continuous-time effects 03 and y^
] n ( a j 0.119 0.017 6.87
D rw l -2.294 0.295 7.78
staged,.! 0.445 0.082 5.42
dfix,.! -0.358 0.070 5.09
D rre(t) 26.85 2.745 9.78
Drr»(t) -3.366 2.066 1.63
lnrw(t) 3.313 0.908 3.65
rel(t) 2.080 0.319 6.51
lnunin(t) -0.510 0.060 8.52
lnprin(t) -1.081 0.337 3.21
size(t) 673.8 361.8 1.86
fd j(t) -0.769 0.250 3.08
a 2(t) -0.845 0.137 6.18
cd,(t) -0.450 0.183 2.46
cd2(t) -0.603 0.138 4.38
cd3(t) -0.592 0.137 4.33
cd4(t) -0.451 0.090 5.00
cdJ(0+cd6(t) -0.421 0.051 8.26
N  =  61; z S =n 850; Sargan x2(35) =  47.889 p-value
group-specific effects (yQ and y j
constant 20.59 0.645 31.94
W Council -0.307 0.422 0.73
Public 0.406 0.331 1.23
TU 0.056 0.247 0.23
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Table 5.5 Estimates of the duration equation12
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
spell specific and continuous-time effects (j3 and
0.079 0.052 1.54
D rw l -2.11 0.785 2.69
lnrws_! -3.357 1.196 2.81
staged,.! 0.257 0.221 1.17
dfix,.! -0.445 0.159 2.80
D rr^ t) -13.074 6.088 2.15
rel(t) 1.632 0.544 3.00
lnunin(t) -0.563 2.437 0.23
p r in ll( t) 2.009 0.818 2.46
size(t) 29.158 1543.0 0.02
ai(t) -32.106 61.51 0.52
fd^t) -17.94 6413 0.003
fd2(t) -1.044 0.901 1.16
cdj(t) -14.92 708795 -2. m o -5
cd2(t) -38.14 33.39 1.14
cd3(t) -1.235 0.898 1.38
cd4(t) -0.860 0.932 0.92
cd5(t)+cdfi(t) -5.059 22.40 0.23
N =  61; 2 S =  850; Sargan * 2(35) =  1.09*10" p-value =7.7*10‘7
n
group-specific effects (VQ and r j
constant -9.701 0.142 68.32
W Council -0.649 0.345 1.88
Public 0.560 0.319 1.76
TU 0.029 0.133 0.22
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Table 5.6 Estimates of the duration equation13
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
s p e l l  s p e c if ic  a n d  c o n t in u o u s - t im e e ffe c ts  (p  a n d  v  ^
l n ( s j 0.090 0.028 3.18
D rw l -2.806 0.435 6.45
staged,., 0.405 0.117 3.47
dfixs.. -0.625 0.101 6.21
Drr*(t) -4.673 1.041 4.49
rel(t) 1.035 0.413 2.50
lnunin(t) -0.475 0.058 8.14
lnprin(t) 0.478 0.235 2.04
size(t) 16.35 38.70 0.42
fd,(t)
fd2(t)
-1.233 0.292 4.23
-0.730 0.134 5.46
cd,(t) -1.071 0.260 4.12
cd2(t) -1.050 0.240 4.38
cd3(t) -0.855 0.191 4.49
ed4(t) -0.031 0.091 0.337
cd}(t)+cd6(t) -0.536 0.073 7.35
N = 61; I  S = 850; Sargan
n
g r o u p -s p e c i f ic  e ffe c ts  fy  a n d
x2(37) =  39.877 p-value
constant -7.205 0.183 39.35
W Council 0.073 0.099 0.74
Public 0.575 0.169 3.40
TU 0.0379 0.060 0.63
Table 5.7 Estimates of the duration equation14
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
spell specific and continuous-time effects (p and y^ )
0.145 0.058 2.48
D rw l -6.335 0.980 6.47
staged,., 1.185 0.253 4.58
dfix,., -1.259 0.216 5.82
Drr°(t) -9.617 1.343 7.16
rel(t) 0.098 0.712 0.138
lnunin(t) -0.908 0.101 8.95
lnprin(t) 1.471 0.425 3.46
size(t) 86.70 54.29 1.60
fd (t)
fd2(0
-2.056 0.639 3.22
-1.220 0.265 4.61
cd,(t) -1.879 0.542 3.46
cd2(t) -1.893 0.479 3.95
cd3(t) -1.665 0.401 4.15
cd4(t) -0.209 0.201 1.04
cd5(t)+cd6(t) -1.036 0.129 8.03
N =  61; Z S =  850; Sargann
group-specific effects (yQ and y j
x2(37) =  38.138 p-value
constant -9.404 0.555 16.94
W Council 0.665 0.284 23<
Public 0.969 0.336 2.88
TU 0.056 0.183 0.30
0.417
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Table 5.8 Estimates of the wage equation15
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
spell specific and continuous-time effects (p and y^
DrrCTJ 0.046 0.060 0.76
lnrw(TJ -0.348 0.075 4.64
D rw l 0.080 0.032 2.47
rel(TJ 0.240 0.026 9.37
lnun(T,) 0.047 0.020 2.35
lnunin(Ts) -0.042 0.016 2.67
prod(T,) 0.440 0.092 4.81
prin(T„) -0.036 0.018 1.96
size(TJ 73.33 18.60 3.94
staged, -0.002 0.009 0.20
sfixs -0.015 0.011 1.31
-0.001 0.002 0.68
ln (3 j -0.007 0.004 1.63
fdiCT.) -0.024 0.037 0.65
fda(TJ -0.037 0.010 3.78
-0.062 0.016 3.83
cd2W -0.057 0.016 3.63
cd3(T8) -0.055 0.014 3.95
cd4(Xs) -0.054 0.011 4.98
cd5(T.) -0.077 0.008 9.29
cd6(TJ -0.045 0.012 3.56
d!2(TJ 0.009 0.006 1.43
N =  61; s S =  850; Sargan
n
* 2(18) =  23.810 p-value
group-specific effects (yQ and y )
constant -2.691 0.040 68.00
W Council -0.068 0.023 3.01
Public 0.054 0.051 1.06
TU 0.002 0.013 0.17
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Table 5.9 Estimates of the wage equation15
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratii
spell specific and continuous-time effects (fi and v J
InrwCT,,) -0.259 0.069 3.73
D rw l 0.057 0.023 2.50
rel(TJ 0.204 0.020 10.02
Inun(TJ 0.027 0.019 1.378
lnunin(T,) -0.021 0.014 1.54
prod(TJ 0.309 0.064 4.82
sizeCT,) 69.947 14.109 4.96
staged. -0.039 0.025 1.57
fd .W -0.037 0.032 1.15
f< W -0.037 0.008 4.74
cd,(TJ -0.065 0.014 4.63
cd2(T^ -0.062 0.015 4.17
cd3W -0.052 0.012 4.22
cd4W -0.058 0.010 5.60
cd5cr,) -0.079 0.007 11.58
cd6(TJ -0.046 0.011 3.91
d!2(TJ 0.021 0.006 3.62
N =  61; E Sq= 850; Sargan x\24) =  25.467 P-value
group-specific effects (yQ and
constant -2.022 0.032 63.60
W Council -0.049 0.019 2.53
Public 0.052 0.055 0.95
TU 0.002 0.010 0.17
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Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics for the spell specific variables 
used in the regressions (levels)
number o f cross-section groups =  61
variables Means Std Dev
DW 0.066469 0.042248
LNDUR 3.8980 0.57978
LNDUR-1 3.9071 0.55203
DRW1 0.018306 0.040086
D R R (TJ -0.042866 0.030933
R E L(T J 1.6691 0.21744
LN R W (TJ -6.3795 0.10021
LNUN(Tns) 6.0544 0.34729
LN U N IN (T J 2.2480 0.68635
PRO D(TJ 0.028225 0.020491
P R IN (TJ 0.055124 0.10678
S IZE (T J - 1.808E-005 0.00017
STAGED,,, 0.20824 0.40605
STAGED,,., 0.18588 0.38901
d f ix m., 0.068235 0.25215
SFIXns 0.030588 0.17220
F D 1(TJ 0.0047059 0.068438
C D 1(TJ 0.024706 0.15523
C D 2(TJ 0.040000 0.19596
C D 3(TJ 0.028235 0.16564
FD 2(TJ 0.034118 0.18153
C D 4(TJ 0.051765 0.22155
C D 5(TJ 0.10824 0.31068
C D 6(TJ 0.035294 0.18452
D T12(TJ 0.24588 0.43061
total observation =  850
M in Max observation
with value 1
-0.08683
0.00000
0.00000
-0.12792
-0.17169
0.319498
5.4553
5.4553 
0.23181
0.058915
1.3021 2.3923
-6.6562 -6.0600
5.2428 6.8337
-0.48551 4.3053
-0.00800 0.14200
-0.34558 0.53509
-0.00207 0.00079
0.00000 1.0000 177
0.00000 1.0000 158
0.00000 1.0000 58
0.00000 1.0000 26
0.00000 1.0000 4
0.00000 1.0000 21
0.00000 1.0000 34
0.00000 1.0000 24
0.00000 1.0000 29
0.00000 1.0000 44
0.00000 1.0000 92
0.00000 1.0000 30
0.00000 1.0000 208
Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics o f instruments used 
for the duration equation (levels)
number o f cross-section groups = 61 total observation =  850
Variable Mean Std Dev M in Max
DRR2 -0.041937 0.025250 -0.17332 0.01047
RR52 -0.039873 0.020772 -0.092162 0.016741
DRR104 -0.042788 0.021485 -0.095781 0.0069123
DRW2 0.014333 0.034816 -0.12842 0.17983
DW2 0.058989 0.033135 -0.086826 0.26203
DP2 0.038274 0.023050 -0.005370 0.16588
RPI2 0.038274 0.023050 -0.0053706 0.16588
RPI104 0.040742 0.021884 -0.0021482 0.10121
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Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics o f instruments used 
for the duration equation (contd’)
number o f cross-section groups =  61 total observation =  850
Variable Mean Std Dev M in Max
RPI52 0.036450 0.019346 -0.010672 0.099644
DRR2 -0.0058327 0.0071845 -0.041420 0.012516
DRR52 -0.0052515 0.0075792 -0.023840 0.020474
DRR104 -0.0042247 0.0082945 -0.023704 0.017387
UNEM2 0.090275 0.31625 -0.49061 1.3508
UNEM52 0.10797 0.27334 -0.31572 1.0257
UNEM104 0.14253 0.27882 -0.28703 0.83987
REL2 1.6079 0.18958 1.2940 2.3713
REL52 1.6212 0.19806 1.2762 2.2623
PROD2 0.025454 0.020356 -0.0080357 0.12394
PROD52 0.020343 0.013969 -0.0039604 0.072835
PROD104 0.025434 0.015505 0.0019920 0.079282
EARN2 0.069466 0.043125 -0.075749 0.32132
EARN52 0.059940 0.039289 -0.047351 0.21010
EARN104 0.068445 0.044298 -0.047351 0.21010
LNEARN2 2.6260 0.27837 2.1294 3.2438
LNEARN52 2.6836 0.29025 2.2094 3.3534
LNEARN104 2.7489 0.31189 2.2915 3.4965
LNRPI2 4.6418 0.15591 4.3656 5.0330
LNRPI52 4.6775 0.16529 4.3969 5.0795
LNRPI104 4.7172 0.17946 4.4625 5.1602
LNRET2 -0.17030 0.028316 -0.23193 -0.13239
LNRET52 -0.17559 0.029250 -0.23350 -0.13202
LNRET104 -0.17986 0.028590 -0.23350 -0.13643
LNDUR2 3.9143 0.54046 0.00000 5.4161
LNDUR3 3.9354 0.51313 0.00000 4.9836
LNRW2 -6.3470 0.098058 -6.5937 -6.0165
SIZE216 0.0012954 0.0015283 4.7318E-005 0.011382
SIZE52 0.0012830 0.0014908 4.6046E-005 0.010718
SIZE104 0.0012601 0.0014491 4.1667E-005 0.009874
LNUNIN2 2.0879 0.66848 -0.69315 3.7954
LNUNIN52 2.1641 0.68293 -0.69315 4.4232
LNUNIN104 2.2654 0.69471 -0.69315 4.4232
PROIN52 0.045525 0.10197 -0.29851 0.50394
PROIN104 0.046660 0.11141 -0.41667 0.47253
STAGED2 0.16588 0.37197 0.00000 1.0000
DFIX2 0.057647 0.23307 0.00000 1.0000
F D lfT ^ ) 0.0047059 0.068438 0.00000 1.0000
C lfT ^ ) 0.024706 0.15523 0.00000 1.0000
C2(T„s.2) 0.038824 0.19317 0.00000 1.0000
C3(T„s.2) 0.028235 0.16564 0.00000 1.0000
FD2(Tn>.1) 0.036471 0.18746 0.00000 1.0000
C4(Tns.2) 0.050588 0.21916 0.00000 1.0000
C 5(T„,2) 0.098824 0.29842 0.00000 1.0000
C6(Tm.2) 0.028235 0.16564 0.00000 1.0000
0.19882 0.39911 0.00000 1.0000
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Table 5.12 Descriptive statistics for the instruments used 
for the wage equation (levels)
number o f cross-section groups =  61 total observation =  850
variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
LNDUR1 3.9071 0.55203 0.00000 5.4553
LNDUR2 3.9143 0.54046 0.00000 5.4161
LNDUR3 3.9354 0.51313 0.00000 4.9836
DRR1 -0.041804 0.029247 -0.17169 0.058915
DRW2 0.017258 0.036477 -0.12792 0.21989
RET1 -0.0059445 0.0076599 -0.041420 0.022472
RET2 -0.0058327 0.0071845 -0.041420 0.012516
PROD1 0.026336 0.020807 -0.008000 0.14160
PROD2 0.025453 0.020358 -0.008000 0.12390
REL1 1.6391 0.20375 1.2940 2.3714
REL2 1.6079 0.18959 1.2940 2.3714
SIZ1 0.001284 0.001487 5.05E-5 0.001026
SIZ2 0.002395 0.000153 4.73E-05 0.011382
LNUN1 5.9636 0.34045 5.0907 6.8337
LNUN2 5.8899 0.33368 5.0907 6.5597
LNW HI1 3.5323 0.096725 3.4250 3.7887
LNW HO l 3.7888 0.12587 3.5957 4.1311
FD1 0.0047059 0.068438 0.00000 1.0000
C l 0.025882 0.15878 0.00000 1.0000
C2 0.038824 0.19317 0.00000 1.0000
C3 0.028235 0.16564 0.00000 1.0000
FD2 0.035294 0.18452 0.00000 1.0000
C4 0.051765 0.22155 0.00000 1.0000
C5 0.10588 0.30769 0.00000 1.0000
C6 0.034118 0.18153 0.00000 1.0000
D12 0.23882 0.42636 0.00000 1.0000
STAGED 1 0.18588 0.38901 0.00000 1.0000
STAGED2 0.16588 0.37197 0.00000 1.0000
SFIX1 0.029412 0.16896 0.00000 1.0000
LNUNIN1 2.1572 0.67352 -0.69315 4.3053
LNUNIN2 2.0879 0.66848 -0.69315 3.7954
PROIN 1 0.051248 0.11015 -0.34558 0.53509
PROIN2 0.055961 0.11459 -0.34558 0.53509
LNRW2 -6.3470 0.098058 -6.5937 -6.0165
LNRW3 -6.3606 0.098290 -6.6458 -6.0631
EARN1 0.071638 0.045494 -0.075749 0.32132
EARN2 0.069466 0.043125 -0.075749 0.32132
RPI1 0.041293 0.025509 -0.0053706 0.19183
RPI2 0.038274 0.023050 -0.0053706 0.16588
DRR2 -0.041937 0.025250 -0.17332 0.010147
215
Footnotes to chapter 5
1. This is required in determining appropriate lagged explanatory variables as 
instruments.
2. Our sample is large in terms o f the number o f bargaining groups, N, but 
small in terms o f the number o f observed bargains (which is random and 
variable across groups); thus, the relevant sampling theory is asymptotic in 
N.
^  ^  ^  A  A  ^
3. Compute the average o f h(<5ns) = exp(r2’zns+ * i ’cn+ + un+ £ ’x(5ns)) over a ll 
observations o f duration in nearest months.
4. W ith respect to the way workers update their information in making the 
price/retention ratio expectations, we have carried out a similar estimation 
with one month lag as opposed to no updating, but the overall estimates are 
very similar including the parameters o f the duration dependence. Only 
difference is seen in the coefficient o f D rr11 which is no longer as 
significant, and is much larger in magnitude. This makes sense since D rr1 
under the expectation with 1 month lag is very small and hardly varies over 
t. On the other hand, i f  workers have rather slow flow  o f information, their 
expectation apt to include significant expectational error (i.e ., D rr°), and 
such error plays a negative significant role in the hazard.
5. In order to make sure that there is no cycle, possibly annual, exhibited by 
D rr5, we seasonally adjusted the retail price index by using TSP’s SAMA 
command and use the adjusted series in the following analysis. Casual glance 
at the figure (4.1) and (4.2) o f Drib’s movement for arbitrary observations 
revealed a jump at around a year, which could have been taking the effect o f 
the annual jump. However, such spikes turned out to be not seasonal, and the 
estimates hardly changed for the specifications o f table 5.6.
6. Our economic theory does not explicitly predict the forms at which each 
variable enter the hazard. Nonetheless, as far as the time-varying covariates 
are concerned, it is the changes since the start o f the spell, and not their 
levels, that builds pressure towards a failure once the spell starts, since 
the hazard is conditioned on the starting event o f the spell. Their levels at 
the start o f a spell, however, may carry a different implication altogether 
as the in itia l condition o f a spell reflecting the era in which the 
observation took place. It maybe that in the 70’s, bargaining groups might 
have been more predisposed towards annual contract as a norm than they were 
in the 50’s due to factors not captured by already existing explanatory
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variables. I f  so, this is sufficiently represented by a single trend variable
that is spell specific. Since our data is a panel, time t is measured from 
the different origin in calendar time not only for the different bargaining 
groups but also for the different spells o f the same group. In order to avoid 
difficulties in interpretations as well as for the numerical stability, it  
seems better to let the secular trend be included in the spell specific
variable while x(t) should include variables that carry similar magnitude 
overtime. In our specification, log o f real wage may fa ll into such category 
o f secular trend. Hence, we either omit such variable altogether or we leave 
its value at the start o f the spell in zns.
7. Our hazard equation embodies the mechanism o f economic pressure that 
accumulates to trigger the failure, as predicted in the theory o f chapter 4.
However, a decision to call for a short completed spell is reasonably
considered to base on a very different criteria from what our theory depicts. 
Shorter durations tend to accompany staged settlement, which is already taken 
into account by the stage dummy. S till, there are many short durations that 
do not involve staged settlement (there are 19 observations started by a 
staged settlement and also 19 started by a non-staged settlement that have 
lasted for less than 15 weeks). In view o f this, we merged shorter duration 
spells with either the preceding or succeeding spells and treated them as a 
single spell so as to avoid breaking the chain o f the multiple spells for 
each group. The resulting estimates, however, hardly changed for any o f the 
variables.
8. First step heteroscedastic consistent estimates. Drr*(xi) is based on 
information available at x*-1 or x°.
9.
Baseline hazard, h0(t;a) =
1 t <  48
a +  1 48< t <72
1 t >  72
where a is constrained to be positive by setting a=exp(b) and iterating the
values o f b. Estimated value o f b was -39.2945.
10.Second step estimates. Drr^x*), D rr^x ') is based on information set
available either at xi3 or x°. Seasonally adjusted RPI used to derive D rr 
variables.
11.Second step estimates. Drr^x*), D rru(xi) is based on the information set 
available at x°. Seasonally unadjusted RPI used to derive Drr.
12.First step heteroscedastic consistent estimates. Drr^x*) is based on
information set available either at xi3 or x°. Seasonally adjusted retail
price index.
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13.Second step estimates. D rr^x') is based on the information set available at 
t '-3 or t°. Seasonally adjusted RPI used to derive Drr.
14. Second step estimates. Drr^x*) is based on the information set available at 
x‘-3 or t°. The baseline hazard is constrained to be: h0(t)= a ta-1 with a=2. 
Seasonally adjusted RPI used to derive Drr.
15.Second step estimates.
16.Used as instruments are :
size2 =  number o f workers negotiating (Tns_2)/total employment (Tns_2), and 
not its difference since the previous negotiation, as is used in the actual 
hazard equation. Same holds for size52 and sizel04.
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Chapter 6: Simulation and incomes policy extension
6.1 Incomes p o licy  sub-model
Incomes policy is put into effect by a statement made by the government over 
a description o f a policy which consists mainly o f two elements: the degree o f 
allowance and enforcement. The first usually imposes a ceiling to the rate o f 
wage changes. They include forms such as wage freezes (i.e ., zero pay norm), 
fla t increases, fixed rate increases, increases accordance with productivity, 
and those induced by the cost o f living allowances (COLA). The degree o f 
enforcement varies from mere advisory to statutory, and they can be targeted 
towards different sectors o f the economy such as public, wages council or 
private.
The method we have been adopting so far captures the effect o f individual 
incomes policy episode by simple on/off dummies. But it  is not capable o f 
gauging the effectiveness o f the particular degree o f norm and/or enforcement on 
the timing and degree o f wage settlements that is consistent throughout the 
sample period. Practically speaking, even though a policy itself is made up o f 
these two components, their effectiveness is said to largely vary w ith a 
political climate at a time and the appropriateness o f the monetary and fiscal 
policies mix simultaneously adopted with the incomes policy. Nonetheless, it  is 
o f an interest to find out i f  there exists any consistent responses in the 
settled wages to the degree o f enforcement and the ceilings set by the 
government throughout our sample period. Separate dummies can differentiate the 
effect o f separate policies that took place at a certain point in time, but they 
cannot differentiate the effect o f different degrees o f allowances and 
enforcement. In other words, with the dummy formulation, it  is not possible to 
measure the effect o f changes in the degree o f norms or enforcement, from that 
o f a norm n% to (n-l)% , for instance. I f  a huge data set were available, one 
could use separate dummies for every possible degree o f policy criteria, 
although in practice, a number o f different combinations would be too large for 
such an analysis to be feasible. Therefore, instead o f the individual policy 
dummy approach, we propose a competing model with a self contained incomes 
policy sub function whose arguments include both a degree o f pay norm and 
enforcement so that we can represent any episodes o f incomes policy by varying a 
degree o f these arguments. In this way, we can find out i f  there exists any 
consistent impact o f the norm and enforcement on the timing and magnitude o f 
wage changes in our sample. Also, by adjusting the size o f a norm according to 
the length o f a contract just terminated, we can measure the annualized impact
219
o f the norm; per unit effect o f the norm on the rate o f wage changes per unit o f 
time (i.e ., 1 year). This analysis, to an extent, enables us to see the combined 
impact o f the ceiling policy, on both timing and magnitude o f wage changes. 
Having such a self-contained sub function capable o f expressing any forms o f the 
incomes policy is particularly useful in the context o f simulation. For example, 
it  is possible to simulate what would have happened to the wage levels i f  the 
policies took place at different times.
This idea was introduced in the work o f Pudney and Boyle (1986), in  which 
they incorporated such a sub model into the average earnings equation. A  major 
complication in their macro model involved a procedure to express a sequence o f 
complex pay norms in terms o f the approximate percentage increase over each 
quarter in a sample. Since the macro data they have used was observed quarterly 
while the policy was announced on a monthly basis, it  was necessary to 
incorporate the policy-off as well as the policy-on segment o f any quarter to 
construct a new pay norm series corresponding to each quarter. W ith respect to 
the degree o f enforcement towards the public sector, they used a share o f 
employees in such sector out o f total number o f employees, which always lies in 
the [0,1] domain. This is a rather arbitrary but sensible proxy, considering 
that the analysis was done at such an aggregated level. In our case, however, 
the analysis can be far simpler to implement. We know exactly in which month o f 
the year a wage change o f a particular group took place, and the hazard equation 
takes into account o f the monthly observed explanatory variables, into which the 
incomes policy norm is straightforward to introduce. In addition, the degree o f 
enforcement can also be easily incorporated since our analysis distinguishes i f  
a group unit belongs to the public, wages council or the private sector.
6.1.1 The model: wage equation
Our aim is then to incorporate such a self contained function o f incomes 
policy into the system o f timing and size o f wage changes and to find out i f  
there is any consistent impact o f a degree o f pay norm and enforcement on these 
two variables.
The purpose o f the government in setting a norm is to deflect the amount o f 
pay rise away from what would have been without the policy towards a norm stated 
by the policy. Then, we would be more interested in the impact o f the different 
levels o f norms on the amount o f wage changes rather than on the probability o f 
negotiation. It is not too clear i f  the negotiation probability should be 
affected by whether the norm is 2% or 3%, but rather, whether the norm is zero
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or nonzero. In addition, complication arises due to the introduction o f incomes 
policy sub function in the hazard equation. Hence, we consider incorporating 
such sub-function mainly in the context o f wage equation.
Consider the predicted rate o f wage change without the presence o f an 
incomes policy at calendar time, Tns, denoted as fns. And compare such value 
w ith the target o f the government: the norm. For the wage change observed at
Tn„  we have:
fm =  * * ' C  +  r , ’ C„ (6-1-1)
where £*s is the vector o f covariates used in the wage equation (5-3-2) without 
the incomes policy dummies. Then introduce the incomes policy variables, N(t) 
and Dn(t). N(t) is a time series representing a degree o f ceiling in terms o f a 
rate o f nominal wage change set out by the government. It is equal to fns when 
there is no policy at Tns. Dn(t), on the other hand, also represents a norm but 
only for the groups towards which such policy is enforced. In this sense, this 
variables is affixed with a group identifier, n. Hence, this variable equals 
N(Tns) when there is an enforced policy at T ^, and equals fn3 when there is no 
such policy. The wage equation can now be written as:
* «  =  - * i( f»  - N (T J ) - <p2(fm - D „(T J ) +  u„ +  vm (6-1-2)
where, at Tns;
n ctj =
Dn(TJ =
N(Tns) i f  there exitsts a policy with norm N(Tns) 
f n8 otherwise
N(Tns) i f  there exists an enforced policy with norm N(Tns) 
f ns otherwise
Hence, in the absence o f any incomes policy at T^, the wage equation becomes:
K, =  f„3 +  un +  Vm (6-1-3)
The government’s aim o f the incomes policy is to draw the rate o f wage increase,
\Vns, away from fns towards N(Tns). <f>x measures the impact o f a policy w ith a 
norm N(Tns) in the absence o f enforcement and <f>2 measures the additional effect 
o f an enforced policy. Hence, the total effect o f a fu ll incomes policy is
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(f>l +<p2. In the case o f an enforced policy with a norm, N(Tns), the equation (6-1- 
2) can be written as:
^ns =  (1 -0  r0 2 ) fns +  (01+ 0 2 )N (T ns) +  Un +  Vns (6-1-4)
The closer (0 j+ 02) is towards 1, the more effective the policy. I f  we assume a 
p rio ri that a voluntary policy has no effect on the rate o f wage changes, we can 
ignore 4>{. On the other hand, i f  we assume that a degree o f enforcement has no 
impact on the rate o f wage changes, <f>2=0. This representation is only a local 
approximation that assumes a 1% change in a norm, whether it  is a change from 5%
to 4% or 1% to 0%, to provide the same effect on \Vffi. This makes it  seem as i f
the government could lower the value o f \VM to any level by setting Nns 
arbitrarily low. More satisfactory specification would have <f>i and <P2 as the 
increasing functions o f N ^, each with an upper asymptote. This means that the 
more strict the norm, the lower its per unit effectiveness. Nonetheless, we 
assume here that the government has an incentive not to assign norms unduly low 
so that an approximation such as (6-1-2) is good enough.
This equation can be differenced to eliminate a need to make any 
distributional form assumptions for the random group specific effect, un, hence:
AWn8 = Afns - 01(Afns - AN (TJ) - ^ (A fM - ADn(T J ) +  Avns (6-1-5)
This can then be estimated by the GMM using the same set o f instruments that was 
used in the 2SIV estimation with the individual incomes policy dummies (chapter 
5). A  list o f the norms used for creating the series, N(Tns), is in Table 6.1 
above. We have considered the upper end o f their announced range as most 
relevant to the unions in demanding their wage claim, hence, applicable to 
N (Tns). Amongst all the policies in the sample period, only cd4 was vague on 
their announcement o f the norm, stating only that "target considerably less than
Table 6.1 Incomes policy and the norms
policy period enforced sector norm
fd l 1961 Jul-62 Mar non-private 0
cdl 1962 Apr-63 Mar non-private 0.025
cd2 1963 Apr-65 Apr non-private 0.035
cd3 1965 Apr-66 Jul non-private 0.035
fd2 1966 Jul-67 Jun all sectors 0
cd4 1967 Jul-68 Mar all sectors 0.0175
cd5 1968 Mar-69 Dec all sectors 0.035
cd6 1970 Man-70 Jun all sectors 0.045
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previous 3-3.5%". We have opted for the mid point between 3.5 and 0, the norms 
o f the adjacent policies.
6.1 .2  The model: hazard equation
It is not straightforward to incorporate the level o f different norms in the 
hazard equation since the norm is not explicitly comparable with the hazard but 
the rate o f wage changes. Intuitively speaking, what we are interested in is the 
impact o f a norm on the target wage, the level o f wage that workers aspire given 
the economic conditions at a time. This reflects the imaginary level o f wages 
were the unions to strike a bargain at every month during a contract. 
Negotiation is triggered whenever a difference between such a target wage and 
the actual wage exceeds the cost o f negotiation. Then, our question is really 
how the degree o f norm affects the level o f target wage so as to change a 
negotiation probability. Since such target wage is only im plicit in the hazard 
equation, it cannot be compared with the norm directly. Nonetheless, considering 
that the norm does not have too wide a range unless it  is a zero norm, it  seems 
reasonable to consider only the effect o f zero or nonzero norm towards the 
negotiation probability rather than try deriving the impact o f every different 
degree o f norm. Therefore, we pursue estimation o f the hazard equation with two 
incomes policy dummies representing zero and non-zero norms. In addition, this 
framework can easily incorporate their interactions with the degree of 
enforcement. The hazard equation at i-th month during the n,s-th contract which 
started at calendar time Tns.j becomes:
h(TL 'Tra-i) =  e x p (f( r j +  ip ( x j +  un +  e J  h0(T^-TM.,) (6-1-6)
where;
f ( 0  =  P ’X * ( 0  +  V 2 Zns + * l ’Cn
i p C O  =  M iF C O  +  M2C C O  +  +  tL4E (x 'J C (x 'J
1 i f  there exists a freeze policy at x'm 
0 otherwise
C(tD = {
1 i f  there exists a ceiling policy at t *s 
0 otherwise
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i _  r 1 i f  a po licy  at t ‘ s is enforced 
E( n8) \  o otherwise
x * ( T ns) 1S the vector o f within-spell varying covariates used in the hazard 
equation (5-3-1) without the incomes policy dummies. measures the impact o f a 
non-enforced ceiling policy on the negotiation probability while i^ + j^  measures 
their effect when fu lly  enforced. Likewise, measures the impact o f a non­
enforced freeze policy and j^ + i^  is that o f an enforced freeze policy.
6.1.3 E stim ation : wage equation
The differenced equation (6-1-5) is estimated by GMM. The second step 
estimates and t-ratios based on their heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors are listed in Table 6.2, column (l)-(3 ). The second step estimators use 
the estimated variance covariance matrix based on the first step estimator as a 
weighting matrix in the objective function to be minimized.
Real and relative wages, a wages council dummy and productivity variables 
are again found to be the main determinants. Significant role played by the 
number o f negotiators, SIZE, and the last consecutive real wage changes, DRW1, 
in the 2SIVE (Table 5.8, 5.9) are not observed here. Also, there seems to be a 
finding consistent with the hysteresis evidence where the global unemployment 
exerts a negative excess supply effect while the industry unemployment gives a 
positive effect. Opposite finding was seen in table 5.8 and 5.9 although none o f 
them were significant. Staged, pre-determined wage changes are exerting a 
stronger negative impact here than in table 5.8, although they are s till not 
precisely estimated. Moreover, there seems to be a correlation between <t>{ and 
02, which causes <t>2 to be insignificant. This is possibly due to: (1) a lack o f 
variation in the group characteristic variables which failed to be identified, 
and (2) a lack o f variation between N(Tns) and Dn(Tns). But the same regression 
without 4>\, ignoring the effect o f a voluntary policy, also revealed 
insignificantly negative 02. Moreover, the regression with 02=O suggests a very 
strong influence o f <t>x as listed in column (2). We have also run the same 
regression while fixing the parameters o f wages council and constant term. Here, 
too, 02 is found insignificant (Table 6.2, column (3)).
These results so far suggest a definite impact o f the incomes policy, in 
particular, that o f the non-enforced policy. Additional impact o f the 
enforcement seems negligible and insignificant. Notably, the effect o f having a 
wage changes during the non-enforced wage freeze policy as compared to having it  
during the no-policy regime is a reduction o f as much as 41-46 percent in the
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Table 6.2 Estimates of the wage equation
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
spell specific effects
size(TJ 27.716 30.587 26.753 34.293
(0.69) (0.86) (0.75) (1.59)
ln rw (T J -0.197 -0.202 -0.198 -0.201
(2.96) (3.13) (21.0) (32.1)
D rw l 0.003 -0.007 0.002 -0.007
(0.10) (0.25) (0.06) (0.28)
re l(T J 0.227 0.233 0.229 0.198
(8.77) (11.12) (9.81) (11.1)
lnun(TJ -0.053 -0.057 -0.055 -0.025
(1.85) (2.22) (2.86) (1.64)
lnunin(TJ 0.038 0.041 0.040 0.023
(1.83) (2.16) (3.02) (1.96)
prod(TJ 0.169 0.152 0.172 0.098
(2.23) (2.12) (2.50) (1.98)
stagedns -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(1.21) (1.16) (1.36) (1.45)
sfixns -0.047 -0.051 -0.049 -0.021
(1.95) (2.93) (1.96) (1.95)
d l2 (T J 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.017
(1.81) (1.99) (2.22) (3.85)
fns-N(TJ 0.417 0.464 0.428 0.141
(2.03) (5.23) (2.19) (1.88)
fns-Dn(Tns) 0.036 0.030 0.133
(0.30) (0.25) (3.39)
group-specific effects
constant -1.238 -1.262 -1.240 -1.240
(2.45) (2.58)
W Council -0.249 -0.256 -0.249 -0.249
(4.38) (4.75)
Sargan test 35.11 36.23 35.33 35.26
(d f) (26) (27) (28) (28)
(p-value) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
prevailing rate o f wage increase, which seems rather large. An additional effect 
o f the enforcement is shown to be roughly 3 percent, making the impact o f fu ll 
incomes policy freeze to be around 44-49 percent. This result also implies that 
a 1% point decrease in the non-enforced norm induces 0.44% point reduction in
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\Vns. Recall the wage equation with additive incomes policy dummies in chapter 5:
+  n fd lC T J +  jr2c d l(T J  +  73cd2(TJ +  jr4cd3(Tns)
+  r 5fd2(Tlls) +  9'6cd4(TIJ  +  r 7cd5(Tns) +  r 8cd6frn!1) +  u„ +  vm (6-1-7)
Unfortunately, this model is not nested in the nonlinear model o f the equation 
(6-1-2), which makes direct comparison o f their coefficient estimates 
impossible. A  major difference lies in the fact that the coefficients, r ’s, o f 
the individual policy dummies represent the combined effects o f per unit change 
in the norm and the deviation between the target norm and the prevailing wage at 
a time, which the government wants to reduce to zero. In addition, such effect 
o f per unit change o f a norm is allowed to vary from one policy to another. On 
the other hand, 0’s in the incomes policy sub-function model represent the 
effectiveness o f per unit change in the norm where such impact is assumed to be 
fixed across the policy regimes. Nonetheless, we can make a rough comparison o f 
their implied incomes policy effects on wages by calculating the rate o f change
in between the policy-off and policy-on regimes. Computing the rate o f
change o f \Vn8 makes this comparison as robust as possible to the differences in
fns predicted by (6-1-2) and (6-1-7). For example, we can compare ^ / ( f ^ + f i j
from (6-1-7) for fd l with - (^  +$2)^ ns/V n + '\i), where f ns or ( f n+ un) is the 
sample average o f estimates over observations that took place during the 
relevant policy regime, using the coefficient estimates based on (6-1-7) and
A ^  A(6-1-2), respectively. Likewise, for cd l, we can compare r 2/ ( f n+ un) from (6-1-7)
with - ( fn-0.025)(^ +un) from (6-1-2), and so on. In doing this
comparison, a set o f explanatory variables that are used to predict fns are made 
identical to each other, to Table 6.2. I f  per unit effect o f the norm is
constant throughout the sample period, they should roughly be the same. Note 
that this is not a formal test. I f  one wants to test the invariance across
regimes o f per unit impact o f the norm, one has to build a model that allows for 
a separate impact o f the norm per unit for different policies, in which equation 
(6-1-2) nests. A set o f linear restrictions can then be tested on such a model, 
but a number o f parameters w ill be too large for it to be feasible.
For now, look at table 6.3 and make a rough comparison between the implied
effectiveness o f each policy derived from f ns’s and 0’s from equation (6-1-2)
and ! ns’s and y ’s from (6-1-7). For example, the effect o f fd l in non-private
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groups is -0.623 in column (2) which is comparable to -0.597 in column (7), 
since the fd l dummy is only made applicable towards the enforced groups. We can 
make similar comparisons for other policies by looking at column (2) and (7). 
These comparisons suggest that the first four policies appear to have as large 
an effect towards non-enforced sector as they do towards the enforced ones. In 
other words, the policy seem to have no additional enforcement effect over the 
non-private groups during cd l, cd2 and cd3. In general, earlier policies seem to 
have a stronger per unit impact than the latter as can be seen in column (7), 
which failed to be captured by the parameters <P{ and <f>2 since they assume per 
unit effectiveness o f a norm to be invariant across the policies. This
divergence, in addition to the fact that the estimates and $2 are not as 
precisely estimated as their individual dummy counterparts, may suggest that 
factors other than the norm and enforcement are important in determining the 
effectiveness o f the incomes policy. A better comparison can be done by looking 
at the dynamically simulated wage levels based on these specifications, results 
o f which w ill be reported later.
Introduction o f the incomes policy sub-function in the wage equation enables 
us to see the impact o f norms on the timing o f negotiations in a way that is not 
possible when the individual policy dummies are used. So far, we have seen the 
impact o f the norms set by the government on the rate o f wage changes without 
taking into account how long the previous contract has lasted. The norm stated 
by the government usually refers to the rate o f wage changes over a course o f 
one year. This is clear when a policy states a norm in conjunction with a 
requirement that at least 12 months should separate the settlements. However, 
whether workers assume such norm to be an entitlement per year or per settlement 
is not clearly known. I f  they consider it  as an entitlement per settlement,
Table 6.3 Comparison o f individual policy effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A------- A A------- A A------- A
policy enforced non-enf nob f n»+Un f n s + Un r / ( f n s + U n ) enforced non-enf
( 6 - 1 - 2 ) ( 6 -  1 -7)
fd l -0.623 -0.582 20 0.068 0.062 -0.597 -0.785 -0.404
cdl -0.203 -0.189 53 0.055 0.061 -1.059 -0.562 -0.292
cd2 -0.267 -0.250 106 0.069 0.075 -0.826 -0.515 -0.282
cd3 -0.338 -0.316 90 0.082 0.080 -0.653 -0.552 -0.296
fd2 -0.211 29 0.051 0.076 -0.486 -0.569
cd4 -0.486 44 0.121 0.132 -0.439 -0.524
cd5 -0.363 92 0.120 0.137 -0.578 -0.434
cd6 -0.351 30 0.150 0.146 -0.312 -0.397
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except for the zero-norm, a higher wage can be achieved by having more frequent
settlements while still abiding by the policy, as long as the outcome o f each
settlement is below the norm. I f  this is true for all the ceiling policies, we 
should be able to see the difference in their impact once we take into account 
o f the contract length which has just terminated. For this purpose, equation 
(6-1-2) is simply reformulated as:
* „ s  =  fns - *l*(fns - N ( T J ^ i)  - 02*(fM - Dn( T J ^ i )  +  un +  V„s
(6-1-7)
In (6-1-2), represents the impact o f a norm, NCT^ on \Vns at each settlement 
while in (6-1-7) represents its effect per annum. Hence, i f  the norms are 
abided by at each settlement but it occurs more frequently than once a year, <t>x 
should become larger than <f>i*, consequently making equation (6-1-2) look as i f  a 
policy is effective.
Look at column (4) o f Table 6.2 (this is comparable to the result o f column 
(3)) and also, column (8) and (9) o f table 6.3 which are a ll based on equation
(6-1-7) above. We find distinct changes, first o f all, in the relative
significance o f <j>{ and <f>2, then, in their magnitude. The total impact o f the 
enforced policy on \Vns has declined, which supports our prediction that the 
policies are, after all, not as effective in reducing \Vns per annum as it seemed
they are in column (3). It shows a reduction o f 0.27% points in \V per annum for 
every 1% point decrease in the enforced policy. Even though the total impact o f 
the fu ll policy has declined, the additional enforcement effect has increased 
and is now strongly significant. Impact o f the policy per annum more or less 
doubles when it  is an enforced one, as is also seen from column (8) and (9) o f 
table 6.3. On the other hand, the impact o f non-enforced norms has declined. 
This indicates that the reduction in \Vns per settlement is partly compensated by
having \Vns more frequently while abiding by the policy norm at each settlement, 
at least among the non-enforced private sectors. This is indeed the case when 
one looks at the average rate o f wage changes occurred and the average contract 
length terminated in each quarter over the period plotted in figure 6.1 and 6.2. 
During cd l, cd2 and cd3, non-private groups had larger rate o f wage changes on 
average than the private groups, and during cd2 and cd3, they had a longer 
contract length terminating than the private groups on average. W hile the 
policies still had some impact, private groups who experienced non-enforced cdl
cd2 and cd3 policies had, on average, more frequent settlements with lower \V,
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hence <j>*<<l>i. On the other hand, non-private groups, towards whom the firs t 3 
ceiling policies were enforced, had terminated longer contracts, longer than one
year, with higher \V on average, hence, <t>*><t>2- The average length o f contract 
terminated during cd l, cd2 and cd3 are 66.67, 71.29 and 52.84 for the non­
private groups and 63.9, 58.36 and 41.89 for all the groups. When equation (6-1- 
7) is estimated without fixing the coefficients o f wages council and constant 
terms, these variables in addition to <f>{, <f>2 failed to be identified (very large 
coefficients with large standard errors). This is probably due to strong 
collinearity between <pu <f>2 and wages council dummy since the variations
originally found in f  s were smoothed by the introduction o f contract length.
This finding is consistent with the finding from the hazard equation
estimation (table 5.6) where the ceiling policies cd l, cd2 and cd3 are found to 
have comparatively large positive effect (as much as 242% increase fo r the fd l) 
towards enforced sectors on the average duration.
6 .1 .4 E stim ation : hazard equation
Estimates o f the hazard equation specification (6-1-6) has revealed that 
there is a significant impact o f the voluntary freeze policy in reducing the 
hazard rate (column (1) table 6.4). Additional impact o f the enforced freeze
policy is in fact significantly positive, although the net effect is s till
negative. The ceiling policy is insignificant when not enforced, but becomes 
significantly effective in reducing the hazard when enforced. In addition, being 
a wages council group significantly prolongs, while a public sector group 
significantly reduces the contract length.
Figure 3.24 shows that the number o f negotiations occurred each quarter 
during the sample period is dramatically reduced during the freeze policies. The 
average wage changes observed during the corresponding period, however, provides 
a mixed message: during fd l, it  actually rises, while during fd2 it is sharply 
reduced. Also, according to the analysis in the previous section that estimates 
the annualized impact o f norms for the ceiling policies, we find that during the 
first three ceiling policies, the non-private sectors had particularly 
infrequent wage changes while that was not the case during the latter ceiling 
polices enforced to all sectors. This may suggest that there is a difference in 
the impact o f enforcement on the contract length depending on the parties 
towards which the policy is enforced. In order to separate their effect, we 
redefine E(t^) to represent all-sector enforcement and add another dummy 
variable, P E ^ J , for the non-private sector enforcement, so that:
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E(t*s) =
epWD =
1 i f  a p o ilcy  at t ‘s is enforced in all sectors 
0 otherwise
1 i f  a p o ilcy  at x js is enforced in non-private sectors 
0 otherwise
Hence, the incomes policy effect in the hazard equation is now represented by:
ipCO = PiFCO + I^CCO + m3E(tJ F ( t4) + |i4E(tJC (tJ
+ti5EP(T^F(T^ + k6EP(t^C (tJ
Then, provides the impact o f a non-enforced freeze policy, gives the
total impact o f a freeze policy enforced to all sectors, likewise, 
represents the impact o f a freeze policy enforced only to the non-private 
sectors (including wages council). As can be seen from column (2) o f Table 6.4, 
there is a strong effect o f the non-enforced freeze policy in reducing the 
hazard. Additional effects o f enforcement are positive for both fd l and fd2, but 
their fu ll effects are still negative and about the same size. Enforcement o f 
the ceiling policy significantly reduces the probability to negotiate. In 
particular, ceiling policies enforced towards non-private sectors are found to 
have stronger restraint on the occurrence o f wage changes than those enforced to 
all sectors, which is a consistent finding to our result in the former section; 
during cd l, cd2 and cd3, the non-private sector groups had a longer contract 
length on average.
6.1.5 Conclusion
An introduction o f the non-linear incomes policy sub-function has turned out 
to be o f little  improvement over the individual dummy variable approach in terms 
o f their significance. Nevertheless, it  was possible to measure the impact o f 
incomes policy that are different from those derived from the policy on/off 
dummies; the effect o f different degrees o f norms and enforcement on both the 
timing and the size o f wage settlements.
In the hazard equation, we found that the non-enforced freeze policy plays 
an important role in reducing the hazard. Negative impact o f the ceiling policy 
is severed with enforcement. In particular, the ceiling policies, cd l, cd2 and 
cd3 had the strongest and significant impact. They increase the contract length 
on average by as much as 75%. In the wage equation, a particularly interesting
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Table 6.4 Estimates of the hazard equation1
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
Variable (1) (2)
spell specific effects
ln(<V i) 0.062 0.060
(2.75) (2.50)
D rw l -2.816 -2.667
(7.15) (5.78)
staged,,,., 0.461 0.461
(4.61) (4.30)
-0.442 -0.478
(5.25) (5.34)
D rr“(t)2 -6.002 -5.376
(5.56) (5.05)
lnunin(t) -0.426 -0.441
(7.68) (7.61)
lnprin(t) 0.152 0.056
(0.60) (0.21)
size(t) 3.721 2.993
(1.01) (0.74)
rel(t) 0.887 1.080
(1.98) (2.36)
Freeze(t) -2.042 -1.811
(3.39) (3.59)
Ceiling(t) -0.108 -0.103
(1.34) (1.09)
EFreeze(t) 1.507 1.172
(2.46) (2.33)
ECeiling(t) -0.383 -0.346
(4.51) (3.51)
EPFreeze(t) 1.120
(1.86)
EPCeiling(t) -0.648
(3.94)
group-specific effects
constant -5.195 -4.969
(42.6) (39.8)
W Council -0.233 -0.220
(3.07) (2.67)
Public 0.312 0.406
(5.28) (6.59)
TU 0.034 0.038
(0.86) (0.88)
Sargan test 41.67 39.72
(d f) (40) (38)
(p-value) (0.40) (0.39)
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finding was the dramatic shift in the relative effect between enforcement and 
non-enforcement policies when we considered a norm as a lim it per annum (i.e ., 
adjusted the norm according to the elapsed contract length). When the 
effectiveness o f the policy was determined on the basis o f the deviation between
expected \V and the norm, it seemed that the policy had a huge effect on the non- 
enforced groups with hardly any additional effect towards the enforced groups.
However, when the impact was based on the measure between the expected \V and the 
norm adjusted for the length o f the contract just terminated, the effect on the 
non-enforced groups has largely declined while the additional enforcement effect 
has increased. A 1 % point decrease in the non-enforced norm was found to reduce 
the rate o f wage increase per annum by around 0.14% with an additional 0.13% 
reduction when enforced. This implies that during the cd l, cd2 and cd3, non 
enforced groups enjoyed relatively frequent wage changes, thus making it  seem as 
i f  they were abiding by the policy. And this is totally consistent w ith our 
finding from the hazard equation estimates.
Nonetheless, comparing roughly the implied impact o f each policy between the 
individual dummy and the policy sub-function formulation implies the 
effectiveness o f the norm and enforcement that is not quite consistent 
throughout our sample period. Moreover, the parameters in the sub-function were 
not as precisely estimated as the individual policy dummies. These results 
suggest one point: factors other than the norm and enforcement are important in 
determining the effectiveness o f each incomes policy. Hence, varying the 
elements o f incomes policy tool does not necessarily change the degree o f 
effectiveness, but rather, its timing - the political climate, economic 
condition not captured in our models, the appropriateness and the consistency o f 
the other fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies adopted at the time - 
seems to play a big role. A proper comparison o f these models have to be made by 
dynamic simulations, to which we now turn.
6.2 Dynamic S im ulation
Given the estimated coefficients o f the hazard and the wage equations we 
have analysed so far, it  is o f an interest to investigate more fu lly  the dynamic 
impact o f external influences on this system, particularly o f incomes policies, 
by means o f a dynamic simulation technique. This enables us to clearly look at 
two different effects o f policies on wage changes: delay and moderation. 
Moreover, based o f these results, we can make comparisons amongst the various 
specifications we have considered for this system.
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In a usual regression model, dependent variable can be simulated using the 
values o f exogenous variables from the data and the lagged endogenous variables 
substituted for the lagged simulated values. The hazard equation, however, 
implies a probability distribution o f the contract length but not the actual 
point at which a contract terminates. Since the hazard depends on the time 
varying explanatory variables in our formulation, there is no unique contract 
length that can be determined from such a duration distribution function. The 
problem is that the rate o f change o f wages cannot be simulated unless the 
tim ing o f the settlement is known.
In view o f this, we have considered the discrete approximation o f the 
process where the decision to terminate the spell is made each month according 
to the probability given by the hazard equation. More specifically, we pick a 
starting date, say To, for an arbitrarily chosen observation from the data and 
derive the estimated hazard for the first month given the group’s 
characteristics and other spell specific factors known at the start o f this
A  A
particular contract, h (l). Having derived h (l), it is straightforward to compute
A
the corresponding survivor function, S (l). Then, at T0+ ( l month), a Bernoulli 
tria l takes place whose probability to exit between T0 and T0+ l  is
Prob(0^5^1|5^0), which is equal to (S(0)-S(1))/S(0)=(S(0)-S(1)). The
instantaneous exit rate at particular duration, 5, is equal to h(5). Since we
are approximating the truly continuous decision sequence to take place monthly, 
a discrete probability o f exiting at the 5-th month given that the last decision
was made at the (5-l)-th  month has to include the possibility o f exiting
sometime between (5-1) and 5, which is approximately equal to the sum o f the 
hazard over a one-month interval. I f  the "exit” is chosen, this contract is
terminated with a one-month duration at T0+ ( l month), calendar time. A t this 
point, the agreed wage is computed and the spell specific factors are updated 
for the new contract starting at T0+ ( l month). I f  "non-exit" is chosen instead,
this contract continues into the second month. In either case, the next step is
to consider a similar choice problem at T0+(2 months), then at T0+(3 months), 
and so on. As a result, we w ill have the simulated monthly hazard and the level 
o f wages prevailing at each months for as long as there are data o f exogenous 
variables. This computation can be done repeatedly, and consequently their 
averaged values can be compared with the similarly simulated values with the 
incomes policy coefficients set to z e ro -a  simulation o f what would have 
happened in the absence o f the incomes policy. Dynamic simulation o f the hazard 
generates the timing o f negotiation, on the basis o f which the wages to be
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claimed is determined. The effect o f incomes policy is not only to reduce the 
level o f the wage claim, but also to alter the timing o f negotiations which in 
turn affect the amount o f wage changes. Hence, a dynamic simulation o f the wage 
equation taking the timing o f wage changes as fixed would not provide a fu lly  
satisfactory analysis o f the impact o f incomes policy, since it  fails to 
incorporate their effect on the magnitude o f wage changes as a result o f their 
altering the timing o f settlements.
In this section, we first dynamically simulate the wage changes keeping the 
timing o f settlements fixed at their observed values. Then we w ill derive the 
average wage levels by simulating both the timing as well as the amount o f wage 
changes using the procedure described above. In so doing, our aim is to divide 
the effect o f incomes policies on wage changes into two separate effects: delay 
and moderation.
6.2.1 Dynamic S im ulation: wage equation
Here, we simulate the average simulated wage level keeping the timing o f 
wage changes as observed in our data. Due to the nature o f the data, the 
starting and the ending period differ across groups. We use the settlement dates 
observed during the incomes policy period, namely, between 1961 and 70.
During the course o f this simulation, we are keeping the price level as well 
as the aggregate average earnings level fixed at their historical values. In a 
fu ll model, we should allow prices to respond to the general variation o f wage 
level in the form o f a dynamic price equation. However, it  is not clear how the 
variation in the negotiated wages o f a single bargaining unit affects the
general wage level. As long as we conduct our simulation conditional on the 
historical relation between prices and aggregate earnings, we consider it
reasonable to assume that the negotiated (i.e., simulated) wage rise applicable 
to a single bargaining group is not significant in influencing the general 
earnings level, and hence the general price level.
Figure 6.3 plots the simulated average wage levels based on the estimates 
listed in table 5.9 which includes individual policy dummies. The policy-on
locus o f simulated values has a very close correspondence with the actual
prevailing average wage level. These wage levels are derived from the rate o f 
change o f wage equation where the simulated values are substituted for the 
relevant explanatory variables such as DRW1, Rel and Lnrw. In this sense, they 
are not the estimated wage levels but the dynamically derived values. Hence, 
there always is a possibility o f cumulative errors building up to move the 
simulated values away from the actual values. Comparison o f the simulated
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average wage levels with and without the incomes policies clearly shows that the 
wage level without the policy is never below the policy-on level. The difference 
between policy on and o ff regimes gradually widens as they enter the late 60’s, 
and it is at its widest during the policy cd5 and cd6. In practice, there was an 
enforced freeze policy starting in November 72 and a vague voluntary policy was 
announced between the times but were not included in our wage equation. 
According to figure 6.3, the differences in their simulated wage levels narrows 
substantially by the end o f 71.
We have done a similar dynamic simulation based on the estimates o f wage 
equation with the incomes policy sub function analysed in section 6.1. Figure 
6.4 is based on wage equation (6-1-2), without any adjustment for the elapsed 
durations, and figure 6.5 is based on equation (6-1-8) that has a level o f norm 
adjusted for the elapsed contract length. In both cases, policy-off wage levels 
are simulated equally well and they never fa ll below the policy-on levels. The
gap in the wage levels between them also narrows by 71’ but not as much as it
does in figure 6.3. The strong impact o f cd5 and cd6 found in figure 6.3 is more 
clearly seen in figure 6.5, which incorporates the adjusted policy sub-function, 
but their effect in pulling down the hazard is simulated slightly more strongly 
than their actual effect.
6.2 .2 Dynamic S im ulation: hazard and wage equation
We have argued that the dynamic simulation o f the wage equation, while
treating their timings as those observed in the data, is not a satisfactory way
to measure the impact o f the incomes policy. This is indeed true since these 
policies not only affect the level o f wages directly, but also the timing o f
wage changes. Hence, a certain incomes policy may be able to reduce the
frequency o f wage changes, and by so doing, pull the wage levels below what 
would have been without the policy. In this section, we use the hazard as well 
as the rate o f wage change equation to dynamically simulate average wage levels
during the incomes policy period, between 1961 and 71.
The average over 50 replications o f the simulated wage levels and the 
monthly conditional exit rate (i.e., the hazard summed over a monthly interval,
called, monthly hazard hereafter)3 based on the estimates o f table 5.5 and 5.9, 
for an arbitrary chosen group starting from an arbitrary observation point, are 
plotted in figure 6.6-6.7, 6.10-6.11, 6.14-6.15 and those based o f table 5.6 and 
5.9 are in figure 6.8-6.9, 6.12-6.13, 6.16-6.17. For the sake o f comparison, the 
groups and the timings o f their starting points used for these simulations 
include those used to derive the estimated hazard in figure 5.28-5.29 and 5.34-
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5.35 in chapter 5. Even though differences exist between different 
specifications o f the hazard, these figures clearly suggest the significant 
effect o f the incomes policies in reducing the wage levels, as well as the 
hazard rate in general. Note that their movement over time depends on the 
particular group and the timing chosen as a starting point o f the simulation.
Specifically, figures 6.6-6.9 are for a wages council group with a starting 
period o f May 1961. The first tick on the X-axis corresponds to June 61 and they 
are ticked monthly thereafter. Since the group belongs to the wages council, it  
is exposed to the enforced incomes policy fd l, cd l and cd2, period o f which are 
indicated below the graphs. There is a mixed evidence on the level o f the 
monthly hazard during the beginning o f fd l policy. A common feature is an acute 
decline in the hazard as soon as it enters the fd l policy. In figure 6.6, it  is 
not certain what makes the policy-off regime o f the simulated hazard to drop 
suddenly whose timing coincides with the introduction o f fd l. Thereafter, the 
probability to negotiate as well as the wage level is lower under the policy-on 
regime. The simulation o f figure 6.10-6.13, on the other hand, starts in May 
1968 o f the same wages council group. This simulation period covers the ceiling 
policies, cd5 and cd6, which are enforced to all sectors. They suggest a 
significant impact o f these policies in reducing the conditional exit 
probability. In particular, as soon as cd6 is terminated, we find a discrete 
jump in the hazard creating more frequent wage changes leading to sharper rise 
in wages. The absence o f further policies after cd6 seems to move the wage level 
eventually back to its original path that experienced no incomes policies.
Figures 6.14-6.17 are for a private sector group with a starting date o f 
December 1965. During this period, this group is exposed to the enforced fd2, 
cd4 and cd5 policies. cd3 is not enforced towards this group and our policy 
dummy is allowed only for the non-private groups. The freeze policy, fd2, has an 
immediate effect in reducing the hazard and keeping it  lower while virtually 
halting further pay rises. As soon as fd2 is over, the simulated monthly hazard 
increases to bring about more frequent wage changes throughout cd4. But the 
introduction o f cd5 again pulls the hazard down, which subsequently lowers the 
rate o f wage rise. In the data, number o f negotiations acutely increased right 
after the fd2 and reached a peak in the middle o f cd4 policy. Consequently, the 
simulated wage level is constantly lower as long as the enforced policies are in 
effect.
In order to see the effect o f the non-enforced policies, we have done 
another simulation on the same private sector group starting in August 1960. So 
hence it w ill experience the non-enforced fd l, cd l and cd2 policies. Since the
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model with the individual policy dummies does not allow the non enforced 
policies to have any impact, this time, we have used the estimates o f table 6.4 
column(2), which has 6 dummies to differentiate the effect o f incomes policy 
depending on the degree and coverage o f the enforcement. For the wage equation, 
we continue using the result o f table 5.9. They are plotted in figure 6.18-6.19. 
Under this specification, fd l is found to be more effective in reducing the 
hazard towards the non-enforced private sector groups. While cd l, cd2 and cd3 
were particularly effective towards enforced non-private sector groups. The 
figures show a sudden decrease in the hazard during the non-enforced freeze 
policy, fd l. As a result, the simulated wage rise slows down as it  enters fd l 
and its level stays almost invariant during the freeze. After fd l, we see hardly 
any effect o f the non enforced ceiling policies on the hazard, nonetheless, the 
wage level continues to be lower than the policy-off level. As we have seen from 
table 6.4, these figures suggest the significance o f the non-enforced policies, 
particularly o f fd l, on both the magnitude and the timing o f wage changes in the 
private sector.
So far, all o f these figures (6.6 - 6.19) have shown a significant impact o f 
the incomes policies. It  is not possible, however, to gauge the effect o f the 
incomes policies on the average wage levels across groups over the entire sample 
period from them. These figures depend on their in itia l condition, the choice o f 
the starting date and the movement o f x(t) during the period covered by the 
simulation, a ll o f which are unique to each. In order to capture the effect o f 
incomes policies on the average level o f negotiation probability and wages 
throughout the period during which the incomes policies were in effect, we need 
to have a dynamic simulation analysis done over the entire sample groups that 
actually experienced wage rises during such period. For this purpose, we have 
rearranged the simulation so that it calculates the averages o f 30 replications 
for each group that had a negotiation during the beginning o f 1961. Conditional 
on the in itia l observation point and the corresponding spell specific (zns, 
although Staged and D fix are set to zero) and group specific factors (including 
bargaining system employed and the group specific random factor estimates, u j,  
it  simulates the monthly hazard rate and the wage level month by month for a 
100-month period. Consequently, we are able to derive the average simulated 
conditional negotiation probability and the wage levels between mid 1961 to 
1971. In this way, this simulation captures not only the direct impact but also 
the indirect impact o f the incomes policies, through their effect on the timing 
o f wage changes, on the level o f wages. We do this dynamic simulation on the
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basis o f the estimates reported in table 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 7.4, for the sake o f 
comparison. Table 5.7 restricts the duration distribution to follow  W eibull w ith 
parameter 2. Table 7.4 assumes the Weibull duration distribution with no time- 
varying covariates and no heterogeneity and is estimated by the Maximum 
Likelihood. The average simulated wage levels are compared with the simulated 
wage levels o f the former section derived with the timing o f negotiations fixed 
as in the data. By so doing, we hope we can differentiate two kinds o f impact, 
delay and moderation, on the average wage levels.
Figure 6.21 depicts the average wage level derived from the dynamic 
simulation o f the timing as well as the rate o f wage change based on the 
estimates o f tables 5.5 and 5.9. Incomes policy consistently and significantly 
reduces the level o f wages. However, this specification yields unrealistically 
low conditional exit rates (figure 6.20). As a consequence, simulated wage level 
is averaged out to be much lower than the actual level.
Figure 6.23, on the other hand, depicts the simulated average wage level 
based on table 5.6 and 5.9, and the result is far more reasonable than that o f 
figure 6.21. Under this specification, the incomes policy consistently reduces 
the level o f wages, and in general, reduces the conditional exit probability 
(figure 6.22). In particular, the fd2 freeze policy has a severe restraining 
effect on the negotiation probability, during which the wage rises are also 
suppressed. As they enter the following ceiling policy, cd4, the probability o f 
negotiation acutely increases, which raises the rate o f wage changes. However, 
such rate o f wage rise is quickly restrained as it enters the next ceiling 
policy that pulls the negotiation probability down. The effect o f cd5 and cd6 in 
reducing the frequency o f wage changes, therefore, lowering the rate o f pay rise 
seems too strongly simulated. The actual wage level increased much faster during 
the 70’s. Nonetheless, the monthly hazard shoots up as soon as the last ceiling 
policy terminates, in June 70, and the presence o f no further incomes policy 
makes the policy-on wage level to almost catch up with the non-policy locus by 
the early 71.
Figure 6.25 is the similarly simulated wage levels using the hazard 
specification o f table 6.4. This formulation o f the hazard allows for the 
separate effect o f non-enforced policies, in which we found a significant 
negative impact o f fd l towards the private sector groups. Accordingly, the 
simulated conditional exit probability (figure 6.24) now clearly suggests a 
significant decrease during fd l, and less pronounced effect o f a ll other 
policies. However, the resulting simulated policy-on wage locus are hardly 
different from figure 6.23.
238
The hazard specification o f table 5.6 or table 6.4 assumes a constant hazard 
were it not for the movement o f x(t) during the spell. In other words, its 
baseline hazard has the Weibull duration distribution with a constrained to be 1 
a priori. The same dynamic simulation based on the estimates o f the Weibull 
hazard specification with a constraint, a=2, (table 5.7) are listed in figure 
6.27-28. Note that for a given value o f a, the comparative static effect on the 
log duration can always be deduced from the coefficient estimates, which between 
a = l and a =2 are found broadly similar with an exception o f the relative wage 
effect. The simulated conditional exit probability is markedly different during 
the fd l, but the overall movement from then onwards is similar. More 
importantly, the resulting simulated wage level is very close, including the 
under-predicted rate o f wage increase in the 70’s (figure 6.26). These evidence 
implies that the set o f explanatory variables incorporated in the hazard
specification o f table 5.6, even though it failed to allow for a pure duration 
dependence, adequately explains the duration dependence: the way the implied 
negotiation probability evolves over the sample period.
We have also conducted a dynamic simulation on the basis o f the maximum 
likelihood estimates that assumes no heterogeneity and no time varying 
covariates. Hence, once the spell starts, a timing o f the next negotiation is 
determined purely by the passage o f time, in particular, according to the
W eibull duration distribution. Even though the M L estimation lacks important 
factors such as the group random effect or any time varying covariates other 
than the elapsed duration itself, their simulated wage level has succeeded in 
capturing the faster growth in the 70’s, the phenomena the former simulation 
failed to capture. Since there is no time varying covariates, the dynamic
simulation can also be done by generating the values o f completed durations for 
given values o f the start-of-a-spell conditions, rather than repeating a
Bernoulli tria l month by month. Nonetheless, for the sake o f comparison with the 
other specifications, we have proceeded to do this simulation also according to 
the Bernoulli trials, so that the average simulated conditional exit probability 
w ill be computed. Figure 6.29 is the simulated average monthly hazard based on 
the MLE. We find hardly any effect o f the incomes polices, only a small increase 
during fd l and a slight decrease during cd4, both o f which are findings 
different from any o f the previous figures. This specification only predicts the 
effect o f incomes policy status at the start o f a spell, and does not take into
account the length o f such policy, nor any changes in the policy regime during
the contract spell. In this sense, their incomes policy impact are not
instantaneous. As a result, there are no clear policy effect seen in the
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simulated values o f the monthly hazard. On the other hand, in the dynamic hazard 
specification, such as table 5.6 or 6.4, fd l is found to have a significantly 
negative effect and cd4, insignificantly negative effect. From the data, we have 
seen the number o f negotiations go down acutely during fd l and decrease after 
the in itia l increase during the cd4 policy. Since the coefficient estimates in 
the dynamic specification represent the instantaneous effects o f the policies,
it makes sense to find their effect negative for fd l and ambiguous for cd4. 
Indeed, they are reflected on the simulated monthly hazard in ways that are
consistent with the data. These are the examples o f how incorrectly the static 
hazard formulation simulates the effect o f incomes policies on the tim ing o f 
negotiation. The overall conditional probability to negotiate between 1963 to 
late 71 is almost invariant to whether the policy is on or o ff. This implies 
that the simulated wage level depicted in figure 6.30, although they are close 
to the actual values, is merely a result o f the dynamic simulation o f the wage
equation with the timing o f wage rises taking place at random.
The dynamic simulation that fixes the timing o f wage changes as observed in 
the data has succeeded in simulating the average wages that are almost 
equivalent to the actual wage levels. When the timing is also simulated, the 
wage levels are very close to the actual values between 62 and 68 (figure 6.31), 
but the discrepancies exist between them during the rest o f the sample period. A  
comparison o f the simulated wage levels between the two reveals some interesting 
points. I f  the movement o f these simulated values differ, we know that is due to 
the simulated frequency o f wage changes.
As can be seen in figure 6.31, prior to 62, it  is higher than the actual due 
to more frequent wage changes simulated during fd l (since this diversion is not 
found in any o f figure 6.3-6.5). Surprisingly, this is the case even when the 
simulation is based on the hazard formulation that showed a strong negative 
impact o f fd l on the private groups (table 6.4). W ith such a negative effect o f 
fd l amongst all groups, less frequent wage changes should be simulated resulting 
in lower, closer to the actual, simulated wage levels than those based on table 
5.9. This does not seem to be the case, however. A t the termination o f fd l, we 
see a slight rebound in the wage level which was not seen in the actual wage 
level. From then onwards, the wage levels are well simulated up to the firs t 
all-sector-enforced ceiling policy, cd4. During cd4, cd5 and cd6, the wage level 
actually increased more rapidly than the simulated ones. That is, the impact o f 
these policies in reducing the frequency o f negotiations were too strongly 
represented compared to their actual effect. This resulted in the lower than the
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actual rate o f wage increase to be simulated during the early 70’s. The huge 
rebound at the termination o f cd6 observed in the actual wage level, on the 
other hand, has been successfully picked up. This is mainly caused by an 
increased frequency o f wage changes that led to a higher rate o f increase in the 
average wage level. And such rate o f increase is accurately simulated. 
Eventually, we find the policy-on locus o f the simulated wage levels catching up 
with the policy-off locus by the early 71, at the time, their simulated wage 
level also converges to the actual wage level.
Comparison with the simulation using the wage equation only (figure 6.3-6.5) 
reveals the misspecified portions o f the policy-off average wage levels. We have 
already found out that there are significant differences between the locus o f 
policy-on and policy-off negotiation probabilities. For example, a significant 
rebound in the hazard seen when cd6 terminated was not found in the policy-off 
simulated hazard. Considering that the figure 6.3-6.5 are based on the 
historical settlement dates that actually experienced all the incomes policies, 
the wage levels depicted there are likely to be overstated. This is because the 
actual impact o f the incomes policies in altering the frequency o f wage changes 
are kept intact even in the simulation without any policies. In these figures, 
wage changes take place equally frequently throughout the sample period whether 
the policy is on or off. In general, the simulated wage level is much smoother 
when the timing is fixed. And the gap in the wage levels between policy-on and 
policy-off regimes is more uniform across episodes. When the tim ing is also 
simulated, their impact become more diverse since they now include the combined 
effect on the wage levels, that is, they are now additionally picking up the 
effect o f the changes in the frequency o f negotiations. According to them, cd5 
and cd6 had the largest combined impact in reducing the average wage levels, 
although, as we have seen, they have overstated the extent o f the actual effect.
Failure to correctly simulate the rate o f wage rise during the 70’s are seen 
in a ll the hazard specifications reported so far except for the static one. A t 
least, this implies that the identification problem regarding the pure duration 
dependence in the hazard specification is not responsible for this problem. What 
is, then, causing cd4, cd5 and cd6 to suppress the hazard too much? It may be 
that some factors that offset the negative impact o f the latter incomes policies 
on the frequency o f wage changes are being omitted from the hazard specification 
o f table 5.6, or that these policies did not have an uniform degree o f impact on 
the hazard throughout their policy period. The observation that the simulated 
policy-off locus is lower than the actual implies the strong possibility o f the
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former. In view o f this, we have additionally incorporated the log o f real wage 
level, which showed a sudden slight increase in the early 70, into the spell 
specific component and allowed the policy cd5 and cd6 to have separate effects 
on the hazard. However, the resulting simulated wage level has turned out to be 
hardly different.
6.2 .3 Conclusion
In order to investigate the impact o f the incomes policies more fu lly  on the 
dynamic system determining the timing and magnitude o f wage changes, we have 
experimented with the dynamic simulations.
As long as the specification for the hazard contains time varying 
covariates, a unique length o f a completed duration spell given its starting 
point cannot be determined by the hazard function. In a fu ll dynamic simulation, 
we need to simulate when the wage changes take place (i.e ., completed 
durations), since the rate o f wage change equation is conditioned on the timing 
o f the settlement and the average wage levels are simulated on the basis o f the 
wage equation.
In order to simulate the timing o f settlement, we approximated the 
continuous sequence o f decision making to take place monthly. Then, this problem 
reduces to a repeated monthly Bernoulli trials with the conditional probability 
to exit at the 5-th month o f the elapsed duration being (S(5-l)-S(5))/S(5-l), 
where S(.) denotes a survivor function which can be easily deduced from the 
hazard rate. Provided that the timing o f negotiation is simulated, the 
explanatory variables that determine the wages to be claimed at such simulated 
timing also become available. Thus, the wage levels can be simulated 
accordingly. The dynamic simulation done this way enables us to investigate the 
fu ll impact o f external influences, particularly o f incomes policies, on this 
system, particularly, on the timing and the magnitude o f wage changes.
The figures show lower negotiation probability during all the policy 
episodes with a possible exception o f cd4, which took effect right after the 
mandatory freeze policy, fd2. The first freeze policy, fd l, was found effective 
in reducing the frequency o f negotiation, thus, lowering the rate o f wage rise 
even amongst the non-enforced groups. Simulated wage levels, whether the timing 
is also simulated or not, were lower under all the policy episodes. In 
particular, the average wage level, simulated with the timing o f settlements 
fixed as in the data very closely replicated the actual wage level. Also, 
amongst the average simulated wages based on several specifications o f the wage 
and hazard equations, the most restrictive static specification o f the hazard
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estimated by the M LE replicated the ones closest to the actual levels. 
Nonetheless, we found that :(1) additionally simulating the tim ing o f wage 
changes enabled us to see the impact o f policies in suppressing or increasing 
the frequency o f wage changes and their resulting impact on the realized wage 
claim, (2) allowing the external influences to affect the hazard continuously 
throughout the spell enabled us to derive the instantaneous impact o f these 
variables, which were reflected in the simulated probability to negotiate in a 
way consistent with the data. The static representation failed to predict any 
effect o f the incomes policies on the negotiation probability. Hence, their 
simulated wage levels, even though they were closer to the actual average than 
those based on the time-varying hazard, was a result o f the simulated 
settlements taking place at random, since their timing was not affected by the 
external influences. In particular, our simulation succeeded in replicating most 
o f the average wage level prior to 1970, and the sudden increase in the 
negotiation probability in the aftermath o f fd2 and cd6, which led to a sharper 
increase in the wage level. However, the impact o f the latter ceiling policies, 
cd4, cd5 and cd6, in reducing the hazard rate was much too strongly simulated 
than their actual effect. This may be due to some omitted factors that induced 
more frequent settlements during the 70’s. A t least, the failure to allow for 
the pure duration dependence in our final specification o f the hazard is not 
responsible for this. Otherwise, the time varying covariates incorporated for 
the specification can be said to have adequately explained the dynamic 
dependence for much o f our sample period.
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Simulated average wage: fixed timing
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Simulated average wage: fixed timing
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting May 61, WC group (table 5.5)
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Simulated wage level 
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting May 61, WC group (table 5.6)
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Simulated wage level 
starting May 61, WC group (table 5.6)
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting May 68, WC group (table 5.5)
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Simulated wage level 
starting May 68, WC group (table 5.5)
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting May 68, WC group (table 5.6)
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Simulated wage level 
starting May 68, WC group (table 5.6)
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting Dec 65, WC group (table 5.5)
0.2 -
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08-
0.06- 6866 67 67 67 68 68 68 6966 66
w/ IP dummies  w/o IP dummies
Figure 6.14
Simulated wage level 
starting Dec 65, WC group (table 5.5)
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting Dec 65, WC group (table 5.6)
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Simulated wage level 
starting Dec 65, WC group (table 5.6)
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Simulated monthly conditional exit prob
starting Aug 60, WC group (table 6.4)
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Simulated monthly wage level 
starting Aug 60, WC group (table 6.4)
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Simulated average conditional exit prob
for all groups, based on table 5.5
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Simulated average wage for all groups 
based on table 5.5 and 5.9
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Simulated average conditional exit prob
for all groups, based on table 5.6
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Simulated average wage for all groups 
based on table 5.6 and 5.9
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Simulated average conditional exit prob
for all groups, based on table 6.4
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Simulated average wage for all groups 
based on table 6.4 and 5.9
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Simulated actual wage for all groups 
Weibull: a = 1 v s a = 2
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Simulated average conditional exit prob 
for all groups, based on table 5.7
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Simulated average wage for all groups
based on table 5.7 and 5.9
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Simulated average conditional exit prob 
for all groups, based on table7.4(MLE)
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Simulated average wage for all groups
based on table 7.4 and 5.9
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Figure 6.30
Simulated average wage for all groups 
table 6.4+5.9 vs table 5.6+5.9
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Footnote to chapter 6
1. First step heteroscedastic consistent estimates, t-ratio in parenthesis.
2. D R R ^ t 1) is based on information set available either at t *-3 or t ° .
3. Plot o f the estimated density function would be appropriate i f  plotting it  
against the elapsed duration. However, since the dynamically simulated 
durations corresponding to each point in calendar time largely vary, we plot 
the conditional monthly exit probability against the calendar time.
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Chapter 7: Comparison with the other estimation methods
7.1 In troduction
The paramount uniqueness o f the model discussed in chapter 4 and 5 is its 
capability in explaining both the timing and the degree o f negotiated wage 
changes simultaneously. The bargaining intervals and the negotiated wages are 
interrelated with each other in a sense that the wages to be negotiated depend 
on the length o f the contract just terminated and its tim ing. In explaining 
their interdependence, our model is able to incorporate not only the length o f 
the contract, but also the entire time path o f economic environment during such 
contract. In practice, a simultaneous model like ours becomes particularly 
useful in explaining any pairs o f variables bearing a similar relation where one 
measures an elapsed spell length while the other is observed at the end o f such 
spell, therefore, depends on the length and the tim ing o f spell termination.
Look at the figure below for a typical s-th duration for n-th cross-section 
group (ie. S ns)  which started at Tns-i and ended at Tns, calendar time. Let the 
corresponding measure be wage, wns, which is determined at the end o f sns, at
TA ns*
- cOn i
ca.l-e#\JLe,h - t i 'm e
' n,s~l Tns
(Figure 7.1)
The simultaneous relation is represented in terms o f a jo in t density function 
which can be decomposed into two components: the spell duration distribution and 
the conditional wage distribution, where the latter is conditioned on the entire 
history up to and including a termination point o f the current spell. This is to 
say that a size o f wage change is assumed to be determined after a decision to 
terminate a previous contract is made. Once the jo in t density is decomposed in 
this way, it is then possible to model and estimate them separately. The 
conditional wage distribution is represented in terms o f a linear wage equation 
where the explanatory variables include factors known at a time o f new 
negotiation, hence, its estimation becomes quite straightforward. On the other 
hand, the duration distribution is represented by the hazard rate which has one
261
to one relation with the duration density function. We have chosen the hazard 
rate for the analysis essentially because it is more intuitive compared to the 
the duration distribution itself. But the advantages o f using the duration 
analysis is far more than that. It can accommodate censored data, time-varying 
regressors, random heterogeneity, and moreover, can identify a form o f duration 
dependence. As one can imagine, different restrictions and assumptions over 
these complex issues yield different models, therefore different ways to 
estimate them. Obviously, the estimation techniques grow more complex as the 
model becomes more generalized and less restrictive. Essentially, estimation 
method varies according to the assumptions over how to deal with a time path o f 
the explanatory variables, the duration distribution (i.e., a form o f the 
baseline hazard) and the heterogeneity distribution.
In this chapter, we set forth several conventional methods o f estimating the 
hazard equation and actually estimate them using the same data set we have used 
for our model in the previous chapters. In the following section, we categorize 
these different estimation methods into three groups and discuss brie fly their 
pros and cons in general. They are then compared to the nonlinear instrumental 
variable estimates o f our dynamic hazard model. In section 7.3, the actual 
models to be estimated are described and their results discussed. Since most o f 
the existing studies have avoided the complication by fixing the values o f 
explanatory variables at the start o f a spell, we pay particular attention to 
the effect o f such variables being spell specific instead o f varying throughout 
the spell, and see how the direction o f duration dependence is affected by such 
restrictions. For this purpose, the time-varying covariates are not considered 
here.
7.2 Methods o f estim ation
We assume the proportionate hazard formulation throughout this chapter. For 
the s-th duration observation o f the n-th group, s™, observed at calendar time 
T n s - i + 5 n s ,  ^ e  most general hazard given the explanatory variables zns, the 
group-specific random heterogeneity un and the error term e is:
h(s I z u e  ) =  exp( r ’z +  u +  c ) h (Sm;a)ns ns n ns ns n ns U
h0 captures its dependence on time that is common to all groups, while the 
remaining part shifts the hazard for different negotiation groups for each 
observation. Followings are the estimation methods for the above hazard function 
most widely used in the conventional literature:
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(1) Linear regression
(2) Fully parametric maximum likelihood
(3) Partial likelihood/ semi-parametric maximum likelihood
Our methodology in chapter 5 and 6 can be regarded as a fam ily o f regression , 
models, though, these referred under (1) here are with a simple dependent 
variable such as a logarithm o f duration. Hence they cannot take into account o f 
the within spell varying regressors nor can it  identify a parameter o f duration 
dependence. As is the case in the dynamic method in chapter 5 and 6, censored 
data cannot be handled. On the other hand, the group or the spell specific 
random terms, and the possibility o f correlations between these terms and the 
explanatory variables can be straightforwardly incorporated. Its simplicity 
makes it  a valuable starting point before embarking on to more complicated 
estimations.
In our context o f multiple spell setting, the hazard is conditioned on its 
past history o f bargaining. Hence, the jo in t density for each duration is a 
product o f conditional densities each of which is conditioned on the unknown 
heterogeneity term, possibly, both group and spell specific. In order to adopt a 
maximum likelihood estimation (ie. (2)), it requires a multiple integration over 
such heterogeneity terms to derive the appropriate marginal likelihood. Hence, 
to estimate parametrically, we must assume distributional forms for a ll o f these 
random terms. However, not only w ill these assumptions be inevitably ad hoc, 
since the economic theory rarely predicts their forms, but also their 
computation o f the marginal distribution be complicated and d ifficu lt, 
particularly when both group and spell specific random terms are allowed. Also, 
the individual error term may not be independent but correlated with the lagged 
durations. Moreover, introduction o f time varying explanatory variables would 
further complicate such computation. One can, on the other hand, ignore the 
random terms and start o ff by introducing the time-varying covariates. But the 
ad hoc assumption over the parametric forms o f the baseline hazard s till has to 
be made, while, this time, the difficulty arises in identifying between the 
time-varying covariates and the pure duration dependence. The correctness o f the 
parametric assumptions is inherent problem with the parametric maximum 
likelihood which can be avoided, to a certain extent, by adopting the semi- 
parametric method.
Unlike (1) and (2), the partial likelihood method in (3) does not require 
any assumption over the form o f the baseline hazard since they cancels out in 
the process o f building a "partial” likelihood. This makes the method more
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robust to the specification error. However, it  cannot practically accommodate a 
random heterogeneity term and the inclusion o f time-varying covariates makes 
computation rather messy. The semi-parametric method, on the other hand, can 
handle the random heterogeneity rather easily. The semi-parametric method 
maintains the parametric forms of how the explanatory variables enter the hazard 
(i.e., exp(y’z)), while either the baseline hazard or the heterogeneity or both 
can be estimated non-parametrically. Essentially, they treat the mixing 
distribution or the baseline hazard as a step function and estimate the values 
o f their steps along with the structural parameters (ie. 7). In this case, the
baseline hazard estimator should ideally posses as many steps as there are
distinct duration observations, although this induces inefficiency as such 
number increases. For example, this may not be suitable for our sample which 
contains 118 distinct duration observations. In practice, a number o f steps to 
be estimated is allowed to be substantially smaller, but this time, the 
intervals between the steps and the number o f steps may become a source o f 
specification error. The random heterogeneity term, on the other hand, is 
considered estimable for up to 4 points o f increase, according to the Monte 
Carlo experiments (Heckman and Singer 1984). The same simulation results also 
suggest that such nonparametric mixing distribution is poorly estimated compared 
to the structural parameters. A t least, these estimators can be used to check 
the plausibility o f the structural parameter estimates o f the fu ll parametric 
model, although there is no formal test statistics to compare the two. In
practice, estimating the mixing distribution as well as the baseline hazard non- 
parametrically seems rather d ifficu lt (Meyer 1990). Moreover, they are not 
immune to the usual problem with the likelihood estimation o f a mixture model: 
sensitivity to the starting values and multiple local maxima. Nonetheless, these 
methods are important because o f their robustness to the specification errors, 
which too frequently overshadow the other estimation methods.
Considering the advantages and disadvantages o f the several estimation
methods discussed above, our methodology still bears the superior robustness in 
a sense that it  is free o f unnecessary assumptions over the random heterogeneity 
distributions both group and spell specific, and the duration distributions. It 
can also accommodate complications such as heterogeneity and time-varying 
explanatory variables in great ease. The latter is important since it  allows the 
spell length to be influenced by the events occurring at any time after a 
negotiation, hence the hazard is not only a function o f a duration but also o f 
the entire time path o f the explanatory variables during the course o f a spell. 
In this way, out model embodies a functional relation rather than a function.
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Furthermore, our regression format enables a simple test o f lagged duration 
dependence, since our model naturally incorporates a multiple spell nature o f 
our sample without having have to go through a complicated multiple integration 
to derive the marginal jo in t density. The drawbacks are the difficulties in 
identifying the pure duration dependence and in dealing with the time varying 
variables that are collinear with the elapsed durations during the spell. It is 
important to find some time varying explanatory variables that have sufficient 
variations across observations, yet posses a monotonic movement, so that they 
are identified to represent the underlying duration dependence. Censored 
duration observations are not considered and cannot be handled in our model. 
Nonetheless, for the purpose o f analyzing a jo in t determination o f a pair o f 
variables, this system o f the hazard and wage equation seems most adequate. The 
robust semi-parametric method, which estimates the baseline hazard and the 
heterogeneity non-parametrically, would be most compatible to our model in terms 
o f the robustness with respect to the specification errors, but its estimation 
is very complicated by itself, hence, w ill not be estimated here.
7.3 E stim ation
We have discussed the several different estimation methods, their like ly 
shortcomings, their a priori assumptions, and restrictions. In this section, we 
carry out the actual estimation and find out the effect o f the assumptions 
restricting each estimation method.
The explanatory variables used in the estimations hereafter are somewhat 
different from those used under our dynamic model in chapter 5 and 6, for they 
are constrained to be spell specific, so that they are not allowed to vary 
during the spell. The explanatory variables corresponding to each duration 
observations are those observed at the start o f a spell. We assume, unless 
stated otherwise, that each observation are homogeneous in the unconditional 
probability distribution over the duration times except for these covariates, 
zns, which is invariant within a spell. Hence, there is no random nor fixed 
unobservable factor that represents group specific effect upon pooling o f 
observations, and the group characteristics are assumed to be wholly captured by 
the Wage council, public sector dummies and the number o f trade unions involved. 
Other explanatory variables involve spell specific factors representing: real 
take home pay, employers capacity to pay, outside influence, incomes policy, and 
other influences such as the dummies for the staged settlement. Following lists 
are the specific variables representing above factors actually used in the 
estimation. For the incomes policy dummies, we lis t the criteria for which a
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value 1 is assigned. W refers to wages, R to retention ratio and P to retail 
price index.
(1) Group characteristic variables
WC =  1, i f  the group is in the Wages Council sector
Pub =  1, i f  the group is in the public sector
TU =  number o f trade unions involved in the negotiating group
Spell specific variables
(2) Real take home pay
lnrw =  log(W (Tns.1)R(Tns.1)/P(Tns.1)
D rw l =  W(Tns.1)R(Tns.1)P(Tns.2)/W (Tns.2)R(Tns.2)P(TnB.1) - 1
(3) Employer’s capacity to pay
lnprin =  log o f industry’s trading profit at Tns.t
(4) Outside influence
rel =  the ratio o f average UK earnings at time to the group’s 
wage, WCT^,) 
lnunin =  log o f industry specific unemployment rate
(5) Incomes policy 
Wage freeze
fd l = 1 ,  for public sector groups, i f  T ^ j^ J u l 1961 - Mar 1962) 
fd2 = 1 ,  i f  Tn^ € (M  1966 - Jun 1967)
Wage ceiling
cdl =  1, for public sector groups i f  T ^ ^ A p r  1962 - Mar 1963)
cd2 =  1, for public sector groups i f  Tns^ G(Apr 1963 - Apr 1985)
cd3 =  1, for public sector groups i f  Tns.j€(Apr 1965 - Jul 1966)
cd4 = 1 ,  i f  T^eCTul 1967 - Mar 1968)
cd5 = 1 ,  i f  T^eCM ar 1968 - Dec 1969) 
cd6 =  1, i f  Tns.j€(Jan 1970 - Jun 1970)
Twelve-months policy 
d l2  = 1 ,  i f  Tns.l€(Jul 1967 - Dec 1970)
(6) Other factors
size =  number o f workers covered by the n-th bargaining group as a 
proportion o f total UK employment at Tns-l 
staged =  1, i f  the wage increase at Tns.j is a part o f a staged settlement 
dfix =  1, i f  the date o f wage increase at is fixed in advance 
as part o f a staged settlement 
lagdur =  log o f previous duration, 6ns_j
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In the following sections, we present the methodology and the actual model to be 
estimated for each method introduced in a former section and discuss their 
estimation results.
7.3.1 Linear regression
First o f all, conduct a simple linear regression estimation. Assume a 
constant hazard function with a vector o f explanatory variables, zns, unique to 
the n,s-th observation so that: h(5ns|z) =  exp(zns’y). We are assuming also that 
these explanatory variables are time-invariant, hence, the hazard is fixed at 
any length o f elapsed duration given a set o f explanatory variables. The 
relationship between the hazard and the duration density is:
f5(t) =  h(t) (exp (- SlQ h(x) dx)) (7-3-1)
Transformation o f a variable from t to u where u =  -log(J* h(x)dx) gives a 
density o f the transformed variable as:
fu(u) =  exp(-u-exp(-u)) (7-3-2)
hence, u follows a type I  Extreme value distribution with mean 0(1) and variance 
0’ (1), where 0(£) is the digamma function: 0(£)=dlnr(£)/d£. In this special case 
o f a constant hazard with time-invariant explanatory variables, logt =  - r ’z -u, 
where u follows such an ancillary distribution which doesn’t depend on the value 
o f y1. Then, allowing a conventional spell specific random error term, vns, a 
linear regression model to be estimated is:
log S„s = **’z„s + (7-3-3)
where ens= -u -0 (l)+ vns, which is constructed to have a zero conditional mean. The 
estimated result is listed in Table (7.1). Note that variables that reduces
duration length on average increases the hazard (i.e., -y = r* ).
The overall f it o f the model is poor, but the directions to which the spell 
specific variables exert their effects on the hazard are rather similar to the 
dynamic model where (Table 5.6 or 5.4). Relative pay as well as the staged dummy 
exerts a strong shortening effect on the average durations. Staged settlement
with fixed date has significant net negative effect as predicted. Spells started 
during the incomes policy in general have a tendency to last longer with one 
significant exception o f fd j. Since the incomes policy dummies indicate their 
status at the start o f a spell and does not incorporate how long such policy
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have continued to last nor any possibility o f other policy taking place during 
the contract, comparing their estimated coefficients with those derived from the 
dynamic model can be misleading. We w ill talk about this later in the conclusion 
section. We find no evidence o f a strong lagged duration dependence. Puzzling 
effect o f the log o f real take home pay exists with a long run elasticity (-
0.377). It implies that the lower net real pay at the start o f the contract 
induces longer contract ceteris paribus, which is contradictory to the theory. 
Under this equation, it  is not possible to differentiate the unexpected from the 
expected real take home pay, and how these covariates evolved once a spell has 
started is ignored.
A natural extension o f the simple OLS estimates is the introduction o f a 
group-specific effect, un, which is easily introduced under this regression 
framework:
In sM =  r * ’zm +  u„ +  e„, (7-3-4)
Some groups are predisposed towards longer negotiation intervals than the others 
often in a way not totally explained by the observable factors such as a degree 
o f unionisation or a bargaining structure. Hence, it is important to allow for 
such a random group-specific effect although for other estimation methods, it  is 
not so easy to implement. To make the matter more complicated, the existing 
explanatory variables, zns, which include lagged dependent variable, is likely 
to be correlated with un in our context. In order to avoid making an ad hoc 
distributional assumption over such a random term, we have estimated the 
differenced equation by using the same set o f instruments as those in the 
dynamic hazard equation and achieve the consistent estimates (asymptotic is over 
the number o f cross section observations). Recall the argument in selecting the 
appropriate set o f instruments: a timing o f observation at Tns_j is endogenous 
to ensl (one o f the error component in a differenced equation), and the 
exogenous variables observed at the endogenous timing should be treated as 
endogenous, therefore not suitable as instruments. The result is shown in Table 
(7.2). The estimated effects o f the time-varying covariates are quite different 
from Table (7.1). In addition to the increase in efficiency, a strong positive 
lagged duration dependence and the significant and positive effect o f the real 
take home pay at the start o f the spell are observed. Relative wage still has a 
highly significant positive effect and F d l at Tns l no longer shortens the 
contract that followed. However, the Sargan’s test statistic barely satisfies 5%
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critical level for the correct specification. In particular, their strong effect 
o f relative wages, overall incomes policies, and lagged positive duration 
dependence are all commonly observed with the estimates from the dynamic model. 
They both allow for a random spell specific as well as a group specific error 
term but no direct duration dependence. In the dynamic constant hazard 
specification, the hazard was allowed to vary with the passage o f time through 
the time-varying explanatory variables. Here, a ll the variables are measured at 
the start o f a spell, including Lnrw which should have a tendency to prolong a 
spell, ceteris paribus.
7.3.2 Parametric maximum like lihood
Under this estimation method, a parametric likelihood function for each 
observation is required which is then maximized with respect to the unknown 
parameters. This means that the complete parametric form o f density function has 
to be assumed i f  not known a priori.
As before, we assume the proportionate hazard formulation: h(t,z) =  
exp(znsV ) hQ(t;a). Using the relationship between the hazard and the duration
distribution, we derive the likelihood for the n,s-th duration observation as: 
fs (« J =  exp(zM»  h0 exp[-exp(zM’r )  ho dt) j (7-3-5)
Elements o f the vector z are those known at T ^  (ie. start o f the n,s-th 
spell), and their paths during the spell are considered invariant.
There are several choices one can adopt for the parametric form, ho, which 
has to be somewhat arbitrarily determined to carry out the parametric M L 
estimation. The exponential duration distribution, h0= l,  is equivalent to the 
constant hazard where the hazard is fixed throughout the spell but its level is 
determined entirely by the covariates, z. This was also the case in the simple 
regression models o f the former section. Then the log likelihood is:
L  =  ? ? t - exp(zM’r)  sm ] (7-3-6)
Assumption o f the constant hazard is obviously too restrictive, a ll the more 
since the covariates which are in fact varying continuously are considered fixed 
during the spell. A monotonic duration dependence can be incorporated by
assuming the Weibull duration distribution, h0 =  a  ta_1, which nest the 
exponential case when a = l. For a >  1, the hazard is monotonically increasing. This 
parameter cannot be identified when a regression method such as those described
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in the former section is used. For now, neither o f these allow for a group nor a 
spell specific random error term. With the Weibull assumption, the likelihood 
becomes:
L  =  Z I  [ Zm'f +  toga + (a -l) logs^ - exp(z,„V) 5®. (7-3-7)
The resulting estimates o f the exponential and the W eibull duration distribution 
models are listed in Table (7.3) and (7.4), respectively. The estimated 
coefficients o f the exponential hazard specification, Table (7.3), although very 
poorly estimated, strongly resemble that o f the OLS estimates, Table (7.1). The 
latter does not allow for a random group specific term but a spell specific 
error term, while the former allows none. Note that their coefficients should be 
opposite in signs to imply the same direction o f effects. Most remarkable 
feature o f Table (7.3) is its strong positive duration dependence identified by 
a=2.68, although the overall effect o f other variables, particularly o f those 
significant, have remained rather similar in all three cases (ie. simple OLS, 
exponential M LE and Weibull MLE). Note also that under the W eibull baseline 
hazard, the direct effect o f z on the log o f duration is represented by r/a  
rather than r  alone. Compared to the exponential M LE, the coefficients are more 
precisely estimated, and the major determinants are found to be staged, dfix, 
lnunin, WC and the incomes policies fd l, cd3 and cd4. F d l is the only incomes 
policy which gives a tendency to shorten a spell length on average. This finding 
was consistent in a ll three specifications, where its immediate effect on log 
duration is 2.1177/2.679 =0.79 in the Weibull MLE, 0.697 in the exponential M LE 
and 0.567 in the OLS.
In the dynamic specification, explanatory variables were allowed to vary 
throughout the spell, amongst which the unexpected real take home pay, industry 
unemployment and most o f the incomes policy variables gave particularly strong 
push towards ending the contract spell. Having taken into account o f the time- 
varying economic environment, the average hazard computed at the completed 
duration observation was shown to decline, at least up to 2 years, with 
duration. Nonetheless, the way the hazard varies over time depended hugely on 
the time-path o f covariates. Under the current specification, the way the hazard 
varies over time is solely determined by the W eibull duration distribution, a 
monotonic relation with the elapsed duration. Considering it  was mainly the time 
path o f variables after the negotiation that contributed in raising the hazard 
as the spell lengthened, it is likely that their omission creates a bias 
particularly in a direction o f duration dependence. Look at figure 5.19 which
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plots average estimated hazard against the elapsed durations in months. This is 
based on the result o f Table 6.2.4, the Weibull duration distribution without 
heterogeneity. Dotted lines are the interpolated locus o f average estimated 
hazard, since there is no observation corresponding to some o f the longer 
duration length. The figure suggests an overall positive duration dependence. 
Also, the average estimated density o f duration in fig  5.20 depicts a very 
plausible peak at around 9-15 months, as suggested by the data. Comparing this 
to the figure 5.17, for example, which shows decreasing estimated average pdf at 
the completed duration observations, it  may seem that the specification o f the 
dynamic hazard model is unreasonable. The result o f dynamic simulations reported 
in chapter 6.2, however, captures the incomes policy effect on the exit 
probability (ie. negotiation probability) far more responsively and reasonably 
than the prediction based on the Weibull duration distribution. The simulated 
exit probabilities based on the result o f the MLE with Weibull are broadly 
invariant throughout the sample period, irrespective o f the presence o f incomes 
policy. Hence, their simulated wage levels are the result o f settlements taking 
place almost randomly, with no clear impact o f the policies on the tim ing o f 
wage changes.
Apart from the potential misspecification caused by treating all the 
covariates as fixed, MLE estimates reported in Table (7.4) are liable to 
heterogeneity bias since the likelihood function (7-3-7) did not take into 
account o f a term representing omitted spell specific attributes. As far as the 
finding o f a positive duration dependence in Table (7.4) is concerned, however, 
the omitted heterogeneity, even i f  existed, would have given a downward bias to
a (Lancaster (1979)). I f  anything, the positive duration dependence is would 
only be strengthened.
Nonetheless, let us see what happens with the inclusion o f such 
heterogeneity term in this formulation. First, we introduce a multiplicative 
heterogeneity term, jli, in the hazard, so that:
h„s =  exp(znsV) h(, n
Allowing for such factor again requires an ad-hoc parametric assumption for its 
distribution, which, for the sake o f convenience, is considered to follow  the
Gamma with an unit mean and variance, <r2. Then, its distribution (ie. the mixing 
distribution), f(n), is:
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y w  = V? 1 exp(-fi <r'2) <r'2 (7-3-8)
In order to derive the unconditional distribution o f the duration, which is what 
we observe, it is necessary to integrate out for u, so that:
f ( 5 n s l Z J  =  f ( 5 n s l Z n s ^ )  f ^ )  dfl (7-3-9)
0
Solving a differential equation after integrating by parts yields:
ho [1 +  ez»r  (7-3-10)
Our data only contains the completed spells, hence, the log likelihood to be 
maximized is simply:
N S n
z z In f(5 I z )n=l S=1 ns I
where f(6ns | zng) takes a form o f equation (7-3-10). In table (7.5), we show the 
resulting estimates o f the Weibull hazard with Gamma mixing distribution. This 
time, the log likelihood to be maximized is:
*
log L  =  ZZ {  z j r  +log(a) +  (a-l)log(5ns) +  (-<r'2-l) lo g (l +<r2 e2"8*  s“ s) }
(7-3-11)
As expected, a duration dependence parameter has increased, probably due to the 
significant heterogeneity term which was omitted in the previous model. 
Estimates o f the structural parameters and their significance have not changed 
much, which should be the case i f  the covariates are independent o f the omitted 
regressors. Apart from the heterogeneity variance and the duration dependence, 
major determinants are again, staged, dfix, Inunin, fd l, fd2, cd3, cd4 and the 
wages council dummy. Significance o f the spell specific random error term is 
clearly seen, but the group specific random term is still not accounted for in 
this formulation.
A t this point, with a spell-specific heterogeneity and a monotonic duration 
dependence allowed for, the static impact on log duration o f potentially time- 
varying covariates (which are constrained to be fixed here) as well as the 
spell-specific covariates differ significantly from the dynamic results stated 
in table 5.6, or even with table 5.7 which assumes W eibull duration distribution
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with a=2. It is hard to see i f  their differences are due to time-invariance o f 
the covariates, lack o f group-specific random terms or the misspecification o f 
duration and/or mixing distributions. For example, starting a spell w ith staged, 
fixed settlement significantly shortens the contract duration on average in the 
M LE as much as 45% in MLE with Gamma heterogeneity-Weibull specification, 14% 
with W eibull specification. However, under the dynamic specification o f chapter 
5 (table 5.6), starting the contract with the staged settlement does shorten the 
contract by 41% but i f  its date is also fixed, it actually increases the 
contract length by 22%. The impact o f the staged variable in the formulation o f 
tables 7.3-7.6 may include the random group specific effect, since the 
lengthening effect o f the staged dummies are also seen in table 7.2, which is 
the only model with the group specific random effect.
7.3.3 P a rtia l L ike lihood
Partial likelihood is a semi-parametric method in a sense that no parametric 
assumption needs to be made over a form o f the baseline hazard since it  cancels 
out as we write the "partial" sample likelihood. Here, we only utilize rank 
information on the duration observations in order to derive the inference on the 
structural parameters for given values o f covariates. Each element o f the 
partial likelihood represents a conditional probability that j-th  spell ends at 
a certain duration, say t, given all the other observations which is at least as 
long as t. This conditional probability can be written in terms o f the hazard 
as: h (t|x :(t))/E  h (t|xk(t)), which, in case o f the proportional hazard,
kGRt
b eco m es: exp (X j(t)r )/k|^ e x p ( x k(t)r ) , w h ere  is  th e  r isk  set ju s t  p r io r  to  the
spell length, t. The risk set at t, R*, contains all the observations w ith spell 
length o f at least t. Log likelihood to be maximized for a set o f observations
N
(Xj,tj) where j  =  1....M  and M  = ZjSn, is:
where n represents a number o f distinct duration observations in a sample. The 
second summation over j  accommodates a possibility o f ties in the observation, 
in which case, there exists more than one j  with a duration observation with 
length tj. Our sample has 118 distinct duration lengths out o f 850 total 
observations. Estimation is carried out using the survival analysis routine o f 
the LIMDEP programming package and is listed in Table (7.6).
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Results are strikingly similar to Table (7.5) or (7.4). Considering that the 
partial likelihood is immune to the specification error involved in the baseline 
hazard, this may imply the appropriateness o f the W eibull assumption, in 
particular, o f the monotonic increasing duration dependence. Moreover, since the 
heterogeneity term in the MLE with the Weibull distribution specification only 
affected the parameter estimates o f the duration dependence but not the other 
structural parameters, it seems that these partial likelihood estimates are not 
affected much by its omission o f the spell specific heterogeneity term. 
Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility of: (1) duration dependence 
being produced prim arily via the movement o f time-varying covariates rather than 
the elapsed duration itself, (2) the significant omitted group specific effect 
that is creating bias in the structural parameters. What we seem to know 
instead, is that given the static covariates and no other group effect, the
W eibull duration distribution is, after all, not a bad approximation.
7.4 Conclusion
The estimation o f the static hazard models have, not surprisingly, revealed 
very different effect o f the start-of-a-spell covariates as compared to their 
continuous counterparts. We have found the significantly increasing hazard 
overtime as well as the significant spell specific random heterogeneity factor. 
Starting with the OLS estimation o f log durations, we have gradually generalized 
a model by introducing (1) the Weibull duration distribution, (2) the Gamma 
heterogeneity, and finally, (3) adopting partial likelihood thereby dropping an 
ad hoc assumption over the duration dependence. The structural parameter 
estimates are mostly consistent throughout these models, in particular, there 
seems to be a strong spell specific random factor and the positive duration 
dependence. Moreover, the assumption o f the W eibull monotonic duration 
dependence assumed in the parametric M LE is supported by the result o f the 
partial likelihood estimation, although this is still within the framework o f 
the time-invariant covariates with no group-specific random factors. Major 
influences are as follows: 1% rise in the industry unemployment at the start o f 
the spell shortens duration by 0.08%, the planned staged negotiation shortens 
the following contract length by as much as 45%. Most effective incomes policies 
are fd l, cd3 and cd4, with their immediate effect being 76% increase for the fd l
and 24% decline for either cd3 or cd4 on average duration. These figures are
very different from the estimates derived from the dynamic hazard formulation o f 
chapter 5.
These static models have revealed monotonically increasing hazard for all
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the duration observations. On the other hand, the dynamic models o f the former 
chapters resulted in the hazard whose movement is largely affected by the time 
path o f the explanatory variables during the spell. Whether this seemingly 
monotonic hazard is in fact generated via the movement o f covariates overtime is 
never made clear under these static models. As a consequence, the effect o f the 
spell specific structural parameters become biased. The implications o f the time 
varying covariates can differ enormously whether it  is the impact o f their 
entire time path during the spell or their values at particular point in time. 
For example, consider the incomes policy dummies. The static model represents 
the effect on the termination probability o f a contract which is started o ff 
during the policy-on period. On the other hand, the dynamic model depicts the 
instantaneous effect o f the policy status any time during the contract. Hence, 
the latter takes into account o f the timing o f events that occur after the 
negotiation, such as a policy’s termination or an introduction o f another 
policy, while the former gives information o f policy on/off at only one point, 
namely, at the start o f the observed spell. For instance, the freeze policy, 
fd l, is considered successful towards the non-private sector groups for the 
first half o f the policy period, namely, between July 61 and Jan 62. But a month 
prior to the end o f the policy some groups started having wage rises. Then, as 
soon as it  terminated, most o f these groups enjoyed another wage rises together 
with many other groups who kept oath during the policy. As a result, those who 
had their wage rises during the fd l had them towards the end o f such policy and 
it was not long before they had another one. This has been reflected in the 
positive impact o f fd l on the hazard in the static model. The truth o f a matter, 
however, is that the policy was unsuccessful only during the latter part o f the 
policy period. Its overall impact on the hazard is likely to be ambiguous as we 
have found from the result o f the dynamic specification model. In this sense, 
the static effect o f the policy status at the beginning o f a spell on the hazard 
can be largely misleading.
There seems to be another source o f bias coming from a misspecification o f 
the model, namely, the omission o f a group specific random effect. A  marked 
departure o f the IV  estimates on the differenced duration equation, which was 
the only equation with both group and spell specific random terms (ie. Table 
7.2), from the other models calls for the significance o f the group specific 
random effect that should not be ignored. In theory, existence o f such effect is 
justified strongly. This brings about another complexity in the estimation 
procedure since the lagged durations and wage changes w ill not be independent o f 
such group-specific effect. Unlike the maximum likelihood or any other
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parametric estimation methods, the regression format used in chapter 5 and Table
7.2 is particularly useful in dealing with this problem.
(Table 7.1)
Estimation o f the duration equation2 
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
d ep en d en t var iab le  : lo g (5  )
ns
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
spell specific variables
!"(« .)ns-1 -0.007 0.20
drw l -0.986 1.58
staged -0.454 5.04
dfix 0.380 3.58
lnrw -0.380 2.43
rel -0.721 3.69
lnunin -0.060 1.60
lnprin 0.042 1.39
size -14.19 0.87
fd , -0.567 3.59
fda 0.310 3.61
cdj 0.120 1.16
0.206 1.49
^ 3 0.286 2.18
Cd4 0.268 2.64
cd5+cdg 0.094 0.99
d 12 0.052 0.46
group-specific effects
constant 0.326 0.18
W council 0.145 2.37
Public -0.048 0.31
TU -0.032 1.93
N  =  61; E Sn=  850; adjusted R-sq =  0.169; D-W st =  2.018
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(Table 7.2)
Estimation of the duration equation3
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
dependent variable : log(5ns)
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
spell specific variables
ln(s )
v ns-r
drw l
-0.193 7.07
-0.287 0.60
staged -0.120 0.90
dfix 0.467 4.54
lnrw 2.498 2.55
rel -2.989 12.60
lnunin 0.133 2.97
lnprin -0.534 1.77
size 208.649 2.66
fd ,
fd2
0.498 2.08
0.564 3.08
cd. 0.304 2.02
0.669 4.95
0.139 1.62
«14 0.256 3.10
cd5+cdg 0.510 6.46
dtl2 -0.150 1.94
N =  61; z S =  850; Sargan’s test =  49.570; p-value=0.066 
Rssq =  0.848
group-specific effects
constant 27.113
W council 0.782 
Public -0.949
TU -0.060
68.38
2.50
0.74
0.47
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(Table 7.3)
Estimation of the duration equation4
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
dependent variable : log(5ns)
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
spell specific variables
ln(3 )
V ns-r
drw l
0.016 0.09
-0.091 0.03
staged 0.351 1.36
dfix -0.222 0.56
lnrw 0.380 0.30
rel 0.413 0.54
lnunin 0.069 0.36
lnprin -0.230 0.18
size 2.753 0.05
fd , 0.697 0.35
-0.218 0.28
cdj -0.122 0.30
Cd2
-0.148 0.36
^ 3
-0.253 0.51
Cd4 -0.243 0.39
cdf +cd6 -0.069 0.13
d l2 0.024 0.05
: S =  850; log likelihood =  -4252.3
group-specific effects
constant -2.361 0.30
W council -0.165 0.55
Public 0.027 0.04
TU 0.023 0.25
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(Table 7.4)
Estimation of the duration equation5
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
dependent variable : log(<5 )
ns
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
spell specific variables
1-1(3 .)ns-i 0.054 0.82
drw l 1.249 1.35
staged 0.754 5.41
dfix -0.379 2.06
lnrw 0.594 1.24
rel 0.415 1.37
lnunin 0.242 3.61
lnprin -0.066 1.20
size -21.52 0.67
fd. 2.118 5.90
-0.429 2.64
cd. -0.675 1.84
cd2 -0.739 1.38
cd -0.595 3.37
-0.705 3.92
cd5+cdg -0.178 1.21
d l2 0.231 1.46
a 2.679 28.99
S =  850; log L  =  -3825,.0
group-specific effects
constant -8.285 2.70
W council -0.459 4.36
Public 0.056 0.23
TU 0.032 0.98
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(Table 7.5)
Estimation of the duration equation6
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
d ep en d en t var iab le  : lo g (5  )
ns
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
spell specific variables
0.056 0.71
drw l 1.142 1.06
staged 0.893 5.04
dfix 0.478 2.18
lnrw 0.714 1.33
rel 0.786 1.95
lnunin 0.236 2.91
lnprin -0.067 1.09
size -11.23 0.31
fd, 2.304 5.10
fd2 -0.546 2.70
cdj -0.273 0.67
cd2 -0.284 0.70
cd3 -0.729 3.29
cd4 -0.739 3.40
cd5+cd6 -0.154 0.89
d l2 0.166 0.87
a 3.028 16.16
sigma 0.425 4.94
N =  61; z S =  850; log L  = -3816.5
n
group-specific effects
constant -9.462 2.69
W council -0.522 4.13
Public 0.017 0.06
TU 0.057 1.55
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(Table 7.6)
Estimation of the duration equation7
(unskilled males; manufacturing and construction ind)
dependent variable : lo g ^ )
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
spell specific variables
0.073 1.03
D rw l 2.285 2.14
staged 0.758 6.06
dfix -0.370 2.15
lnrw 0.552 1.09
rel 0.645 2.07
lnunin 0.263 3.55
lnprin -0.089 1.66
size -19.87 0.81
fd , 2.334 4.44
-0.411 1.78
cd1 -0.175 0.85
Cd2 -0.199 0.84
Cd3 -0.624 3.09
Cd4 -0.771 3.42
cd5+cdg -0.162 0.83
d l2 0.253 1.26
: S =  850;n log L  = -4820.,4
group-specific effects
W council -0.521 4.30
Public 0.009 0.04
T Union 0.041 1.23
Footnotes to chapter 7
1. Although it depends on the correctness o f the formulation for the hazard from 
which this transformation originated.
2. Ordinary Least square estimation. White’s heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors reported.
3. Instrumental fixed effect estimation (differenced) using the same set o f IV  
used to estimate the dynamic hazard function. 2nd step estimates reported.
4. Maximum likelihood estimation, exponential duration dependence assumed.
5. Maximum likelihood estimation, Weibull duration distribution assumed so that:
ho =  a  t a -*
6. Maximum likelihood estimation, Weibull hazard with Gamma heterogeneity.
7. Partial likelihood estimation.
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